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dismissing the plaintiff's complaint as frivolous, nonsensical, and lacking a basis in the law, where the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants “have been gaslighting her”
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7:24-cv-00711-BHH-KFM
04-12-2024
Latasha Boyd, Plaintiff, v. City of Spartanburg, South Carolina DSS, Spartanburg Sheriff Department, South Carolina, United States, Derrick S. Wilkey Sr., Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the defendants. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on February 12, 2024 (doc. 1). By order filed March 5, 2024, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring her case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 5). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, bringing her case into proper form. Nevertheless, upon review of the complaint, the undersigned recommends that it be summarily dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff alleges violations of her First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (doc. 1 at 1). The plaintiff also seeks relief based on the Treaty of 1866 and the Moroccan American Treaty of Peace and Friendship; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, 3631, and 14141; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (id. at 1-2). The plaintiff also seeks money damages for state law claims of retaliation, negligence, misfeasance, malfeasance, malicious prosecution, entrapment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, breach of contract, violations of Judicial Conduct Rule 5(b), and white collar crimes (id.). The plaintiff alleges that slavery has not actually been abolished and that the defendants are using systemic abuse to violate international humanitarian law, have prevented the plaintiff from buying a house, are helping the father of the plaintiff's child, Mr. Wilkey, Sr., psychologically harm the plaintiff, are constantly surveiling the plaintiff illegally, have used social programs to exploit the plaintiff and prevent her from being successful in family court proceedings, have ruined the plaintiff's reputation, are gaslighting the plaintiff by indicating that she has a mental illness despite the fact that the plaintiff has just been grieving, have prevented the plaintiff from being able to hire an attorney, and have violated the plaintiff's rights as an American Indian indigenous to Spartanburg County (id. at 3-10).
The plaintiff further alleges invasion of privacy, pretext for discrimination, pretext for retaliation/malfeasance, abuse of process, misfeasance/judicial misconduct, abuse of power, nonfeasance, malfeasance, misfeasance, manipulation of evidence, exploitation/fraud, unlawful restraint, threat and intimidation, false imprisonment, psychological coercion control (forced treatment and removal of clothing), illegal surveillance, harassment/stalking, negligence, and a due process violation, among other things (id. at 10-30). The plaintiff's injuries include threats to her life, liberty, and property; enduring traumatic situations due to spiritual warfare; being driven insane; a conspiracy against the plaintiff's rights; mental distress (due to harassment and having her children removed from her custody); and lost job opportunities (id. at 30-32). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages, and an order of protection against Mr. Wilkey, Sr. (id. at 32).
APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a Defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
There are two types of federal jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction arises when the case arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction, on the other hand, is conferred upon the Court when a suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction (doc. 1 at 2-3). As set forth below, the plaintiff's claims fail to state a claim for relief; thus, the undersigned recommends that this matter be dismissed.
Because the plaintiff shares citizenship (South Carolina) with several defendants (South Carolina state agencies and Mr. Wilkey, Sr.), diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case (see doc. 1 at 1).
Federal Statutes
The plaintiff's complaint references a litany of federal statutes under which she seeks damages: 18 U.S.C. § 241 (federal criminal statute regarding conspiracy to deprive rights), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (federal criminal statute regarding deprivation of rights under color of law), 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (federal criminal statute regarding violations/penalties for violating sections of the Fair Housing Act), and 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 12601 - Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act) (see generally doc. 1). The plaintiff, as a private citizen, may not enforce federal criminal law. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979). Federal rights of action, like substantive federal law, “must be created by Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)). “To create a private right of action, Congress must speak[ ] with a clear voice and the statute must unambiguously express the intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.” Clear Sky Car Wash LLC v. City of Chesapeake, 743 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Where “Congress is silent or ambiguous, courts may not find a cause of action ‘no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter.'” Planned Parenthood S. At. v. Baker, 941 F.3d 687, 695 (4th Cir. 2019) (partially quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-87). This holds true for federal criminal statutes. See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 448 (4th Cir. 2000); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir. 1987). Further, only the Attorney General is authorized to file a civil action to enforce 34 U.S.C. § 12601. Graham v. Sec'y of the Army, C/A No. 5:17-cv-502-FL, 2018 WL 4623646 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 26, 2018). Similarly, the other statutes cited by the plaintiff do not create a private right of action or unambiguously provide the plaintiff with either a private right or remedy. See Pinckney v. U.S. Gov't, C/A No. 2:19-cv-00939-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 4171117, at *2 (D.S.C. June 20, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 4168753 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2019). Further, the plaintiff has no standing to pursue this matter criminally because private citizens lack a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619. Accordingly, because the plaintiff may not assert claims based upon alleged violations of the various federal statutes outlined above, such claims are subject to summary dismissal.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The plaintiff requests from this court an order for money damages and an order of protection against Mr. Wilkey, Sr., because decisions by unspecified courts in the state of South Carolina were improper (such as denials of orders of protection, family court orders not favorable to the plaintiff, and denial of benefits requests) (see doc. 1). Such claims are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the Rooker- Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). As noted, here the plaintiff seeks to overturn denials of her requests for an order of protection as well as to have unfavorable family court orders overturned (see generally doc. 1). It is well-settled, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues; instead, only the United States Supreme Court may review those state-court decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476-82 (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719 (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, C/A No. 3:08-cv-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine gets its name from two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court finding that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments where the district court is requested to review and reject those judgments. See Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
The doctrine applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 & nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that a federal court must accord full faith and credit to a state court judgment); Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, because the plaintiff seeks an order from this court that would vacate various orders and proceedings in various South Carolina state courts, the instant action is also subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The plaintiff's complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey
To the extent the plaintiff's vague allegations of improper arrests, tickets, and convictions seeks money damages from the defendants, such claims are barred by Heck. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged. Id. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extended to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment). This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff's complaint includes no indication that her charges were adjudicated in her favor - conceding that she pled guilty to many of the charges (albeit unintentionally) by paying the fines, and was wrongfully convicted on other charges (see doc. 1). Because the plaintiff has not alleged a favorable termination for the various tickets and convictions for which she seeks money damages, her damages claim is barred by Heck.
Federal Tort Claims Act Claims
The plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, which is part of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The FTCA sets forth situations in which the United States has waived the sovereign immunity it otherwise enjoys. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. The FTCA vests the district courts with:
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). FTCA claims may only lie against the United States, the defendant named in this action. Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 805-06 (2010). Because the plaintiff's complaint involves events that occurred in South Carolina, the substantive law of South Carolina applies to her FTCA claims. Miller v. United States, 932 F.2d 301,303 (4th Cir. 1991); Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 2009). However, upon review of the plaintiff's complaint, beyond a passing reference to the FTCA, there are no allegations that appear to address the plaintiff's request for relief under the FTCA (see doc. 1). Indeed, as outlined below, the plaintiff's allegations of a wide-spread conspiracy involving government housing assistance programs and national origin discrimination are frivolous in nature - thus, they cannot form the basis of an FTCA claim. As such, the plaintiff's FTCA claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Section 1983 Claims
Some of the claims asserted by the plaintiff appear based on § 1983 (see doc. 1). Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
First, the plaintiff's claims against the State of South Carolina are subject to dismissal because the State of South Carolina is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781,781-82 (1978); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (noting that the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1979) (holding that congress has not abrogated the state's sovereign immunity in § 1983 actions). Further, the South Carolina Department of Social Services and the Spartanburg Sheriff Department are not “persons” as defined by § 1983, thus, they are entitled to summary dismissal. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” As noted, these defendants are not persons; hence, they are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); Stroman v. York Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., C/A No. 0:18-cv-01632-JMC-PJG, 2019 WL 498387, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2019) (finding that the York County Department of Social Services was not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983).
Even construing the plaintiff's complaint as asserting a claim for municipal liability against the city of Spartanburg (and presuming this entity were an appropriate entity for Monell liability), her claim still fails (see doc. 1). As an initial matter, municipalities and other local governing bodies are considered “persons” and may be sued under Section 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, a county or city cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “[N]ot every deprivation of a constitutional right will lead to municipal liability. Only in cases where the municipality causes the deprivation ‘through an official policy or custom' will liability attach.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest [s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”Id. (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 217). Additionally, under Monell, municipal liability arises “only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom.” Walker v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, however, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations have failed to allege any constitutionally offensive action by an individual defendant - and the one individual defendant named (as noted below) is not a state actor for which municipal liability could apply. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654-55 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that when a plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against individual officers, claims based upon supervisory and/or Monell liability also fail). As such, the plaintiff's claims against these defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
Derrick Wilkey, Sr.
The plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Mr. Wilkey, Sr., fail because this defendant did not act under color of state law. It is well-settled that “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the state' can be sued as a state actor under § 1983.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012). However, private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is not covered under § 1983. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999). In distinguishing between state action and private action,
The judicial obligation is not only to preserv[e] an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoi[d] the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control, but also to assure that constitutional standards are invoked when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assn, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). State action may be found to exist “if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has identified several contexts in which private action may be found to constitute state action, such as “when the state has coerced a private actor to commit an act that would be unconstitutional if done by the state”; “when the state has delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor”; “when the state has sought to evade a clear constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor”; or “when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private citizen.” Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993). The critical inquiry in each case is whether the private actor's conduct was fairly attributable to the state. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2001). “[T]he ultimate resolution of whether an actor was a state actor . . . is a question of law for the court.” Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 344 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000). Here, the plaintiff's complaint - which appears to allege that Mr. Wilkey, Sr., conspired in an unspecified way with the defendants to violate the plaintiff's rights regarding custody of a child they share - “includes no facts that establish such a ‘close nexus' between” the challenged actions of Mr. Wilkey, Sr., and the state such that his actions “may be ‘fairly treated' as those of the state itself.” See Perry v. Chattem, Inc., C/A No. 7:08-cv-00106, 2008 WL 983428, at *4 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 2008).
Indeed, there is nothing in the plaintiff's complaint to suggest that Mr. Wilkey, Sr., was a state actor (see doc. 1). As such, the plaintiff's § 1983 claims are subject to summary dismissal.
Section 1985 and Section 1986 Claims
The plaintiff's claims asserting a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 or 1986 are also subject to summary dismissal. First, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has “specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner,” absent concrete supporting facts. See Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995). Further, the plaintiff's complaint does not allege under which subsection of § 1985 she seeks relief; however, her complaint - containing only vague references to various conspiracies - fails to state a claim under all of the subsections. As such, the plaintiff has failed to allege a claim under § 1985. Moreover, because a § 1986 claim is derivative of a § 1985 claim, the plaintiff's § 1986 claim is likewise subject to summary dismissal. See King v. PEM Props., C/A No. 2:16-cv-09876, 2019 WL 6210937, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 17, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6194639 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 20, 2019).
Frivolousness
The plaintiff's complaint is also subject to summary dismissal as frivolous. It is well-settled that the court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams, 40 F.3d at 74; Raiford v. FBI, C/A No. 1:10-cv-2751-MBS-JRM, 2010 WL 6737887, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2020729 (D.S.C. May 23, 2011) (explaining a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”). In reviewing a complaint for frivolousness or malice, the court looks to see whether the complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
Here, even when reviewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint is comprised of factual allegations that are not credible, and which fail to state a claim for relief. See Neal v. Duke Energy, No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff's factual allegations were frivolous, fanciful, and delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were “made without any viable factual supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy”); Feurtado v. McNair, No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd, 227 Fed.Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. dismissed, 553 U.S. 1029 (2008). For example, the plaintiff's assertions that she is entitled to relief based on the Treaty of 1866, the Moroccan American Treaty of Peace and Friendship Treaty, or based on events dating back to 2011 (more than 10 years before this action was filed) are clearly legally and factually frivolous (see doc. 1). The remainder of the plaintiff's allegations are similarly frivolous and nonsensical in nature, including that: slavery has not been abolished and the plaintiff has been subject to national origin discrimination because the plaintiff is “indigenous to this land,” but government assistance programs raise the rent when she earns more money; the defendants used laws and ordinances to cause entrapment and sabotage the plaintiff; the plaintiff's utility bill and car insurance have been high because of “nonstop surveillance”; the defendants have been gaslighting the plaintiff to drive her insane or have her commit suicide; the defendants have been “taking advantage of single-family households, as in Jeffery Epstein”; the plaintiff has been exploited through government programs that subject her to nonstop abuse and harassment; the plaintiff's reputation has been harmed by conspiracies between Mr. Wilkey, Sr., and the other defendants; the plaintiff has been on a fixed income, which constituted “wrongful termination”; the plaintiff has been exposed to systemic “genocide on people of color”; the plaintiff's children have been coerced into thinking they have been abused; the defendant is using black magic to induce the plaintiff's mental illness; the plaintiff was forced into inpatient mental health treatment at the hospital that killed her grandmother; that her request for a concealed weapons permit was denied; and the plaintiff's disability benefits have been wrongfully paid to her mother (based on allegations that she could not handle her disability benefits) (see generally doc. 1). These allegations are clearly frivolous and lack a basis in the law. As such, the plaintiff's complaint is also subject to summary dismissal as frivolous.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
To the extent the plaintiff seeks damages based on state law causes of action - including retaliation, negligence, misfeasance, malfeasance, malicious prosecution, entrapment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and claims pursuant to the SCTCA, to name a few - the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over such claims. Such claims can be considered by this court through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction,” which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal claims. Wis. Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Here, as noted, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a federal claim for relief, as outlined in more detail above. Thus, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”).
Litigation History
Of note, the plaintiff in this matter has continued to file frivolous litigation in this court - and was previously warned that continuing to file frivolous litigation may lead to the imposition of sanctions or prefiling restrictions. See Boyd v. Spartanburg Mun. Corp., et al., C/A No. 7:23-cv-05097-BHH, 2023 WL 7924725 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2023) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous and duplicative of prior actions filed in this court); Boyd v. U.S. Corp., etal., C/A No. 7:23-cv-04236-BHH, 2023 WL 6161946 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2023) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous); Boyd v. Spartanburg Cnty., etal., C/A No. 7:23-cv-02182-BHH, 2023 WL 4686460 (D.S.C. July 20, 2023) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous, duplicative, and for failure to state a claim); Boyd v. Spartanburg Cnty., et al., C/A No. 7:23-cv-02478-BHH, 2023 WL 4601019 (D.S.C. July 18, 2023) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous, duplicative, and for failure to state a claim); Boydv. Wilkey, Sr., C/A No. 6:23-cv-01880-BHH, 2023 WL 3752291 (D.S.C. June 1, 2023) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim); Boyd v. U.S.A., et al., C/A No. 7:22-cv-01633-BHH, 2023 WL 1794569 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2023) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and instructing that future actions not be accepted asserting the same allegations); Boyd v. U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, C/A No. 7:21-cv-01133-BHH, 2021 WL 2477170 (D.S.C. June 17, 2021) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim and warning regarding the entry of prefiling restrictions); Boyd v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., C/A No. 7:20-cv-00829-BHH, 2020 WL 1891913 (D.S.C. Apr. 16, 2020) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case for failure to state a claim); Boyd v. U.S., C/A No. 7:20-cv-00178-BHH, 2020 WL 816077 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2020) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim); Boyd v. Diangikes, C/A No. 7:19-cv-01077-BHH, 2019 WL 2057911 (D.S.C. May 9, 2019) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'd 773 Fed.Appx. 689 (4th Cir. 2019) (mem.); Boydv. S.C., etal., C/A No. 7:19-cv-00867-BHH, 2019 WL 2057961 (D.S.C. May 9, 2019) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim), aff'd 773 Fed.Appx. 678 (4th Cir. 2019) (mem.); Boyd v. United States, C/A No. 7:19-cv-00376-BHH, 2019 WL 1875592 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2019) (adopting report and recommendation and dismissing case as frivolous and for failure to state a claim), aff'd 773 Fed.Appx. 702 (4th Cir. 2019) (mem.). The plaintiff's duplicative and frivolous filings have hindered the court from fulfilling its constitutional duty. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004). Further, in granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the undersigned noted that the plaintiff may be required to pay costs or fees at the conclusion of the case if the case was found to be without merit. See Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972-74 (4th Cir. 1981). As such, the undersigned recommends that the plaintiff be sanctioned.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice (other than claims barred by Heck and the Rooker- Feldman doctrine), without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Additionally, based upon the plaintiff's penchant for the filing of duplicative and frivolous actions in this court, the undersigned further recommends that the assigned United States District Judge sanction the plaintiff $405.00, payable to the Clerk of Court at 250 East North Street, Greenville, SC 29601, for filing this duplicative and frivolous action. It is further recommended that in the event the plaintiff attempts to file another action in this Court before payment of the filing fee and sanction from this case, the Clerk of Court be authorized to assign civil action numbers (for docket control purposes) so that the undersigned may (1) instruct the plaintiff to pay the sanctions (and if the sanctions are not paid, dismiss the action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process) or (2) certify that the action is not frivolous. The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).