Boyd v. Gardner

2 Citing cases

  1. Houser v. Walter Ballard c. Co.

    133 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 4 times

    The depositions of the plaintiff, the only evidence on the hearing on the motion for summary judgment by the defendants, showed no negligence on the part of either defendant, and that, if there were negligence on the part of either of the defendants, the plaintiff had knowledge of such negligence and her injury was due to her own want of ordinary care. See dissenting opinion of Judge Jenkins in Wardlaw v. Executive Comm. Baptist Convention, 47 Ga. App. 595, 596 ( 170 S.E. 830), reversed in 180 Ga. 148 ( 178 S.E. 155); Vaissiere v. Pound Hotel Co., 184 Ga. 72 ( 190 S.E. 354). The case of Boyd v. Gardner, 62 Ga. App. 662 ( 9 S.E.2d 202) is clearly distinguishable on its facts. It follows that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment of each defendant. Judgment affirmed. Bell, P. J., and Hall, J., concur.

  2. Greyhound Corporation v. Stokes

    86 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)   Cited 1 times

    She alleges that she had no knowledge of the difference in the floor levels and the highly polished condition of the floor; and in the absence of such knowledge, we cannot say as a matter of law that she was so negligent as to bar her recovery in entering the semi-darkened restaurant. . . The plaintiff here, as an invitee, is not required to negative her failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and it does not affirmatively appear from the allegations of the petition that she did fail to exercise ordinary care for her own safety as a matter of law." See also Boyd v. Gardner, 62 Ga. App. 662 ( 9 S.E.2d 202); Tybee Amusement Co. v. Odum, 51 Ga. App. 1 ( 179 S.E. 415); Mathis v. Gazan, 51 Ga. App. 805, 808 ( 181 S.E. 503). The cases cited by the plaintiff in error are to be distinguished, either as master-servant cases, where it is necessary for the servant to show affirmatively that his opportunity for knowledge was not equal to that of the master, or that he did not assume the risk (see Holman v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 201 Ga. 454, 39 S.E.2d 85); or because the petition affirmatively showed that the plaintiff was as aware of the obstruction as the defendant ( Rogers v. Atlanta Enterprises, 89 Ga. App. 903, 81 S.E.2d 721); or, as in Hopkins v. Barron, 61 Ga. App. 168 ( 6 S.E.2d 96), where the injured plaintiff was the person in charge of the premises; or, as in Bridger v. Gresham, 111 Ga. 814 ( 35 S.E. 677), where the plaintiff, by closing the door behind himself, shut out the light by which he might have seen the stairway on which he fell. The allegations of the pe