6. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Where there is conflict in testimony in compensation proceeding, or where opposing inferences may reasonably be drawn, Industrial Commission is final arbiter. Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687; Tedesco v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 501, 46 P.2d 670; Boyd v. Industrial Commission, 88 Utah 173, 48 P.2d 498.Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687; Tedesco v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 501, 46 P.2d 670; Boyd v. Industrial Commission, 88 Utah 173, 48 P.2d 498.
Rev. St. 1933, 42-1-82.Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 53 Utah 133, 178 P. 57; Rockefeller v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 124, 197 P. 1038; Frederickson v. Industrial Commission, 68 Utah 206, 249 P. 480; Boyd v. Industrial Commission, 88 Utah 173, 46 P.2d 498; Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124.Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124.
PETITION DENIED. For former opinion, see 88 U. 173, 48 P.2d 498. O.H. Mathews, of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. Joseph Chez, Atty. Gen., and Gustin Richards, of Salt Lake City, for defendants.
The cases from other jurisdictions specifically recognizing the rule of necessity are numerous. E.g., Eby v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 525 ( 102 A 209); Tromblee v. North Amer. Acc. Ins. Co., 158 NYS 1014; Boyd v. Industrial Comm'n, 88 Utah 173 ( 48 P.2d 498); Dabbert v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 Cin. Super. 98, supra; Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ohio App. 539, supra; Foulkrod v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 343 Pa. 505, supra. The theory that the rule of necessity is valid where the declarations of a decedent are the only method of proof available finds at least partial support in McCormick's work.
See Lemmon v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215 (1959). Many jurisdictions recognize as an exception to the hearsay rule statements made by a patient to his attending physician descriptive of the history of the case, if such statements are necessary for an accurate diagnosis and treatment of the illness or injury. See, e.g., Brown v. Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272, 205 A.2d 773 (1964); Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet Eastern Ry., 24 Ill.2d 383, 182 N.E.2d 211, 94 A.L.R.2d 904 (1962); Edwards v. E.B. Murray Co., 305 S.W.2d 702, (Mo.App. 1975); Kellogg v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 60 Ohio App. 22, 19 N.E.2d 511 (1938); Hillman v. Utah Power Light Co., 56 Idaho 67, 51 P.2d 703 (1935); Boyd v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 88 Utah 173, 48 P.2d 498 (1935); Annot. 130 A.L.R. 977 (1941); 3 Jones, Comm. on Evidence 2234 (2d ed. 1926). This exception to the hearsay rule is ordinarily justified on the grounds of trustworthiness and necessity. A patient seeking treatment will not be inclined toward deception and fraud.
Proceeding to review a decision of the Industrial Commission. The Commission made an award of compensation on account of the death of an employee of the plaintiff company, which award plaintiff company here attacks on two grounds, viz: (1) There is no competent evidence that deceased received "an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment;" and (2) There is no "substantial or sufficient evidence from which the Commission could find that such accident caused or contributed to the pathology which caused Taylor's death." The case upon which plaintiff in its brief places much reliance in support of its first contention is Boyd v. Industrial Commission, 88 Utah 173, 48 P.2d 498. However, in our opinion, the principles therein announced when applied to this case compel the conclusion that the 1, 2 evidence is not such that we can say that the commission erred in finding that deceased received an accidental injury in the course of his employment.