The Tax Court declined to address the merits of the Boyds' claim — i.e., whether offsets are subject to levy procedures — on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. See Boyd v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 296, 302-03, 2005 WL 1503680 (2005). The court ruled that, under § 6330, its jurisdiction was limited to instances in which taxpayers obtain the written "notice of determination" that is issued by the Appeals Office following a hearing.
As the Tax Court has recognized, "[s]ection 6402(a) contains a statutory counterpart" to the common law right of offset. Boyd v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 296, 300 (2005). And the common law of setoffs "calls for judicial review of the merits of the claim being invoked as an offset of a government debt."
In the same way, the notice of determination is a "ticket" to the Tax Court for reviewing a collection due process determination. See Boyd v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 296, 303 (2005), aff'd, 451 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the Tax Court's "jurisdiction under § 6330(d) depends upon the issuance of a valid notice of determination" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, to meet her burden of establishing the Tax Court's jurisdiction, the taxpayer in both deficiency and collection due process proceedings must plead the date of the notice of deficiency or determination, see Tax Ct. R. 34(b)(2), 331(b)(2), and submit a copy of the notice with the petition, id. R. 34(b)(8), 331(b)(8).
Moreover, an offset under section 6402 is not a collection action that is subject to review in this section 6330 proceeding. See Boyd v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 296, 300-01 (2005), aff'd, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(g)(2), Q&A-G3.
We also noted the similarity between section 6015(e)(1)(A) and section 6330(d)(1), which we had previously held created a jurisdictional deadline for filing a petition to challenge a collection determination. Pollock, 132 T.C. at 31 (citing Boyd v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 296, 303 (2005), aff'd, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006)).
However, such notices do not confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Boyd v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 296 (2005), aff'd, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006); see also §§ 6402(a), 6512(b)(4); Bobock v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 178, 182 (2006).
In a collection due process (CDP) case, section 6330(e)(1) grants the Court limited power to enjoin a levy, but only if "a timely appeal has been filed [from a notice of determination] under subsection (d)(1)." See I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1), (e)(1); Boyd v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 296, 303 (2005), aff 'd 451F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006). But this is not a CDP case.
The IRS' application of his 2017 tax overpayment, however, did not constitute a levy action subject to review under sec. 6330. See Boyd v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 296, 300 (2005), aff'd, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the application of an overpayment is an offset, as distinct from a levy, and holding that the Commissioner's application of a taxpayer's overpayment for one taxable year to offset the taxpayer's liability for another taxable year does not constitute a collection action that is subject to review under sec. 6330). SO Hollowell treated petitioner's May 10, 2018, request for a CDP hearing as relating to the IRS' seizure of his $555 State tax refund--an action that is subject to review under section 6330--, and the notice of determination expressly sustained only that specific collection action.
Sec. 6402(a). Nothing in section 6330 prohibits the IRS from engaging in other nonlevy collection actions, including offsetting payments from other periods, as the IRS did in this instance. Boyd v. Commissioner, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that informal offset procedures are not generally subject to the procedural protections for levies), aff'g 124 T.C. 296 (2005); 26 C.F.R. sec. 301.6330-1(g)(2), Q&A-G3, Proced. & Admin. Regs. ATL has cited no authority that would render improper the crediting that the IRS performed here, and we know of none. III.
Every Court of Appeals to consider the question agrees with this conclusion. See, e.g., Gray v. Commissioner, 723 F.3d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 2013), aff'g 138 T.C. 295, 299 (2012); Boyd v. Commissioner, 451 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006), aff'g 124 T.C. 296, 303 (2005); see also Kaplan v. Commissioner, 552 F. App'x 77, 78 (2d Cir. 2014); Trivedi v. Commissioner, 525 F. App'x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2013); Springer v. Commissioner, 416 F. App'x 681, 683 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011). Although the petition was not filed with this Court until February 18, 2015, it was mailed on February 13, two days before the unextended due date.