Opinion
A150245
02-28-2018
DAVID BOYD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM BOYD, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. CIV521495)
Plaintiff David Boyd sued his brother William for some $700,000 allegedly owed on oral loan agreements dating back to at least 1981. Following a defense judgment, David contends the trial court erred when it treated William's motions for directed verdict and nonsuit as a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 638.1 and found the action barred by various affirmative defenses. The court's ruling was procedurally sound and David's failure to address its dispositive rulings on William's equitable defenses in his opening brief forfeits any challenge to those rulings on appeal. We therefore affirm.
Because the brothers share a common last name we will refer to them by their first names. We intend no disrespect by this practice.
BACKGROUND
In May 2013 David sued William for fraud, negligence, breach of oral contract and related causes of action. As later amended, the verified complaint alleged that William failed to repay approximately $700,000 borrowed in a series of oral loan transactions that took place between the late 1970s or early 1980s and approximately 2004.
At the outset of trial it was decided the legal issues for the jury's consideration and the equitable issues for the court's would be tried simultaneously. David testified that there were in essence three groups of loans: one in the amount of $90,000 made in September 1981, to be used for commodities trading; two loans totaling $250,000 made in the early 2000s, on which David claimed $90,000 was still owing; and a third group of loans amounting to $520,000 made between May 2007 and March 2010. William asserted affirmative defenses based upon the statute of limitations, the statute of frauds, uncertainty, laches, and unclean hands.
At the close of evidence, William moved for nonsuit and a directed verdict. The court treated both motions as a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. In a detailed 26-page statement of decision, it concluded David's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches. "[G]iven the oral, undocumented nature of the agreements at issue, Plaintiff has delayed filing far beyond a reasonable time. Other than the $520,000 transaction with Epicure, which was initially made in 2007, the other alleged loans were allegedly made as far back as 1981 and 2001-2003. Plaintiff has not offered any reasonable explanation as to the cause of his delay in filing the asserted claims." The court further found that David's unexcused delay prejudiced William's ability to defend himself, particularly as David failed to provide documentary evidence or testimony regarding the material terms of any of the alleged loans. "Given the vague nature of the allegations and Plaintiff's failure to provide details of the alleged loans during trial and Plaintiff's faulty memory on key facts, it would be manifestly unfair to require Defendant to defend against the claims."
Further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court also found David's claims were barred by the doctrine of unclean hands, that certain of them were barred by the statute of frauds, and that the brothers were not in a fiduciary relationship during the relevant period. Judgment was therefore entered for William.
David moved for a new trial and, after his motion was denied, filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court Properly Treated William's Motions as A Motion for Judgment
David's primary argument is procedural. He contends the court erred when it treated William's motions for directed verdict and nonsuit as a motion for judgment under section 631.8. He asserts this statutory procedure is not available in jury trials. Accordingly, he maintains, the court erroneously considered both parties' evidence as permitted under section 631.8, when it should have followed the procedures for a directed verdict and considered only the plaintiff's evidence. He is mistaken.
Under section 631.8," [a]fter a party has completed his presentation of evidence in a trial by the court, the other party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in support of his defense or in rebuttal in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a judgment. The court as trier of the facts shall weigh the evidence and may render a judgment in favor of the moving party, in which case the court shall make findings as provided in Section 632 and 634 of this code, or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence." If the above requirements of section 631.8 are met, the trial court may treat a motion for nonsuit as a motion for judgment under section 631.8. (In re Pack's Estate (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 74, 77-78; East-West Capital Corp. v. Khourie (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 553, 556 (Khourie).)
David correctly asserts that section 631.8 is available only in court trials, but the assertion does not help him. The court's dispositive rulings addressed William's equitable defenses, which were matters for the court to decide. (Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 157-158 (Hoopes).) There was nothing improper or even unusual about the procedure employed here. When an action presents both legal and equitable issues, "[i]t is well-established in California jurisprudence that '[t]he court may decide the equitable issues first and this decision may result in factual and legal findings that effectively dispose of the legal claims.' [Citation.] This District Court of Appeal has observed that 'the better practice' is for 'the trial court [to] determine the equitable issues before submitting the legal ones to the jury.' [Citation.] The historical reason for this procedure, at least as concerns equitable defenses, is that the same order of trial was observed when there were separate law and equity courts: 'If a defendant at law had an equitable defense, he resorted to a bill in equity to enjoin the suit at law, until he could make his equitable defense effective by a hearing before the chancellor.' [Citation.] '[T]he practical reason for this procedure is that the trial of the equitable issues may dispense with the legal issues and end the case.' [Citation.] In short, 'trial of equitable issues may first promote judicial economy.' " (Id. at p. 157.)
Thus, not surprisingly, "California's preference for the trial of equitable issues before legal issues has produced a number of cases in which bench resolution of equitable issues preceded consideration of legal claims, and curtailed or foreclosed legal issues. [Citation.] 'It is well established that, in a case involving both legal and equitable issues, the trial court may proceed to try the equitable issues first without a jury . . . and that if the court's determination of those issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, nothing further remains to be tried by a jury.' " (Ibid.) That is what happened here. The trial court's rulings on William's equitable defenses left nothing for the jury to decide, so judgment was properly entered for William.
David mistakenly relies (solely) on Khourie, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 553, for his contention that a trial court in a jury trial has no power to treat a motion for directed verdict or nonsuit as one for judgment under section 631.8. To the contrary, Khourie reversed a defense judgment because the trial court had not made the findings required by section 631.8, but it expressly acknowledges the trial court's authority to treat a motion for nonsuit as one for judgment "if the requirements of section 631.8 [are] otherwise met." (Id. at p. 556.) Here, in contrast, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.
II. David's Failure To Address Dispositive Rulings Forfeits His Substantive
Challenge To The Judgment
As previously noted, the court found David's action was barred in its entirety by the affirmative defenses of unclean hands, laches and the statute of limitations, while certain claims were also barred by the statute of frauds. David's opening brief challenges the ruling on the statute of limitations, but fails entirely to address the dispositive rulings on the other affirmative defenses. He has therefore abandoned any challenge to those rulings and the judgment that necessarily follows from them. "Courts will ordinarily treat the appellant's failure to raise an issue in his or her opening brief as a waiver of that challenge." (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App. 4th 659, 685; Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 ["[i]ssues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the issues waived"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Siggins, J. We concur: /s/_________
McGuiness, Acting P.J. /s/_________
Jenkins, J.
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------