Opinion
Civil Action No. 16-264 Erie
04-06-2017
ALONZO R. BOYD, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL CLARK, et al., Respondents.
District Judge Barbara Rothstein
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that a certificate of appealability be denied. II. REPORT
A. Relevant Background
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Alonzo R. Boyd (the "Petitioner"). (ECF No. 3). He challenges the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's (the "Board's") decision to revoke his parole and recalculate the term of his sentence as a result of that revocation.
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania explained the relevant facts of this case as follows:
Petitioner was originally sentenced to a term of incarceration of eight years and six months to eighteen years following multiple drug convictions. Petitioner's original maximum sentence date was November 30, 2016. Following expiration of his minimum sentence, on July 30, 2007, Petitioner was released on parole to a community corrections center. Four days earlier, on July 26, 2007, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a list of conditions governing his parole. In this list, the Board specifically advised Petitioner that should he be convicted of a crime on parole, it had the authority to recommit him, after a hearing, to serve the balance of his sentence with no credit for any time spent at liberty on parole. Petitioner later moved to Ohio, with the approval of the Board.
Nearly seven years later, on May 2, 2014, Petitioner was arrested in Ohio and later charged with two counts of drug possession. On September 6, 2014, Petitioner pled guilty to these new criminal charges. On September 25, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of incarceration of six months in Ohio, with credit for ninety-two days served. The Board, following notice from the Ohio authorities, issued a warrant to commit and detain Petitioner. Petitioner was returned to Pennsylvania on December 15, 2014, and incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion. Two days later, the Board provided Petitioner with a notice of charges and hearing related to his new convictions. At that time, Petitioner executed a waiver of his right to revocation hearing and counsel and admitted to his Ohio convictions.(Resp's Ex A, Boyd v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, No. 912 C.D. 2015, slip op. at 1-3 (Pa.Commw.Ct. Mar. 9, 2016) (footnotes omitted, bracketed text in original)).
By decision dated March 2, 2015, the Board recommitted Petitioner as a convicted parole violator to serve forty-eight months backtime and recalculated his parole violation maximum sentence date to be April 12, 2024. On March 30, 2015, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal challenging the length of his recommitment and his newly-calculated parole violation maximum sentence date, and alleging that the Board's recommitment violated his constitutional rights. More specifically, Petitioner alleged that the Board's action violated the cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and constituted impermissible detention beyond the terminate of a judicially imposed maximum sentence, which equates to a violation of his constitutional right to due process. Petitioner emphasized that he spent seven years on parole in "[g]ood [f]aith [s]tanding" and was never delinquent or on the run." (Record at Item No. 5.)
By decision dated May 12, 2015, the Board denied Petitioner's administrative appeal. Citing section 6138(a)(2) of the Prison and Parole Code (Parole Code), the Board explained that Petitioner, as a convicted parole violator, automatically forfeited credit for all of the time that he spent on parole.
The Board's March 2, 2015, decision (which was recorded on February 13, 2015), is attached to the response as Exhibit D. It shows that, at that time, the Board had determined that the Petitioner would not be eligible for reparole until December 12, 2018. It also calculated the Petitioner's maximum sentence date to be April 12, 2024. The Board's May 12, 2015, decision is attached to the response as Exhibit E.
The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review of the Board's decision to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. On March 9, 2016, the Commonwealth Court issued an opinion and order in that appeal. (Id. at 1-6). The Board had conceded in its brief to the Commonwealth Court that it had erred in calculating the presumptive range of the Petitioner's parole violator term (id. at 3-4), and it had requested that the issue "be remanded for the issuance of a new recommitment term that is within the presumptive range." (Id. at 4). The court granted the Board's request. (Id. at 3-4). It denied the Petitioner's appeal in all other respects. Regarding his constitutional claims, the court held:
Petitioner alleges that the Board's action in extending his parole violation maximum date infringes upon his constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy, as well as his right to due process. However, these arguments have been consistently rejected by both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this Court.(Id. (collecting cases)).
In its final order, the Commonwealth Court directed that the Board's May 12, 2015, decision "insofar as it affirmed its previous order recommitting Petitioner to serve forty-eight months of backtime is vacated and this matter is remanded to the Board for the issuance of a new recommitment term that is within the applicable presumptive range." (Id. at 4-5). The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's order "[i]n all other respects." (Id. at 5). The Petitioner did not appeal the Commonwealth Court's decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The Board subsequently modified the recommitment time so that the Petitioner was made eligible to be considered for parole, and on September 28, 2016, it issued a decision that granted him parole. (Resp's Ex. H). According to the Respondents, the Petitioner is currently on parole and residing in Ohio.
In the petition that he filed with this Court on or around November 1, 2016, the Petitioner alleges (in Claims One, Two, and Three) that the Board's March 2, 2015, decision (which was recorded on February 13, 2015) violated his right to due process, as well as his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Double Jeopardy Clause. (ECF No. 3, Petition at 6-9). He also alleges that the Board's decision "encroach[ed] on the Judicial branch of government and its exclusive jurisdiction provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g)." (Id. at 11).
The Respondents filed an answer (ECF No. 13) in which they argue, inter alia, that the Petitioner's claims must be denied because he failed to exhaust them and, therefore, defaulted them. The Petitioner did not file a reply. Local Rule 2254.E.2 ("Although not required, the petitioner may file a Reply (also known as "a Traverse") within 30 days of the date the respondent files its Answer.")
B. Discussion
The "exhaustion doctrine" requires that a state prisoner must raise his federal constitutional claims in state court through the proper procedures before he litigates them in a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[i]t is axiomatic that a federal habeas court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has first exhausted the remedies available in the state courts.") (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). It is "grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights[,]" Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991), and "is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts[.]" O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The Supreme Court held that a petitioner must have "invoke[d] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process[,]" in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added).
Here, the Petitioner was required to first seek administrative review with the Board itself. 37 Pa. Code § 73.1. He completed that step. After the Board denied his request for administrative remedy, the Petitioner was required to file an appeal of the Board's decision with the Commonwealth Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(a). He satisfied this step as well. However, the Petitioner failed to complete the final required step. Specifically, before he could litigate his claim in a federal habeas petition, the Petitioner was required to seek allowance of appeal with Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1112(b) ("A final order of the Superior Court or Commonwealth Court is any order that concludes an appeal, including an order that remands an appeal, in whole or in part, unless the appellate court remands and retains jurisdiction."); Pa.R.A.P. 1114; Williams v. Wynder, 232 F.App'x 177, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2007).
Because the Petitioner did not "invoke[] one complete round of the State's established appellate review process[,]" he did not exhaust properly his federal constitutional claims. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added). As a consequence of his failure to seek the required review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Petitioner has defaulted his federal habeas claims. Williams, 232 F.App'x at 181. See also Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 16069 (3d Cir. 2000); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). Like the exhaustion doctrine, the doctrine of procedural default "is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism," Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730, and it bars federal habeas review of a claim whenever the petitioner failed to raise it in compliance with a state's procedural rules. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Lines, 208 F.3d at 162-69.
Based upon all of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied because the Petitioners' claims are defaulted.
A petitioner whose habeas claim is procedurally defaulted can overcome the default, thereby allowing federal court review, if he can demonstrate "cause" for the default, i.e., that some objective factor "external to the defense" impeded efforts to comply with the state's procedural rule, and "actual prejudice." See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 494 (1986). The Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing either "cause" or "actual prejudice." --------
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 provides that "[a] certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the Petitioner's habeas claims should be denied as defaulted. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied. III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, The Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: April 6, 2017