Opinion
21-cv-01277-TJM
12-21-2021
JOHNNY WILLIAM BOYDE, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH E. FAHEY, Defendant.
Johnny William Boyde Plaintiff, pro se 07001284
Johnny William Boyde Plaintiff, pro se 07001284
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a pro se civil rights complaint filed by Johnny William Boyde (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983”) against Joseph E. Fahey, a retired Onondaga County Court Judge. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff, who is presently incarcerated, has not paid the filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). (Dkt. No. 2.)
I. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Upon review, Plaintiff has submitted a completed and signed IFP Application, which demonstrates economic need. (Dkt. No. 2.) Plaintiff has also filed the inmate authorization form required in this District. (Dkt. No. 3.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's IFP Application is granted.
Section 1915 permits “an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 09-CV-1922, 2010 WL 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). “Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee, to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010)). The current filing fee for a civil complaint is $350.00. Additionally, although his IFP Application has been granted, Plaintiff will still be required to pay additional fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
Under Section 1915(e), the district court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, under Section 1915A, a district court must review any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As used in this Section, the term “prisoner” means “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c).
To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation.” Id. Thus, a pleading that contains only allegations which “are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” is subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, “the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
A pro se litigant's pleadings are held to a less strict standard than attorney drafted pleadings. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”). However, this “does not exempt a [pro se litigant] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 Civ. 4768, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, No. 95-CV-0063 (TJM), 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 1995) (other citations omitted)). Although “[n]o technical form is required, ” the Federal Rules make clear that each allegation contained in the pleading “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d). Further, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules provides in pertinent part that:
A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by No. to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence - and each defense other than a denial - must be stated in a separate count or defense.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). This serves the purpose of “provid[ing] an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Although extreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and the parties have had an opportunity to respond, Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that a district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous). “An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Here, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the undersigned construes his pleadings “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, the Court recommends dismissal because the complaint fails to state a plausible claim.
Although Plaintiff has utilized the pro forma complaint for a pro se civil rights action under Section 1983, he sets forth no facts in the body of the complaint and instead instructs the Court to “See Attached Exhibit A Memorandum and/or Order.” Id. at 4. In turn, Exhibit A is a copy of an “Opinion” from an “Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered February 15, 2011.” Id. at 5-7.
Page references to documents identified by docket No. are to the page No. assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office.
It appears Exhibit A is a copy of People v. Boyde, 122 A.D.3d 1302, 995 N.Y.S.2d 428 (4th Dep't 2014). (Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7.)
As to the Statement of Claims, Plaintiff lists: (1) Fourth, Fourteenth Constitutional Amendments; (2) Illegal Sentence, Reversal/Vacate, Whatever the Court Deem Just Proper; (2) False Arrest, Illegal Imprisonment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Whatever the Court Deem Just/Proper. Id. at 8. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $300,000. Id.
In short, Plaintiff's complaint fails to provide sufficient information for the Court to review or for the defendant to have notice of the claims asserted against him. For example, Plaintiff has not included any dates, locations, or explained how the defendant was involved in any wrongdoing. Also problematic is that the complaint is brought against a retired Onondaga County Court Judge. Id. at 2. While Plaintiff's claims are not clear to the Court, the “Opinion” attached as Exhibit A to the complaint states, in part:
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered February 15, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual abuse in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child.
It is hereby order that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice and on the law, the plea is vacated, and the matter is remitted to Onondaga County Court for further proceedings on the indictment.(Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Thus, it seems logical that Plaintiff is complaining of wrongdoing in connection with that criminal proceeding. However, judges are immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This is true however erroneous an act may have been, and however injurious its consequences were to the plaintiff. Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”). This immunity applies to state court judges who are sued in federal court pursuant to Section 1983. Pizzolato v. Baer, 551 F.Supp. 355, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Pizzolato v. City of New York, 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).
Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). The only two circumstances in which judicial immunity does not apply is when he or she acts “outside” his or her judicial capacity and when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Again, while not entirely clear, to the extent Plaintiff complains of any wrongdoing related to a criminal proceeding in Onondaga County Court, Judge Fahey would be entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Moreover, the statute of limitations for claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 is three years; thus, any claims arising out of events that occurred in Onondaga County Court in 2011 are likely time-barred.
Considering the foregoing, the Court recommends dismissing the complaint pursuant to Section 1915(e) and Section 1915A. In this case, it is not clear whether better pleading would permit Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies identified above. Nevertheless, out of deference to Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court also recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint.
Specifically, any amended complaint must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules. Any such amended complaint must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. See Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Any such amended complaint will replace the existing complaint and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. City Trust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED solely for purposes of initial review; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
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