Opinion
C/A No. 7:20-cv-00829-BHH-JDA
03-25-2020
Latasha Monique Boyd, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Latasha Monique Boyd ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the South Carolina Department of Social Services ("SCDSS") purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the pleadings in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
As noted below, Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint naming only SCDSS. [Doc. 17.] Plaintiff's original Complaint named additional Defendants [Doc. 1], but they are not named in the Amended Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint against SCDSS, Meldrika Ganzaroli, Debbie Evans, Dana Lyles, and Yvetta McClints, which was entered on the docket on February 24, 2020. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated February 28, 2020, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons stated in the Court's Order. [Doc. 11.] The Court, however, noted that Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies of her Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. [Id. at 8-9.] Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint that corrects those deficiencies [identified in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.[Id. at 9.] Plaintiff was further warned that an amended complaint would replace her original Complaint and should be complete in itself. [Id. at 8]; see Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) ("As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In response to the Court's Order, Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint, which was entered on the docket on March 23, 2020. [Doc. 17.] Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names only SCDSS and makes nearly identical allegations as her original Complaint. [Compare Doc. 1-1 with Doc. 17-1.]
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in her Amended Complaint. [Docs. 17; 17-1.] Plaintiff alleges that her children were removed from her custody without a warrant on September 23, 2019. [Doc. 17-1.] Plaintiff asked Yvetta McClints for her "license and certification of participation," and McClints stated she would talk to her supervisor. [Id.] Dana Lyles, McClints' supervisor, said that Plaintiff "wasn't talking right and that everyone had to go take a drug test." [Id.] Plaintiff contends Lyles made this statement in response to Plaintiff's request for "her proof of authority." [Id.] Plaintiff forgot to send documents because she became busy and was trying to handle other cases. [Id.] Plaintiff has been upset and trying to get her mental disorder in check. [Id.] She contends that she takes good care of her children, "but public official[s] keep interfering with a secured private party." [Id.] Plaintiff contends that her children were wrongfully removed from her custody without due process of law. [Id.] Plaintiff contends her children were injured because McClints advised the children's father to keep the children, even though he blackmailed Plaintiff and stole her money when officers gave him the keys to her car and home. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, even if the pleadings were not subject to the pre-screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this Court would possess the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) ("[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.") (citations omitted).
The pleadings of a pro se litigant are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's pleadings are subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter, her pleadings "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
This action is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to name a proper Defendant and Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Defendant is entitled to dismissal.
Plaintiff names only SCDSS as a Defendant in her Amended Complaint. [Doc. 17 at 2.] However, Plaintiff makes no allegations against Defendant SCDSS. Accordingly, Defendant SCDSS is entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed."); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading). Additionally, SCDSS is entitled to summary dismissal because it is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983 and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Dowling v. State of S.C., No. 0:06-cv-1309-PMD-BM, 2006 WL 1751742, at *2 (D.S.C. June 20, 2006).
As noted, Plaintiff named the following additional Defendants in her original Complaint: Meldrika Ganzaroli, Debbie Evans, Dana Lyles, and Yvetta McClints. [Doc. 1 at 1-3.] To the extent Plaintiff intended for these Defendants to remain in the case, they would be subject to summary dismissal for the reasons stated in this Court's Order dated February 28, 2020. [Doc. 11 at 5-6.]
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.
Plaintiff appears to assert causes of action for defamation under the First Amendment and unlawful seizure of her children in violation of her due process rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the pleadings in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, see Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim for relief under § 1983.
Plaintiff's defamation claim fails because allegations of defamation, slander, and libel fail to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn.3-4 (1976). Although state law provides for a right of action for slander or defamation, an alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is not actionable under § 1983. See Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084106, at *3 (D.S.C. May 7, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2084383 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). Thus, Plaintiff's allegations concerning the purely state law claim of defamation fail to establish a claim for a violation of a federal right as required under § 1983, and her claim is subject to dismissal. Wilson v. Ozmint, No. 3:10-cv-2887-RMG, 2011 WL 1336391, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2011).
Plaintiff's remaining claims fail because she has not alleged facts to support a constitutional violation under the Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Although Plaintiff alleges that her children were taken from her without a warrant and without due process, she has failed to allege facts to support that allegation. Critically, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant took her children. Likewise, Plaintiff presents no other facts to support her claims. As such, her claims are subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process and without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford the plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice); Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge March 25, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).