The district court did not have authority to act in cause number 11,993 in 2000; as a result, the 2000 order reducing unpaid child support to judgment is void. See Boyd v. Gillman, 447 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A void judgment is a nullity and its enforcement may be enjoined in a collateral proceeding.
The Cadles cite three cases that state a void judgment is subject to both direct and collateral attacks. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, writ denied); Lawrence Sys., Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied); Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In each of these cases, the courts simply acknowledged that a direct appeal was not the only way to attack a void judgment.
We have recognized that a trial judge may enter orders during the plenary power period. See, e.g., Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Thus during the period of thirty days after the rendition of judgment . . . the trial judge retains plenary power and jurisdiction to take whatever action he may deem desirable to change, alter or modify the judgment rendered."); see also Thompson v. Gibbs, 504 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1973, orig. proceeding) (trial judge could set aside original judgment and grant new trial during plenary power period after overruling of motion for new trial by operation of law); Ex parte Godeke, 163 Tex. 387, 355 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. 1962) (case is still "pending" in trial court as long as judgment rendered in it remains subject to attack by motion for new trial or subject to judicial vacation or modification by the trial court under rule 329b). We hold the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order denying AJ's special appearance.
In this vein, it is elementary that, when a judgment is a nullity, it is subject to either a direct or collateral attack in any proceeding where its validity is asserted. Boyd v. Gillman Film Corporation, 447 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Likewise, a null judgment has no legal effect and will not support a res judicata plea.
Rule 5 provides that a court may not enlarge the period for taking any action under the rules relating to new trials or motions for rehearing except as stated in those rules. In Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a case involving a trial court's belated action in setting aside a prior judgment of dismissal, we reviewed the provisions of the applicable rules here under discussion and reiterated the established law that during the period of thirty days after the date of rendition of judgment or order overruling an original or amended motion for new trial, the trial judge retains plenary power and jurisdiction to take whatever action he may deem desirable to change, alter or modify the judgment rendered, citing Williams v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 408, 251 S.W.2d 148 (1952) and Stonedale v. Stonedale, 401 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1966). We think this rule is applicable here where the trial judge did, within the period of thirty days from the date the amended motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law, elect to change the original judgment and set the same aside and grant a new trial.
The distriction is without merit and the action of the trial Court undertaken on August 31 was a nullity. Rule 329b Par. 5, and Rule 5, T.R.C.P.; American Hospital and Life Insurance Company v. Kern, 359 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1962, writ dism'd); Boyd v. Gillman Film Corporation, 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It has been said that the Texas practice proceeds on the notion that there is something slightly sacrosanct about the precise periods within which motions for new trial must be filed and determined.
After the expiration of 30 days from the date of rendition of the order overruling the amended motions for new trial, the court lost jurisdiction of the case other than to correct clerical errors. Section 5, Rule 329b, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Eli Lilly Company v. Casey, 457 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1970, no writ). It does not appear that the entry of an order in its entirety sustaining a special exception which serves to limit the scope of the pleading and proof in a trial should be considered as a purely clerical correction rather than a judicial action.
There is no question but that a dismissal for want of prosecution is a final judgment. Boyd v. Gillman Film Corporation, 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App., err. ref., n.r.e.); Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Lane, 337 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Civ.App., err. ref); Stuart v. City of Houston, 419 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Civ.App., writ ref., n.r.e.). Neither is there any contention that Fannin Bank's motion to reinstate constituted a bill of review.