[Cits.] . . . With regard to the `independent business' requirement set forth in the code section, the test is essentially whether the contractor has a bon[a] fide existence apart from the employer or functions instead as the employer's alter ego." Bowman v. C. L. McCord c., Inc., 174 Ga. App. 914, 915 ( 331 S.E.2d 882) (1985). The Restatement, Second, Torts § 414 states the rule thusly: "One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care."

"The chief test to be applied in determining whether a person is employed as a servant or as an independent contractor . . . continues to be whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of the performance of the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity with the contract." Bowman v. C.L. McCord Land c. Dealer, 174 Ga. App. 914, 915 ( 331 S.E.2d 882) (1985); see also Perry v. Soil Remediation, 221 Ga. App. 386 ( 471 S.E.2d 320) (1996) (holding that "[t]he key is to determine whether the contractor is truly independent or whether he is simply the employer's alter ego"). Appellee asserts that Harris was a county employee, and therefore an independent contractor, while supervising state inmates during road maintenance work activities.

"[Mitchell] clearly functioned independently of [Soil Remediation] under the circumstances of this case. . . ." Bowman v. C. L. McCord Land c., 174 Ga. App. 914, 915 (1) ( 331 S.E.2d 882) (1985). Perry points out that, on one occasion when Mitchell's liability insurance expired, Soil Remediation paid for a renewal policy out of money it owed him and would not let him operate until the insurance became effective. He also alleges Soil Remediation controlled Mitchell by teaching him the proper way to fill out necessary paperwork and what to do in case of a spill.

" Slater v. Canal Wood Corp., 178 Ga. App. 877, 881-82 ( 345 S.E.2d 71) (1986). See also Bowman v. C. L. McCord Land c. Dealer, 174 Ga. App. 914 (1) ( 331 S.E.2d 882) (1985); Morris v. Constitution Pub. Co., 84 Ga. App. 816 ( 67 S.E.2d 407) (1951). Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Benham, J., concur.

First, Cowart claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for directed verdict on the theory of respondent superior. Cowart argues that the only evidence admitted on which a factual finding of master/servant relationship could be found is that Cowart informed Hall of where to pick up timber and where to deliver it. Citing Coastal Timberlands v. Brown, 141 Ga. App. 800 ( 234 S.E.2d 373) (1977), and Bowman v. C. L. McCord Land c. Dealer, 174 Ga. App. 914 ( 331 S.E.2d 882) (1985), Cowart claims that there was no evidence that he had the right to control Hall with regard to the time, manner or method of delivering the timber which had been harvested to the particular lumberyard. Contrary to Cowart's assertions, the trial court's denial of the motion for directed verdict was proper.

Furthermore, no duty is owed by an employer to ascertain the financial responsibility of the independent contractor, if the contractor has a bona fide existence apart from the employer. Bowman v. C.L. McCord Land Pulpwood Dealer, Inc., 174 Ga. App. 914, 331 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1985). Thus, there is no duty owed by the Counties or the Fair Association to supervise and assure the procurement of liability insurance of its independent contractor which would render them liable in tort.

In several cases involving the relationships between pulpwood producers and the dealers in or users of pulpwood, the courts have focused on a broader range of concerns than just the express terms of the contract. See, e.g., Slater, supra; Bowman v. C. L. McCord Land c. Dealer, 174 Ga. App. 914 ( 331 S.E.2d 882) (1985); and Hampton v. McCord, 141 Ga. App. 97 ( 232 S.E.2d 582) (1977). Our review of the record convinces us that the special verdict form is not subject to the criticisms raised by appellant.

at 275 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (1997)). “The chief test to be applied in determining whether a person is employed as a servant or as an independent contractor . . . [is] whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of the performance of the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity with the contract.” Id. (quoting Bowman v. C.L. McCord Land, etc., Dealer, 331 S.E.2d 882, 883 (Ga.Ct.App. 1985); see also Royal v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 777 S.E.2d 713, 715 (Ga.Ct.App. 2015). The Georgia Court of Appeals has additionally outlined numerous factors to assist courts in determining whether an employer has the right to control the time, manner, and method of a physician's work.

[Cits.] . . . With regard to the `independent business' requirement set forth in the code section, the test is essentially whether the contractor has a bon[a] fide existence apart from the employer or functions instead as the employer's alter ego.Slater v. Canal Wood Corp. of Augusta, 178 Ga. App. 877, 878, 345 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1986) (quoting Bowman v. C.L. McCord, etc., Inc., 174 Ga. App. 914, 915, 331 S.E.2d 882 (1985)); Enviromediation Srvcs. L.L.C. v. Boatwright, 256 Ga. App. 200, 203, 568 S.E.2d 117, 119 (2002); see also Lagoueyte v. Rocket Exp., 196 Ga. App. 143, 143, 395 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1990) (citing Spell v. Port City Adhesives, 183 Ga. App. 816, 817, 360 S.E.2d 63 (1987)). Where one is employed generally to perform certain services for another, and there is no specific contract [either oral or written] to do a certain piece of work according to specifications for a stipulated sum, it is inferable that the employer has retained the right to control the manner, method and means of the performance of the contract, and that the employee is not an independent contractor.

Williams, 481 S.E.2d at 275 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (1997)).“The chief test to be applied in determining whether a person is employed as a servant or as an independent contractor . . . [is] whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of the performance of the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity with the contract.” Id. (first quoting Bowman v. C.L. McCord Land, etc., Dealer, 331 S.E.2d 882, 883 (Ga.Ct.App. 1985); and then citing Perry v. Soil Remediation, 471 S.E.2d 320 (Ga.Ct.App. 1996)); see also Royal v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 777 S.E.2d 713, 715 (Ga.Ct.App. 2015).