Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp.

8 Citing cases

  1. In re N.L.A.

    No. 10-03-00202-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 9, 2005)   Cited 1 times

    The district court did not have authority to act in cause number 11,993 in 2000; as a result, the 2000 order reducing unpaid child support to judgment is void. See Boyd v. Gillman, 447 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A void judgment is a nullity and its enforcement may be enjoined in a collateral proceeding.

  2. Cadle Co. v. Lobingier

    50 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App. 2001)   Cited 140 times
    Holding that civil contempt is not governed by Section 21.002 of the Government Code, citing Ex parte Shaklee, 939 S.W.2d 144, 145 n. 2 (Tex.1997) (orig. proceeding)

    The Cadles cite three cases that state a void judgment is subject to both direct and collateral attacks. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. T. Brown Constructors, Inc., 947 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, writ denied); Lawrence Sys., Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied); Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In each of these cases, the courts simply acknowledged that a direct appeal was not the only way to attack a void judgment.

  3. A&J Printing, Inc. v. DSP Enterprises, L.L.C.

    153 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App. 2005)   Cited 7 times
    Holding trial court had jurisdiction to deny special appearance after case had been dismissed because motion for reinstatement was on file prior to court's denial of special appearance and case was timely reinstated by a written order within the court's plenary power

    We have recognized that a trial judge may enter orders during the plenary power period. See, e.g., Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Thus during the period of thirty days after the rendition of judgment . . . the trial judge retains plenary power and jurisdiction to take whatever action he may deem desirable to change, alter or modify the judgment rendered."); see also Thompson v. Gibbs, 504 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1973, orig. proceeding) (trial judge could set aside original judgment and grant new trial during plenary power period after overruling of motion for new trial by operation of law); Ex parte Godeke, 163 Tex. 387, 355 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. 1962) (case is still "pending" in trial court as long as judgment rendered in it remains subject to attack by motion for new trial or subject to judicial vacation or modification by the trial court under rule 329b). We hold the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order denying AJ's special appearance.

  4. Lawrence Systs v. Superior Feeders

    880 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App. 1994)   Cited 33 times
    Concluding that section 16.066(b) applies to both UEFJA and common-law actions to enforce foreign judgments

    In this vein, it is elementary that, when a judgment is a nullity, it is subject to either a direct or collateral attack in any proceeding where its validity is asserted. Boyd v. Gillman Film Corporation, 447 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Likewise, a null judgment has no legal effect and will not support a res judicata plea.

  5. Thompson v. Gibbs

    504 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)   Cited 7 times

    Rule 5 provides that a court may not enlarge the period for taking any action under the rules relating to new trials or motions for rehearing except as stated in those rules. In Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a case involving a trial court's belated action in setting aside a prior judgment of dismissal, we reviewed the provisions of the applicable rules here under discussion and reiterated the established law that during the period of thirty days after the date of rendition of judgment or order overruling an original or amended motion for new trial, the trial judge retains plenary power and jurisdiction to take whatever action he may deem desirable to change, alter or modify the judgment rendered, citing Williams v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 408, 251 S.W.2d 148 (1952) and Stonedale v. Stonedale, 401 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1966). We think this rule is applicable here where the trial judge did, within the period of thirty days from the date the amended motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law, elect to change the original judgment and set the same aside and grant a new trial.

  6. El Paso Mouldings&sMfg. Co., Inc. v. Southwest For. Ind., Inc.

    492 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)   Cited 16 times

    The distriction is without merit and the action of the trial Court undertaken on August 31 was a nullity. Rule 329b Par. 5, and Rule 5, T.R.C.P.; American Hospital and Life Insurance Company v. Kern, 359 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1962, writ dism'd); Boyd v. Gillman Film Corporation, 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It has been said that the Texas practice proceeds on the notion that there is something slightly sacrosanct about the precise periods within which motions for new trial must be filed and determined.

  7. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Denton

    475 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)   Cited 2 times

    After the expiration of 30 days from the date of rendition of the order overruling the amended motions for new trial, the court lost jurisdiction of the case other than to correct clerical errors. Section 5, Rule 329b, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp., 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Eli Lilly Company v. Casey, 457 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1970, no writ). It does not appear that the entry of an order in its entirety sustaining a special exception which serves to limit the scope of the pleading and proof in a trial should be considered as a purely clerical correction rather than a judicial action.

  8. Fourticq v. Fannin Bank

    461 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 5 times
    In Fourticq v. Fannin Bank, 461 S.W.2d 251, 252-53 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a panel of this court addressed the issue of whether the date of a docket entry, noting dismissal of a case for want of prosecution, or the date of the subsequent signed order of dismissal constituted the date of rendition of judgment for purposes of Rules 306a and 329b. This court held that judgment was rendered on October 31, the date indicated in the written judgment, and not the date of the docket entry.

    There is no question but that a dismissal for want of prosecution is a final judgment. Boyd v. Gillman Film Corporation, 447 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App., err. ref., n.r.e.); Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Lane, 337 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Civ.App., err. ref); Stuart v. City of Houston, 419 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Civ.App., writ ref., n.r.e.). Neither is there any contention that Fannin Bank's motion to reinstate constituted a bill of review.