Opinion
5:21-CV-01277 (TJM/TWD)
04-22-2022
JOHNNY WILLIAM BOYDE, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH E. FAHEY, Defendant.
Johnny William Boyde Plaintiff, pro se
Johnny William Boyde Plaintiff, pro se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On December 1, 2021, Johnny William Boyde (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint asserting three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Joseph E. Fahey (“Defendant”), a retired Onondaga County Court Judge. (Dkt. No. 1.) The undersigned granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) for purposes of initial review and recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 5.) District Judge Thomas J. McAvoy adopted the recommendation, and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint along with a motion to proceed IFP. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, 10.) Judge McAvoy referred the motion and the Amended Complaint to the undersigned. (Dkt. No. 10 at 2.) For the following reasons, the IFP motion is GRANTED (Dkt. No. 7), and the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Court DISMISS the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
I. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Upon review, Plaintiff has submitted a completed and signed IFP Application, which demonstrates economic need. (Dkt. No. 7.) Plaintiff has also filed the inmate authorization form required in this District. (Dkt. No. 3; see N.D.N.Y. L.R. 5.1.4(b)(1)(B).) Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP is granted for purposes of this initial review.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard
This Court must conduct an initial review of complaints filed in forma pauperis, and “complaints in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (governing complaints filed in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (governing complaints filed by prisoners against the government). When reviewing these types of complaints, this Court must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (applying Section 1915(e)(2)(B)); Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying Section 1915A).
Plaintiff is a “prisoner” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (See Dkt. No. 8 at 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) (defining “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”).)
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
This Court must exercise caution when determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a pro se complaint on the grounds that it is frivolous. See Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983). “An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). “A claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Id.
When undertaking this initial review, the Court must construe pro se pleadings with the utmost leniency. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement of the claim must be “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The statement of the claim must do more than present “an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. It must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
B. The Amended Complaint Should be Dismissed
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed because the asserted claims are frivolous, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and the Defendant is immune from suits brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). First, the asserted claims are frivolous because they lack an arguable basis in law. See Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. Construing Plaintiff's pro se Amended Complaint liberally, Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 191, the undersigned concludes Plaintiff advances three claims against retired Onondaga County Court Judge Joseph E. Fahey under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Dkt. Nos. 8, 8-1.) However, none of those claims advance a plausible, recognized, or meritorious legal theory. (See Dkt. No. 8-1 at 5-9.) Through his first claim, Plaintiff asserts Defendant wrongfully adjudicated his New York State criminal case from 2010 to 2015. Id. at 5-6. Through his second claim, Plaintiff asserts he submitted documents related to that criminal case to this Court. Id. at 6-7. Through his third and final claim, Plaintiff asserts he is entitled to several forms of relief. Id. at 8-9. These claims are frivolous because they lack an arguable basis in law. See Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. They should accordingly be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and Section 1915A(b)(1). See id.
Second, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). “To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and (2) that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state law.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). Yet, Plaintiff failed to adequately allege what right or rights Defendant violated, how the Defendant violated his rights, when the Defendant violated his rights, and that Defendant was acting under color of state law during the relevant time. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.) In other words, the Amended Complaint lacks specific allegations about who did what, when they did it, and how their action or inaction caused Plaintiff's injury. See id.; see, e.g., Perez v. Colon, No. 9:19-CV-0722 (BKS), 2019 WL 5102612, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019) (“In the absence of factual allegations sufficient to plausibly suggest that the defendant was personally involved in conduct that violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against him/her.”); Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F.Supp.3d 578, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Pleadings that do not differentiate which defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.”) (collecting cases). Absent these specific allegations, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Velez, 401 F.3d at 84. It also fails to give the Defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Amended Complaint should accordingly be dismissed pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Section 1915A(b)(1). See Perez, 2019 WL 5102612, at *6.
Third, the Defendant is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). Although the allegations in the Amended Complaint do not clarify the context of Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff appears to complain of Defendant's conduct while he was an Onondaga County Court Judge. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.) Claims against judges are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); see, e.g., Hardy-Graham v. Southampton Just. Ct., No. 20-CV-0981(JS) (SIL), 2021 WL 260102, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021) (dismissing claims against a New York State court judge on initial review because of judicial immunity); United States v. Bommer, No. 1:19-CV-00823 (EAW), 2020 WL 1963159, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2020) (same). The Amended Complaint should accordingly be dismissed under Section 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii) and Section 1915A(b)(2). See Hardy-Graham, 2021 WL 260102, at *5.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without leave to amend. Typically, a court should not dismiss a pro se litigant's complaint without granting leave to amend “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-705 (2d Cir. 1991). In this case, however, because Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to amend and additional amendment is unlikely to cure the substantive hurdles in his claims, the undersigned recommends dismissing this action without further leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Animashaun v. Schmidt, No. 17-CV-3026 (KAM), 2017 WL 4863083, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2017) (dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) “because amendment would be futile.”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs IFP Application (Dkt. No. 7) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).