Reider , 514 A.2d at 971, 972 n.4. Thus, under our precedent, both ex post facto claims and due process challenges may be raised in a mandamus action. See also Boyd v. Ward , 802 A.2d 705, 708 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (denying the Board's preliminary objections to a due process claim brought in mandamus); Voss v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 788 A.2d 1107, 1111 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (same). 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 101 -754.

Thus, Petitioners seek mandamus to compel the Board to provide written reasons for its home plan denials in accordance with its statutory duties. This Court accepted a claim analogous to that raised by Petitioners in Boyd v. Ward, 802 A.2d 705 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). There, we considered whether the Board complied with its statutory mandates when issuing a decision to deny an inmate parole.

The reasons provided by the Board in their decisions are not so egregious or so outrageous to "shock the conscience." We find that the reasons stated satisfy the minimal standard set forth in Boyd v. Ward, 802 A.2d 705 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) and Voss v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 788 A.2d 1107 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). Denying Gibbs parole based on the parole board's stated reasons, do not create a substantive due process violation.

See 61 Pa. CS. §6135. In the instant case, the reasons provided by the Board in the decision rendered on January 23, 2014 satisfy the minimal standard set forth in Boyd v. Ward, 802 A.2d 705 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) and Voss v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 788 A.2d 1107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Denying Petitioner parole based on his risk and needs assessment, his prior unsatisfactory parole supervision history, and the negative recommendation of the prosecuting attorney does not "shock the conscience" and, as such, does not constitute a substantive due process violation.

SeeUnited States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F.Supp. 354 (E.D.Penn. 1973) (holding that a prisoner was entitled to a statement of reasons for parole denial so that he could "appropriately adjust his future conduct."); U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, N.Y. State Board of Parole, 363 F.Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); Boyd v. Ward, 802 A.2d 705, 708 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002) (Board of Probation and Parole's parole denial decision reading "the fair administration of justice cannot be achieved through [inmate's] release on parole," without detailing reasons for denial, did not meet minimal written rationale requirements of parole statute mandating the filing of brief statement of reasons for the Board's action); In re Sturm, 11 Cal.3d 258, n. 14 (Cal.Sup. 1974) (due process requires that the Authority support its determinations with a statement of its reasons therefor.); Monks v. N.J. State Parole Board, 71), 277 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1971) (reasons must accompany a parole denial to insure a "responsible and just determination and `a proper basis for effective judicial review.")

P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 669 A.2d 1105 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996). See also Boyd v. Ward, 802 A.2d 705 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002); Ridge v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 690 A.2d 1312 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1997). The Court referred to standards for evaluating constitutional issues not previously decided, see Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427 (1999), and it referred to the rules of statutory construction that technical words shall be interpreted according to their peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition, Section 1903 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903, and that the legislature intended every word, sentence or provision of a statute to be given effect and intended different meanings when enacting two separate provisions at the same time.

P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 669 A.2d 1105 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996). Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party by refusing to sustain the preliminary objections. Boyd v. Ward, 802 A.2d 705 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002). When the motion is in the nature of a demurrer, all of the non-moving party's well-pleaded averments in the complaint must be viewed as true, and only those facts specifically admitted may be considered against the non-moving party.

The majority concludes that Evans does not have a liberty interest in the expectation of release on parole prior to the expiration of his maximum sentence. However, in Voss and in Boyd v. Ward, 802 A.2d 705 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 813 A.2d 844 (2002), this court held that the PBPP's decision denying parole must meet the requirements of due process. In other words, Evans does have a liberty interest in the expectation of being considered for parole in a manner that complies with the requirements of due process.