It is also contended that equal protection of the law, and sections 3 and 6 of Article II of the Colorado Constitution require that the state be held liable for damages in actions founded on tort. Counsel for plaintiffs rely on Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007; Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Department of Agriculture, et al., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278; and Colorado Racing Commission, et al. v. Brush Racing Association, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582. None of those cases involved a claim for damages for injuries resulting from negligence of agents of instrumentalities of the state. They involved the right of persons to sue the state in actions founded on contract, and are authority for the proposition that where the state enters into contractual relations, the persons dealing with the state are entitled to enforce the contractual rights arising therefrom by resort to judicial proceedings, and the state cannot defeat the action by reliance upon a claim of sovereign immunity from suit.

Because of those facts, the court distinguished that case from the Mitchell case. Likewise, we do not think Boxberger v. State Highway Department, Colo., 250 P.2d 1007, 1008, overrules the Mitchell and Postal Telegraph Company cases. There, the State Highway Department had obtained a deed, without payment of any consideration, to certain access right to and from a portion of Boxberger's farm which bordered on a state highway.

This contention is without merit as contracts are the product of intentional acts for which public entities can accurately plan and budget. See, e.g., Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 241, 353 P.2d 609, 609-10 (1960) (distinguishing Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952), and Ace Flying Serv. Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957), as cases involving actions on contracts wherein persons dealing with the state are entitled to enforce their contract rights, from cases premised on the state's negligence.) This court has previously detailed the analytical framework for addressing equal protection challenges.

For example, in Malvernia Investment Co. v. City of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945, 947 (1951), this court suggested that a city could be liable for claims arising from its failure to maintain drainage and sewer systems. In Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1952), this court concluded that a plaintiff could maintain an action against the state where he sought to rescind a deed conveying land to the state, and where the suit was not in tort and did not seek to impose liability on the state, or recover money from the state.¶58 In a trio of cases in 1971, this court abrogated the judicially adopted doctrine by choosing "simply to undo" what it had done and leave the future existence of the doctrine up to the legislature.

1951), this court suggested that a city could be liable for claims arising from its failure to maintain drainage and sewer systems. In Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 250 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Colo. 1952), this court concluded that a plaintiff could maintain an action against the state where he sought to rescind a deed conveying land to the state, and where the suit was not in tort and did not seek to impose liability on the state, or recover money from the state. II.

We recognize that some exceptions to the doctrine of immunity were created both legislatively, see 1963 C.R.S. § 36-1-1(1)(b), and judicially, see Boxberger v. State Highway Dept., 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952). For purposes of this brief discussion, however, it is reasonable to conclude that the general common law rule, at least prior to 1971, was immunity.

This provision, said the court, was "self-executing" but did not apply to an action sounding in tort brought against the state or county. Moreover, we perceive nothing in Grant Construction Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 443 P.2d 1005 (1968); Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 126 Colo. 138, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948), and other cases centering on the Just Compensation clauses of various state constitutions that lend support to appellees. These cases are tied to the language, purpose and self-executing aspect of that particular provision.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that every action in which state officials or members of state agencies are named defendants and designated by official titles should be treated as an action against the state such as to clothe the defendants with immunity from suit. Sovereign immunity does not protect state officials from suits to recover property taken or held in violation of the constitution or without statutory authority, even though the property is held in the name of the state of Connecticut. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 645-47, 82 S.Ct. 980, 8 L.Ed.2d 168; Larson v. Domestic Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 690, 691, 697, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (a case limiting the holding of United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171); Weaver v. Ives, 152 Conn. 586, 590, 591, 210 A.2d 661; Anselmo v. Cox, supra, 81, 82; Boxberger v. Highway Dept., 126 Colo. 438, 440, 250 P.2d 1007; State Road Department v. Harvey, 142 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla.); Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 285, 286, 159 A. 751; Stockton v. Morris Pierce, 172 Tenn. 197, 204, 110 S.W.2d 480; see 49 Am.Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies, 94; 81 C.J.S., States, 216(b)(2). Such conduct on the part of state officials would exceed their powers and, as such, would not be the conduct of the state of Connecticut. Furthermore, the state is powerless to authorize its agents to take or hold real property unconstitutionally or without statutory authority.

" Thus, as we see it, this case is in effect not authority for the proposition advanced. Appellee likewise cites Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007, from the Supreme Court of Colorado, and quotes at length therefrom. This quotation and what this opinion held was nothing more than you couldn't take private property from a person without giving them just compensation.

The doctrine of sovereignty in Colorado is in limbo, only the memory lingers on. Sequiturs that emanated from the doctrine such as "immunity from suit," "immunity from paying interest," "immunity from the statute of limitations," etc., have with the demise of the doctrine become non-sequiturs. Boxberger v. Highway Dept., 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007; Highway Dept. v. Dawson, 126 Colo. 490, 253 P.2d 593; Ace Flying v. Colorado, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278, and Colorado Racing Comm. v. Brush Racing Association, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582. In the case now before us the trial court awarded interest on the amount found to be due. On review we held this award of interest was erroneous because exercise and control of the police pension and relief fund was a governmental function, and in such cases interest is not recoverable, citing as authority therefor Lindsley v. Denver, supra, and Montezuma County v. Wheeler, supra.