Opinion
# 2017-050-046 Claim No. 126585 Motion No. M-90398 Cross-Motion No. CM-90669
09-29-2017
RICHARD BOYD AND BELINDA BOYD v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Seiden & Kaufman, Esq. By: Steven J. Seiden, Esq. Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Daniel S. Hallak, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
In a claim alleging false imprisonment, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and the claimant's cross motion for summary judgment is denied and the claim is dismissed.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-050-046 |
| Claimant(s): | RICHARD BOYD AND BELINDA BOYD |
| Claimant short name: | BOYD |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 126585 |
| Motion number(s): | M-90398 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-90669 |
| Judge: | STEPHEN J. LYNCH |
| Claimant's attorney: | Seiden & Kaufman, Esq. By: Steven J. Seiden, Esq. |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Daniel S. Hallak, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | September 29, 2017 |
| City: | |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
The facts in this claim alleging negligence and wrongful confinement are largely without dispute. While claimant Richard Boyd was stopped for a traffic violation in Queens County on May 27, 2015, the police discovered an outstanding bench warrant in Nassau County for failure to pay traffic ticket fines in 2007. He was taken into custody by the New York City Police Department and transferred that same evening to the Nassau County Correctional Facility. The next morning in Nassau County District Court he was appointed an attorney from the Legal Aid Society and arraigned before a judge who ordered that claimant be released on his own recognizance. Prior to exiting the courtroom, claimant was told to return to court on July 6, 2015 and given a reminder note by the court clerk stating where and when he should return to court. He states he was not given contact information for his Legal Aid Society attorney. Claimant was then returned, still in handcuffs, to the custody of the Nassau County correctional officers who transported him back to the Nassau County Correctional Facility which he assumed was, and generally is, necessary to retrieve his belongings. Unfortunately, claimant's Securing Order was not properly marked to direct that claimant be released and despite him allegedly telling correctional officers repeatedly that he was supposed to be released on his own recognizance, claimant remained in prison. He was released from custody upon being brought back to the Nassau County District Court on July 6, 2015, retained counsel about a week thereafter and the claim before this Court was served on the Attorney General's office on August 13, 2015. Defendant now moves for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212. Claimant opposes the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment.
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proof, which is to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]) by demonstrating that there is no material issue of fact warranting a trial (see Rivera v State of New York, UID No. 2015-040-052 [Ct Cl, McCarthy, J., Oct. 2, 2015]). If the motion proponent discharges its initial burden, the burden will shift to the opposing party who must then demonstrate with admissible proof the existence of material issues of fact warranting a trial (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]; Barsalona v State of New York, UID No. 2013-045-032 [Ct Cl, Lopez-Summa, J., Oct. 22, 2013]).
Initially, to the extent that claimant alleges violations of a constitutional right pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, it is well settled that the State may not be sued under section 1983 because it is not a "person" as defined by that statute (Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172 [1996], citing Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs, 436 US 658 [1978]; Boggs v State of New York, UID No. 2015-015-097 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Dec. 9, 2015]). To the extent the instant claim seeks recovery for violation of constitutional rights or federal law including 42 USC § 1983, the claims are dismissed. As for any alleged state constitution violation, the courts of this State are properly reluctant to recognize a constitutional tort under the New York State Constitution where the claimant has or had an alternative remedy available to redress the purported wrong (see Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78 [2001]; Bullard v State of New York, 307 AD2d 676 [3d Dept 2003]). Cases have held that the availability of a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (see LM Bus. Assoc., Inc. v State of New York, 124 AD3d 1215 [4th Dept 2015]; Carver v State of New York, 79 AD3d 1393 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 707 [2011] as well as monetary remedies under traditional tort principles (see Waxter v State of New York, 33 AD3d 1180 [3d Dept 2006]; Lyles v State of New York, 2 AD3d 694 [2d Dept 2003], affd 3 NY3d 396 [2004]; Albright v State of New York, 32 Misc 3d 855 [Ct Cl 2011]) "render recognition of a constitutional tort cause of action unnecessary" (Boggs v State of New York, UID No. 2015-015-097 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Dec. 9, 2015]). The "narrow remedy" of a constitutional tort established in Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172 (1996) is not applicable in this case where alternate remedies exist. To the extent claimant alleges violations of the State Constitution, these causes of action are dismissed.
To prevail on a cause of action seeking to recover damages for false imprisonment, claimant must prove that: (1) defendant intended to confine the claimant; (2) claimant was aware of the resulting confinement; (3) claimant did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged (see Rivera v County of Nassau, 83 AD3d 1032 [2d Dept 2011]). Here, claimant's cause of action for false imprisonment fails because no agent of the State had an intention to confine him. The testimony of the two clerks working in the Nassau County District Court courtroom on the day in question evinces no malice or even knowledge that claimant would be remanded to jail despite the judge's order that he be released on his own recognizance. The testimony of all relevant parties - the clerks, correctional officers, claimant himself and the exhibits before the Court - fail to establish any intent on the part of the State to imprison claimant.
Claimant makes no attempt to defend his causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress or the negligent supervision and/or training of defendant's agents and the Court finds that, to the extent the claims asserted herein seek recovery predicated upon such theories, they must be dismissed. "[W]hile physical injury is not a necessary element of a cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, such a cause of action must generally be premised upon conduct that unreasonably endangers a plaintiff's physical safety or causes the plaintiff to fear for his . . . own safety" (Savva v Longo, 8 AD3d 551 [2d Dept 2004]). Neither the claim nor the claimant in his testimony allege any such conduct. Regarding negligent supervision and/or training, a theory of negligent training and supervision requires a showing that the employees in question were acting outside the scope of their employment, that the State knew or reasonably should have known of their propensity to engage in the conduct that caused claimant's injuries and that the alleged negligent training and supervision was a proximate cause of claimant's injuries (see Gray v Schenectady City School Dist., 86 AD3d 771 [3d Dept 2011]). Here, claimant fails to allege that the District Court clerks acted outside the scope of their employment (see id.; Singh v State of New York, UID No. 2017-040-018 [Ct Cl, McCarthy, J., Feb. 8, 2017]).
Finally, defendant argues that judicial immunity bars claimant's negligence cause of action stemming from the alleged failure to properly annotate the Securing Order. Claimant argues that the District Court clerk's omission was purely ministerial in nature and therefore subjects defendant to liability.
Liability for a claim that a government entity negligently exercised a governmental function "turns upon the existence of a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public. [A] duty to exercise reasonable care toward [a] plaintiff is born of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the governmental entity" (Coleson v City of New York, 24 NY3d 476 [2014]). The Court of Appeals has determined that a special relationship can be formed in three ways:
"(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation" (McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194 [2009] citing Palaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186 [2004]).
As only the second of these prongs is relevant in this case, claimant's negligence cause of action requires him to establish that the State voluntarily assumed a special duty toward him.
The requisite elements of such special duty are as follows:
"(1) an assumption by the municipality [or governmental entity], through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking" (Valdez v City of New York, 19 NY3d 69 [2011], citing Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255 [1987]).
Although all the elements must be met in order to find a special duty, the Valdez Court singled out the fourth as critical, stating as follows:
"[Reliance] provides the essential causative link between the 'special duty' assumed by the municipality and the alleged injury. Indeed, at the heart of most of these 'special duty' cases is the unfairness that the courts have perceived in precluding recovery when a municipality's voluntary undertaking has lulled the injured party into a false sense of security and has thereby induced him either to relax his own vigilance or to forego other available avenues of protection" (Valdez v City of New York, 19 NY3d 69 [2011], citing Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255 [1987]).Here, defendant has established as a matter of law that it did not assume a special duty to claimant. The deposition testimony of the transportation correctional officer was that regardless of whether a prisoner was remanded or to be released on his own recognizance, he would be returned to the jail first. Claimant's deposition testimony was that he complained to Nassau County correctional officers at the Nassau County Correctional Facility, whose custody he was returned to immediately after leaving the courtroom, that he was to have been released on his own recognizance. He stated he was told each time that the correctional officer would "look into it" but nothing happened. If indeed claimant relied on anyone such that he was "lulled" into a false sense of security upon his return to the Nassau County correctional facility, something that is not at all clear in the record, it would be the Nassau County correctional officers he allegedly complained to (see Exhibit E to affirmation in support of Daniel S. Hallak dated May 8, 2017.
Claimant and co-claimant's deposition testimony was at times evasive or inconsistent and it strains credulity that he was for 41 days unable to seek some sort of assistance in being released, either on his own by telephone or through his co-claimant wife or brother with whom he is close and who brought his wife to visit weekly, yet he was able to retain counsel in this matter within a week of his release. Claimant testified he was unable to make phone calls while in jail because he "didn't know how to use the pin number" "at first" (but then states he didn't know how until "the morning when [he] got out"). Co-claimant Belinda Boyd testified that her husband did not even tell her he was being unlawfully detained for the 41 days but later stated they talked twice about hiring an attorney and that she didn't say anything to officers at the jail because she "didn't want any trouble." Claimant made no attempt to contact the Legal Aid attorney who had represented him. Co-claimant visited him in jail weekly but neither she, his brother nor a friend who visited him made any attempt to have him released or to contact the court, the jail, Legal Aid or an attorney. Claimant testified that a second legal aid attorney represented him the day he was released and referred him to current counsel. His wife'ds testimony, however, was that after her husband's release she contacted a personal injury attorney they had known for about 11 years and he provided the referral. Claimant's testimony regarding his earnings as well as his experience in prison differed markedly between his two depositions.
In the absence of justifiable reliance specifically or the existence of a special duty or relationship generally, claimant's cause of action for a clerk's alleged negligence is insufficient as a matter of law (see Olivar v State of New York, UID No. 2015-016-018 [Ct Cl, Marin, J., Apr. 14, 2015]). Although this could be "a case in which a failure by government to do its job has caused harm . . . our well-settled rule of law mandates" (Tara N.P. v W. Suffolk Board of Co-op Educ. Servs., 28 NY3d 709 [2017]) the holding that defendant is immune from liability to this claimant.
In sum, the claim fails to state a viable cause of action. In light of the foregoing; it is
ORDERED that defendant's motion (M-90398) is granted, the cross motion (CM-90669) is denied and the claim of Richard and Belinda Boyd is dismissed.
September 29, 2017, New York
STEPHEN J. LYNCH
Judge of the Court of Claims The following papers were read and considered by the Court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the claimant's cross motion for summary judgment: 1. Notice of Motion, Affirmation in Support with Exhibits (M-90398). 2. Affirmation in Opposition (M-90398). 3. Reply Affirmation (M-90398). 4. Notice of Cross Motion, Affirmation in Support with Exhibits (CM-90669). 5. Affirmation in Opposition (CM-90669).