Summary
In Boyce, the district court considered whether statements made by the plaintiff's supervisor, the superintendent, constituted direct evidence of discrimination.
Summary of this case from Barnes v. Mayor & Aldermen of SavannahOpinion
3:99-CV-126 (DF).
January 30, 2002
Ethel L. Munson, Atlanta, Ga., Attorney for Plaintiff.
Micheal C. Pruett, Malcolm Charles McArthur, Athens, Ga., Attorneys for Defendants.
O R D E R
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (tab #41). Plaintiff has filed suit against Defendants under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for race discrimination and (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants respond that (1) Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) Plaintiff has not provided a sufficient basis for demonstrating that Defendants' proposed legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for acting were pretextual, and (3) Defendant Belden is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity from damages under § 1983.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an African-American female, has been an employee with the Walton County School District since 1976, at which time she began teaching special-education students at Walker Park Elementary School ("Walker Park"), a predominantly Caucasian school. In 1989, at the request of her superiors, she was promoted to the position of assistant principal at Walker Park. Then, in 1996, she was promoted to the position of principal at Walker Park upon the recommendations of the outgoing principal and the district superintendent, Defendant Belden. Defendant Belden served as the district superintendent from 1995 through 1999. In 1999, Defendant Walton County voted not to renew Plaintiff's contract for the following year, and it decided that she should be transferred to the position of teacher at another school. This transfer serves as the basis for Plaintiff's suit.
Plaintiff alleges that from the moment she assumed the position of principal, racial tensions within the workplace created considerable resistance to her ability to perform her duties. Some of this resistance, according to Plaintiff, came from Defendants. For example, Plaintiff initially appointed a Hispanic male to serve as her assistant principal. However, she claims that Defendant Belden told her that she should select a Caucasian male "for the community." Plaintiff also cites several instances during which Defendant Belden discussed the presence and effects of racial tensions at Walker Park. The first two involved surveys sent out by Enolar Callands and Olivet James, two teachers at Walker Park, concerning the development of an African-American studies curriculum at the school. According to Callands, Defendant Belden stated that the school could not pursue such a program because Plaintiff's appointment as principal had created too much racial tension and that the faculty did not need another racial issue with which to deal. Plaintiff also claims that on another occasion Defendant Belden commented on the racial tensions between Plaintiff and two Caucasian teachers when she told Plaintiff that they would just have to get used to having an African-American principal. Finally, during a student play, Defendant Belden made comments to the effect that Walker Park was no longer a "lily-white" school when she noted the number of minority students in the play.
Plaintiff also contends that she faced substantial resistance from staff and parents who she claims resented the appointment of an African-American principal. Regardless of the reason for this resistence, conflicts between Plaintiff and the faculty and parents existed from the beginning of her appointment as principal. During Plaintiff's first year as principal, Defendant Belden received several complaints about Plaintiff's handling of school affairs. Defendant Belden then had a meeting with Plaintiff and the Walker Park faculty to discuss these issues, during which the faculty voiced concerns about Plaintiff's management and administration of the school. Plaintiff contends that many of these complaints were racially motivated, and she has provided affidavits from several teachers supporting this contention. Plaintiff also contends that by accepting complaints directly from the teachers, Defendant Belden broke the proper chain of command; rather, according to Plaintiff, all teachers' complaints should have first gone through the principal before reaching the superintendent.
Defendants contend that these problems still existed throughout the year and that Plaintiff had not addressed the staff grievances. In March 1998, Defendants attempted to resolve these concerns by implementing a Professional Development Plan ("PDP"). This plan set out four areas in which Plaintiff was to improve her job skills and provided specific means by which those objectives were to be achieved. The four objectives set out by the plan included: (1) establishing expectations and guidelines for all employees regarding student discipline and building maintenance, (2) developing positive relationships with staff and parents, (3) becoming more knowledgeable about the school system and handling problems in a timely manner, and (4) ensuring that adequate instructional, custodial, and office supplies remained available throughout the year. The PDP then provided a list of activities to be performed in furtherance of each objective. Defendants have cited several instances in which Plaintiff failed to comply with the PDP activities and objectives.
The first PDP objective required Plaintiff to establish expectations and guidelines for all employees as to student discipline and building maintenance. As part of this objective, Plaintiff was required to provide written guidance to custodians as to student discipline-an activity that Plaintiff did not complete. This activity was made necessary by a prior incident between a custodian and a student. Plaintiff refused to comply with the PDP directive because she felt this matter to be properly covered by the existing guidebook, which provided national guidelines. Plaintiff also failed to comply with the third activity, which required her to write letters of reprimand to staff members when appropriate. However, Plaintiff claims the reason she did not complete this activity was because of a Georgia Association of Educators publication stating that only the superintendent can write such letters. Plaintiff failed to comply with the fourth activity-establishing procedures for calling the police and/or family services. As before, Plaintiff admits to her noncompliance with the activity, but she states that such an undertaking would have been unnecessary because details on this issue were already covered by written guidelines in the county office.
Defendants also cite several instances in which Plaintiff failed to comply with the fourth objective of the PDP. Plaintiff failed to conduct the number of observations required under the PDP. While Plaintiff responds that she was no longer required to perform these observations because a change in state law removed this requirement, Defendants respond that the PDP nonetheless retained this requirement in addition to those minimums set by state law. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff failed to review supply expenditures on a weekly basis.
At the end of the 1997-1998 school year, the staff of Walker Park were surveyed in accordance with the PDP. Many of the surveys reflected dissatisfaction with Plaintiff's management of the school and her ability to communicate with the staff. Plaintiff claims that there were simply too many questions from teachers to respond to them all.
Defendant Belden then conducted another survey in November 1998, which reflected some improvement. Subsequent to this second survey, Defendant Belden submitted her recommendation form to the school board. This form provided several categories that could be marked either "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory," and it provided space for additional comments. Defendant Belden ultimately recommended Plaintiff for reappointment and marked all categories as "satisfactory," but she also commented that Plaintiff would need to improve in several specific areas to receive a contract renewal for her position as principal. In February 1999, the school board voted 6-0 in favor of Plaintiff's reappointment as principal.
Throughout the remainder of Spring 1999, several incidents occurred that reflected adversely on Plaintiff's performance record. The final incident leading to Plaintiff's transfer occurred in July 1999, when Assistant Superintendent Kathy Arnett reviewed staff personnel files at Walker Park to determine whether the observations and evaluations required under the PDP were complete. According to Defendants, prior to this visit Defendant Belden informed Plaintiff that Arnett was coming for this very purpose. This notice was provided by an email message that stated: "Kathy Arnett will be in your building . . . to review your evaluations and observations forms. Concern [sic] are still be [sic] expressed that you are not following the procedures for the GTOI/GTEP. I have asked her to review your personnel files and evaluation of observation forms." During the visit, Arnett determined that several required observations had not been performed. Plaintiff contends that the observation files had been completed, but had been removed without her knowledge. She further contends that she did not inform Arnett that they were missing because she did not understand that Arnett would be reviewing them on her visit. Plaintiff insists, however, that despite any truth to these assertions by Defendants, that all of Plaintiff's evaluations had been received by the central office within two or three days of the due dates.
Later that month, the school board voted 6-0 not to renew Plaintiff's contract for the position of principal and decided that she would be transferred to a teaching position at another school. Plaintiff then contacted Kirklyn Dixon, the only African-American member of the school board, about her concerns that the decision was racially motivated. Dixon informed her that he would investigate the matter. Subsequent to his investigation, he felt that many of the complaints initially lodged by teachers were rooted in racism and had no correlation to her ability as an administrator. The board then had a re-vote, in which Dixon was the only member who voted against transferring Plaintiff. Plaintiff subsequently quit her position as teacher and accepted early retirement. Plaintiff was replaced as principal by a Caucasian female.
II. DISCUSSION
A . Standard of Review
Summary judgment must be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact necessary to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment arises only when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must review all the evidence in the record while "draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc ., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); see also Maynard v. Williams , 72 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 1996).
The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" and that entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp ., 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact (i.e., evidence that would support a jury verdict) or that the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp ., 477 U.S. at 324-26. This evidence must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations or legal conclusions. See Avirgan v. Hull , 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). Under this scheme, summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp ., 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Title VII Claim
1. Proper Parties to Plaintiff's Title VII Claim
The Court first notes that Plaintiff has brought her Title VII claim for discrimination against Defendant Walton County as well as against Defendant Belden, both individually and in her official capacity. However, the Eleventh Circuit has clearly stated that
[t]he relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not the individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act. . . . [T]he proper method for a plaintiff to recover under Title VII is by suing the employer, either by naming the supervisory employees as agents of the employer or by naming the employer directly.Busby v. City of Orlando , 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Cross v. Alabama State Dep't of Mental Health Retardation , 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot bring a Title VII claim against Defendant Belden as an individual. Nor can Plaintiff sue both Defendant Belden in her official capacity and Defendant Walton County for the same Title VII violation; rather, Plaintiff must bring this action against either one or the other. See Busby , 931 F.2d at 772. Because allowing the claims against both Defendants would be redundant, the Court construes the complaint as asserting a Title VII claim for racial discrimination only against Defendant Walton County, the actual employer.
2. Direct Evidence
Plaintiff first contends that she has direct evidence of discrimination. Direct evidence is "`evidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.'" Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co ., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc ., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1987)). However, "[e]vidence that only suggests discrimination . . . or that is subject to more than one interpretation . . . does not constitute direct evidence." Id . Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Belden's comments about the request for an African-American studies curriculum, her advice about racial tensions at the school, and her statement at the school play constitute direct evidence of discrimination. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees.
While it is true that the statements cited by Plaintiff might be used to show that Defendant Belden perceived that racial tensions did exist at Walker Park, none of these statements shows that Defendant Walton County actually made any employment decisions because of Plaintiff's race. At most, statements might be used to infer that Defendant Walton County transferred Plaintiff to mitigate these tensions; however, to make such an inference would be to treat the statements as indirect. See id . at 1191 (finding that a statement constitutes direct evidence only when "there is no other reasonable interpretation" for the statement than one of discriminatory intent). Each of these statements could just as easily support the inference that Defendant Belden was highly concerned about Plaintiff's transition into an environment filled with racial tensions. Furthermore, none of these statements constitutes commentary by Defendant Belden concerning Plaintiff's race and her ability to perform her job. Rather, Defendant Belden merely made observations about the environment in which Plaintiff was required to work by commenting on others' treatment of Plaintiff. For example, Defendant Belden's comment about the school no longer being "lily white" was a recognition that the school had a more diverse composition; read in the context of the play, it is not at all clear that she made this comment as a negative criticism of the school's growing diversity. Finally, because Defendant Belden was not a final decision maker as to the transfer of Plaintiff, her comments cannot serve as direct evidence of discrimination. See Evans v. McClain of Ga . , Inc ., 131 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that because the defendant "was not a decisionmaker with respect to either of [the] employment decisions, his discriminatory comment cannot satisfy Appellant's burden in this regard"). Regardless of the interpretation given to these statements, at most they provide a basis for the inference of discrimination; therefore, they do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
While these comments do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination, they may, nonetheless, be relevant to the Court's pretext analysis. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr ., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (noting that "[l]anguage not amounting to direct evidence, but showing some racial animus, may be significant evidence of pretext once a plaintiff has set out the prima facie case"). The Court notes, however, that it is not clear that they do show racial animus. See Part II.B.3.c.
3. Indirect Evidence
Because Plaintiff has not provided direct evidence of discrimination, the Court must determine whether she has provided sufficient indirect evidence to support an inference of discrimination. In analyzing a Title VII claim for disparate treatment based on indirect evidence, courts have consistently applied the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). See, e.g., Durley v. APAC, Inc ., 236 F.3d 651, 656-59 (11th Cir. 2000). In accordance with this framework, the plaintiff first bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). At this point, however, the defendant bears only a burden of production, not persuasion. See id . Should the defendant produce any evidence "which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action," then it has satisfied its burden of production. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (emphasis omitted). Upon the defendant's production of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this proffered explanation is merely pretext and that the defendant's real purpose was discriminatory. See Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253. In light of this framework, Defendant Walton County contends that Plaintiff's claim fails for two reasons: (1) she has not made out a prima facie case of race discrimination; and (2) she has not shown that Defendant Walton County's nondiscriminatory reason for the transfer is pretextual. The Court now addresses each of these contentions in turn.
a. Prima Facie Case
"Demonstrating a prima facie case is not onerous; it requires only that the plaintiff establish facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination." Holifield v. Reno , 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). In McDonnell Douglas , the Supreme Court required a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination through the use of indirect evidence to demonstrate that
(1) she is within a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) similarly situated individuals outside the protected class were treated differently, and (4) she was qualified for the job. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 804; Durley , 236 F.3d at 655-56. Focusing on the third prong of the prima facie case, Defendant Walton County claims that Plaintiff has failed to establish that similarly situated individuals outside her class were treated differently. In making this argument, Defendant Walton County relies heavily upon Holifield , in which the Eleventh Circuit stated: "In determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways."Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1562. In relying solely on Holifield , however, Defendant Walton County fails to recognize that the four-part test set out in McDonnell Douglas is not the sole means of establishing an inference of discrimination based on indirect evidence. See Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ ., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that while the McDonnell Douglas framework provides one method for establishing an inference of discrimination, "[i]t is not the exclusive means"); see also Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment , 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998).
Often it is necessary to modify the McDonnell Douglas framework based on the unique circumstances of each case. See McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13 (noting that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required . . . is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations"); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens , 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas framework was "never intended to be rigid"). Although McDonnell Douglas involved claims of racial discrimination in hiring, the Eleventh Circuit has modified this four-part test to apply to cases not involving discrimination at the hiring stage. See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ ., 616 F.2d 116, 120 (5th Cir. 1980). A plaintiff suing for a discriminatory termination, for example, may satisfy the similarly situated requirement by demonstrating that "after his termination, the employer hired a person not in plaintiff's protected class, or retained those, having comparable or lesser qualifications, not in plaintiff's protected class." Id . at 121; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr ., 509 U.S. at 506; Hinson v. Clinch County Bd. of Educ ., 231 F.3d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying the same prima facie analysis to a discrimination claim in which the plaintiff was removed as principal and transferred to a teaching position); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc ., 922 F.2d 1515, 1525 (11th Cir. 1991). Applying this modified analysis to this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that she was replaced as principal by a Caucasian female-an individual outside her protected class. Under the circumstances, such a replacement successfully establishes the inference of a racially motivated employment action.
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all decisions issued by the former Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
The only other part of the prima facie case challenged by Defendant Walton County is whether Plaintiff was qualified for the job. While McDonnell Douglas did include this factor within its prima facie case for claims of discrimination at the hiring stage, this factor has less relevance within the context of a transfer, because the plaintiff has already demonstrated her qualifications at one time in order to obtain the position. See Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Prods., Inc . , 827 F.2d 1493, 1495 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that when a Title VII plaintiff is discharged from a position held for a long period of time, her qualifications for the position can generally be inferred). Additionally, in certain circumstances, the issue of job qualifications may be more appropriately addressed at other stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework. The Eleventh Circuit recognized this exception in Young v. General Foods Corp ., 840 F.2d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 1988), and determined that a plaintiff who was fired from a position after serving just under three years did not have to establish his job qualifications as part of the prima facie case. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
because General Foods has asserted poor job performance as its reason for firing [the plaintiff], we need not decide whether Young is entitled to an inference of qualification under Rosenfield. Instead, [t]he focus of the inquiry [is] not a determination of whether [the plaintiff] was in fact performing his job adequately, but rather, whether there was sufficient evidence of unsatisfactory performance to be a legitimate concern of [the defendant and] whether this was the real reason for the termination and not a pretext for age discrimination.Id . at 830 n. 3; see also Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1562 n. 3 (noting the appropriateness of addressing qualifications during the pretext analysis when these issues are closely intertwined). As in Young , Defendant Walton County's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for transferring Plaintiff is based on its alleged perception of Plaintiff as being unable to adequately perform the duties of a principal. Because this issue of job qualification goes to the heart of the pretext analysis, and because Plaintiff has brought this claim as a transfer claim, the Court will address the issue of job qualifications below.
b. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason
Having made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production now shifts to Defendant Walton County to provide "reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." Hicks , 509 U.S. at 507. However, because this is a burden of production, and not a burden of proof, the Court's determination of whether Defendant Walton County has met this burden "can involve no credibility assessment." Id . at 509.
Here, Defendant Walton County has stated that Plaintiff's poor performance in numerous areas throughout her tenure as principal was the only reason for her transfer. In support of this proffered reason, Defendant Walton County points first to the initial teacher complaints received during Plaintiff's first year as principal. Additionally, it points to numerous criticisms and responses made through the surveys that were used to evaluate Plaintiff's performance throughout her time as principal. Defendant Walton County also claims that Plaintiff was given several opportunities to correct any perceived problems. For example, Defendants created the PDP, with which Plaintiff admittedly failed to comply on several occasions. Defendants also rely on Defendant Belden's letter of recommendation, which cited several areas in which Plaintiff needed to improve in order to adequately carry out her duties as principal. Finally, Defendants cite the events of July 1999, when Arnett visited Walker Park. This showing is sufficient to satisfy the Defendant's burden.
c. Pretext
Faced with Defendant Walton County's nondiscriminatory reason, Plaintiff "must be afforded the `opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for the discrimination.'" Reeves , 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253). "[A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. . . . [However, t]his is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate." Reeves , 530 U.S. at 148; see also Hinson , 231 F.3d at 831. Additionally, "conclusory allegations of discrimination, without more, are not sufficient to raise an inference of pretext or intentional discrimination where an employer has offered extensive evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions." Carter v. City of Miami , 870 F.2d 578, 585 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court should consider "`the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered.'" Hinson , 231 F.3d at 832 (quoting Reeves , 530 U.S. at 148-49). For the following reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met this burden.
First, while Plaintiff goes to great lengths to show that Defendant Walton County's reasons for transferring her are ill-founded and that she was in fact qualified for the job, she never provides any basis for believing these reasons are pretextual. More specifically, Plaintiff never actually challenges Defendant Walton County's claim that it relied on her failure to comply with the PDP in reaching its decision to transfer her; she merely disagrees with this reasoning for this decision. For example, Plaintiff has admitted that on several occasions she did not comply with the terms of the PDP, but then she provides allegedly valid reasons for this noncompliance. However, such justifications, in and of themselves, do not satisfy her burden of demonstrating pretext. The issue before the Court at this stage is not whether Defendant Walton County was correct in its determination of Plaintiff's performance; rather, the Court must examine whether Defendant Walton County made its employment decision because of these perceptions of her performances, regardless of whether these perceptions were actually correct. See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc ., 161 F.3d 1318, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that "the heart of the pretext inquiry is not whether the employee agrees with the reasons that the employer gives for the discharge, but whether the employer really was motivated by those reasons"); Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1565; see also Hicks , 509 U.S. at 511 (noting that the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory intent remains with the plaintiff at the pretext stage). Thus, simply showing that Defendant Walton County relied on an incorrect perception of her abilities does not demonstrate that this reason is pretextual and that its underlying motivation was discriminatory. See Holifield , 115 F.3d at 1565 (noting that in the face of bad performance reviews, "an employee's assertions of his own good performance are insufficient to defeat summary judgment"). Rather, "In order to directly attack [the defendant's] reasons, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate `such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could find [all of those reasons] unworthy of credence.'" Standard , 161 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns , 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir, 1997). Here, no such showing has been made; if Defendant Walton County truly believed Plaintiff was incompetent, and if it acted for that reason, Plaintiff cannot meet her burden simply by showing that she was in fact competent to do the job.
Second, Plaintiff's contention that because the PDP was a vehicle meant only to appease the criticisms of the staff does not provide a basis for believing Defendant Walton County's reasons are pretextual. In fact, the PDP provided only a neutral and objective means of measuring Plaintiff's abilities as principal; the PDP did little to change the substance of those requirements already imposed on Plaintiff by the nature of her job, and it provided a more narrowly tailored process by which she should fulfill those requirements. In the end, Plaintiff has done little, if anything, to show that the PDP did not provide an objective basis through which Defendant Walton County could evaluate her performance on the job.
Third, Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Belden violated the chain of command in her handling of teacher's complaints does not create an inference of racial animus. Plaintiff disagrees with the method in which complaints were considered and claims that the fact that the complaints were not first shown to her is evidence of pretext. However, Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that this procedure is in any way an indication of disparate treatment against her. Plaintiff points to no written policy of procedure from which Defendants deviated in handling these complaints. Nor can she point to any instances in which complaints had been filed against past principals.
Fourth, Plaintiff claims that since Defendant Belden's appointment as superintendent, the number of certified minority teachers has declined. This point does little to support Plaintiff's claim of discrimination, however, because "[s]tatistics without an analytic foundation are `virtually meaningless.'" Evans , 131 F.3d at 963 (quoting Brown v. American Honda Motor Co ., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff also relies on conduct and statements by Defendant Belden to demonstrate that Defendant Walton County's purported reasons for the transfer are pretextual. Despite the fact that Defendant Belden did not make the ultimate employment decision, or the fact that only Defendant Walton County may be held liable for this Title VII claim, Defendant Belden's conduct (as well as motives for that conduct) is still relevant to the Court's analysis. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained,
[d]isparate treatment analysis requires that none of the participants in the decision-making process be influenced by racial bias. . . . Thus, the motivations of both the [decision maker] and [the subordinate] are pertinent. If the [decision maker] were not motivated by racial animus but [the subordinate] were consciously recommending discipline only for blacks, the [decision maker's] neutrality with respect to race would not cure [the subordinate's] racial bias, and a claimant could make out a prima facie Title VII disparate treatment claim. Moreover, just because [the subordinate] may not have known of prior similar violations and failed to recommend discipline, does not relieve the department as a whole of liability, if the [decision maker] ever knowingly decided not to recommend discipline (which had been recommended by any other officer) for a similar violation by a white officer.Jones v. Gerwens , 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 n. 13 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Ferrel v. Masland Carpets , 97 F. Supp.2d 1114, 1126 (S.D.Ala. 2000) (recognizing "that an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination if the actions of a neutral decision maker are somehow influenced by the prejudice of a non-decision maker"). Therefore, discriminatory animus by someone who was not a final decision maker, but who was nonetheless an "integral part of the multi-level hiring process," may influence the final decision maker and "taint" the entire process. Schoenfeld v. Babbitt , 168 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Defendant Belden was responsible for making recommendations to Defendant Walton County as to the qualifications of Plaintiff. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it appears that these recommendations may have been highly influential as to whether Plaintiff remained as principal. However, even assuming that such a causal inference is proper in this case, these comments do not create an inference of discrimination.
The Court notes that in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa , 186 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit stated that
[w]hen the biased recommender and the actual decisionmaker are not the same person or persons, a plaintiff may not benefit from the inference of causation that would arise from their common identity. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory animus behind the recommendation, and not the underlying employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual cause of the other party's decision to terminate the employee.Id . at 1333. However, imposing this standard runs contrary to well-established Eleventh Circuit precedent expressly allowing for just such an inference of causation when the non-decision maker influences the decision maker. Because Title VII allows suit only against the "employer," and because it provides no express means of imposing liability on individual employees, allowing employers to escape liability for the discriminatory actions of their supervising employees would create a loophole through which many defendants could escape liability. Furthermore, Stimpson makes no reference to cases applying the inference to claims of race discrimination, but rather relies solely on the standard set out for supervisor liability in sexual harassment cases in reaching its conclusion. See id . at 1331-32. Accordingly, the Court will continue to abide by the long-standing doctrine that states that when a recommendation of a non-decision maker who was motivated by racial animus influences the final employment decision, that racial animus should be imputed to the ultimate decision maker.
Specifically, Plaintiff relies on several specific comments and instances of conduct by Defendant Belden to create the inference of discrimination, including (1) statements made about getting used to the racial tensions, (2) statements regarding the denial of the African-American studies curriculum, (3) comments that the school was no longer "lily white," and (4) her statement to Plaintiff about selecting a Caucasian assistant principal. As discussed in the context of direct evidence, the first three statements do not necessarily imply that Defendant Belden was motivated by race. Additionally, Defendant Belden's conduct regarding the hiring of an assistant principal is a separate and distinct issue from that of Plaintiff's transfer. See Mencer v. Hammonds , 134 F.3d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that statements not related to the employment decision in question are not probative of discriminatory animus). At most, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant Belden was aware of racial tensions at the school, and that she may have considered race in the hiring of a different person to a different position. However, Plaintiff has failed to provide a basis for showing how any of these actions or statements demonstrate that she recommended the transfer of Plaintiff because of her race.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that the surveys which contributed to Defendant Walton County's decision to transfer her were "rooted in racism," and therefore tainted the school board's decision making process. However, Plaintiff has failed to provide a sufficient basis for which a fact finder could determine that these surveys were in fact racially biased. In fact, the only basis for Plaintiff's claim is the deposition testimony of Dixon, but even that does little to support her claim of pretext. Dixon did not state that the surveys were facially discriminatory, but he simply noted that the lack of any factual bases in these complaints led him to conclude that they were racially motivated. Because this conclusion constitutes nothing more than inadmissible speculation, it does not save Plaintiff from summary judgment. See Pinkerton Laws, Co. v. Roadway Express, Inc ., 650 F. Supp. 1138, 1140 (N.D.Ga. 1986) (noting that a court "may consider only admissible evidence when deciding a summary judgment motion"); see also Evans , 131 F.3d at 962 (noting that evidence based on gossip, common knowledge, and hearsay of an individual could not be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment).
Taken as a whole, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Walton County's reasons for transferring her were pretextual.
In determining whether summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case, the court should take into consideration a number of factors. Those factors `include the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered.Hinson , 231 F.2d at 832 (quoting Reeves , 530 U.S. at 148-49). Here, Plaintiff's provides nothing more than the minimal basis for a prima facie case, and she provides little, if any, basis for disbelieving Defendant Walton County's proffered reason for acting. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claim for disparate treatment must ultimately fail.
C. Section 1983 Claim
In addition to seeking damages under Title VII, Plaintiff has also sued Defendants under § 1983 for equal protection violations. Because § 1983 equal protection claims generally "have the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework" as Title VII disparate treatment claims, the Court can "address the Title VII claim with the understanding that the analysis applies to the § 1983 claim as well." Standard , 161 F.3d at 1330; see also Alexander v. Fulton County , 207 F.3d 1303, 1314 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2000); Cross , 49 F.3d at 1507-08 (noting that "when § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violation of Title VII, the elements of the two causes of action are the same"). Generally, therefore, the Court can apply the Title VII framework to determine Defendants' liability under § 1983. Despite the application of the Title VII framework to § 1983 equal protection claims, however, several differences between these statutory schemes greatly affect the Court's analysis of each Defendant's liability. For this reason, the Court will analyze Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against each Defendant separately.
1. Claim Against Defendant Walton County
Section 1983 does not allow a municipality to be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and a plaintiff cannot simply impute the conduct of its employees to the final decision-making body. See Busby , 931 F.2d at 776 (noting that a plaintiff must demonstrate that "the alleged racial discrimination . . . occurred pursuant to a custom or policy of [the municipality]"). More specifically,
a local government may not be sued under [section] 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.Monell v. Department of Human Servs ., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Therefore, this standard for liability under § 1983 is even higher than that under Title VII, because under § 1983 a plaintiff cannot establish liability simply by imputing to the municipality any racial animus of an employee. Rather, Plaintiff must establish that the decision was made pursuant to a custom or policy of acting contrary to an individual's constitutional rights, see Busby , 931 F.2d at 776; Hartley v. Parnell , 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), or that Defendant Walton County officially sanctioned the actions of an employee who acted in violation of those rights. Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale , 923 F.2d 1474, 1479-80 (11th Cir. 1991); Samedi v. Miami-Dade County , 134 F. Supp.2d 1320, 1349 (S.D.Fla. 2001) (noting that "[o]nly a decision maker vested with final authority to create policy can open the government to section 1983 municipal liability").
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any policy or procedure of discrimination by Defendant Walton County. Nor has Plaintiff shown how Defendant Walton County, itself, acted in a discriminatory manner so as to be liable under § 1983. The record provides no indication that Defendant Walton County acted on any information or basis other than the facially race-neutral reasons before it: that Plaintiff consistently failed to comply with the PDP and that she lacked the ability to manage the school's faculty effectively. At most, only one of the board members even suspected that these complaints may have arisen out of racial motivations. However, Plaintiff informed only that school board member of her concerns about racial discrimination, and that board member conducted an independent investigation of the matter. There is no evidence in the record that anyone ever presented to the entire school board a conclusive determination that the complaints by the teachers and Defendant Belden were anything but legitimate concerns about Plaintiff's ability to act as principal. Accordingly, her § 1983 claim against Defendant Walton County must fail.
2. Claims Against Defendant Belden, in Her Official Capacity
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that "when an officer is sued under § 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Busby , 931 F.2d at 776 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Owens v. Fulton County , 877 F.2d 947, 951 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff has brought claims against Defendant Walton County and Defendant Belden. Because allowing the claim to proceed against both Defendants would be redundant, Plaintiff is barred from asserting this § 1983 claim against Defendant Belden in her official capacity. See Busby , 931 F.2d at 776.
3. Claims Against Defendant Belden, in Her Individual Capacity
A government official can be sued under § 1983 in her individual capacity; however, a defendant sued in her individual capacity is sometimes entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for her conduct. See id . at 772. Here, Defendant Belden has properly raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, and the Court will examine Plaintiff's individual-capacity claim against Defendant Belden accordingly.
The affirmative defense of qualified immunity serves to protect government officials from being sued for conduct resulting from the administration of their official duties. The Supreme Court has recognized the policy that "[r]eliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Therefore, "[q]ualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil trials . . . and from liability if their conduct violates no `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Lassiter v. Alabama A M Univ ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Harlow , 457 U.S. at 815). Analysis of the qualified immunity defense involves a two-part inquiry. See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach , 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000). First, the defendant asserting this defense must demonstrate that she was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority at the time of the alleged violation. See id . Second, if this showing is made, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct violated some clearly established right. See id . Here, Plaintiff has conceded that Defendant Belden was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority. Therefore, the Court need determine only whether the conduct violated a clearly established right.
In order to establish the violation of a clearly established right, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that she has suffered from the deprivation of a currently cognizable constitutional right. See Conn v. Gabbert , 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999); Chesser v. Sparks , 248 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2001). If the violation of a currently cognizable right is determined, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct such that a reasonable person would have been put on notice of the constitutional violation. See Conn , 526 U.S. at 290; Chesser , 248 F.3d at 1122. Here, to determine whether Defendant Belden is liable for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must apply the same analytical framework as used for Title VII disparate treatment claims. See Cross , 49 F.3d at 1507-08. In accordance with the above Title VII analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established an inference of discrimination. Without such an inference of discrimination, Plaintiff's equal protection claim cannot withstand summary judgment.
The Court recognizes the general rule that the consideration of a defendant's subjective intent on a motion for summary judgment involving the defense of qualified immunity is inappropriate. See Crawford-El v. Britton , 523 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1998); Harlow , 457 U.S. 815-18. However, "[w]here discriminatory intent is an element of the tort-intent remains relevant." Ratcliff v. DeKalb County , 62 F.3d 338, 341 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Crawford-El , 523 U.S. 588-90, 592-93 (discussing the circumstances in which intent is an actual element of the constitutional claim and how this affects the qualified immunity analysis). Equal protection violations require such a showing of discriminatory intent. See Mercer v. Hammons , 134 F.3d 1066, 1070 (11th Cir. 1998); Parks v. City of Warner Robins , 43 F.3d 609, 616-17 (11th Cir. 1995). Therefore, Defendant Belden's subjective intent is properly before the Court on this issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.