Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-2320-CM.
December 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Barron R. Bowling filed this action alleging that two United States Drug Enforcement Agents (DEA), defendants Timothy McCue and Brendan Fitzpatrick, and a Task Force Officer, defendant Brandon Collins, who was assigned by local law enforcement jurisdiction to work with the DEA Drug Task Force, violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, plaintiff asserts claims for excessive force (Count I), false arrest and imprisonment (Count II), and conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights (Count III). The complaint also contains an additional count to alternatively allege that, in the event that Task Force Officer Collins was found to be acting under color of state rather than federal authority, the arrest of the plaintiff and any excessive force alleged used to effectuate that arrest would be a violation of plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV). This matter is before the court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice or, in the Alternative, Motion for Stay (Doc. 7).
I. Background Facts
There exists considerable disagreement concerning the events that occurred just before and during the arrest of plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the following occurred: On the afternoon of July 10, 2003, plaintiff was driving his car northbound on 10th Street, just north of Montana, in Kansas City, Kansas. Plaintiff noticed a black Monte Carlo drive up behind him at a high rate of speed and attempt to pass him on the right side, although there was no lane to the right. Alarmed by the Monte Carlo's high rate of speed and the unsafe effort to pass on the right, plaintiff sped up in an attempt to avoid an encounter. Plaintiff claims that, despite his efforts, the Monte Carlo hit his vehicle, leaving a long horizontal gouge the length of the passenger side. Plaintiff drove a couple hundred feet, intending to find a spot to pull over to speak with the driver of the other vehicle. Plaintiff then heard a siren and pulled over. As plaintiff was emerging from his vehicle, with his driver's license in his hand, he saw a man running toward him with a gun drawn. Plaintiff also saw a second man running toward him. Both men shouted at him to put his hands behind his back and get on the ground.
As alleged by plaintiff, the Monte Carlo was unmarked and had tinted windows. Apparently, however, the Monte Carlo was being driven by a law enforcement officers.
Plaintiff asserts that the men proceeded to beat him. Then, as alleged by plaintiff, despite the absence of any probable cause, defendants McCue, Fitzpatrick, and Collins arrested plaintiff and turned him over to the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department, which detained him overnight, then released him.
Plaintiff was charged in relation to the collision with criminal damage to property and reckless driving in Wyandotte County District Court. Those charges are still pending and the case is set for jury trial. Plaintiff also is charged with possession of drug paraphernalia in relation to an empty pipe he turned over to officers at the time of his arrest. Plaintiff also is to be tried on that charge.
II. Discussion
Defendants argue that this case should be either dismissed without prejudice or stayed due to the fact that plaintiff's state criminal charges remain pending. Defendants rely primarily on the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that, when a prisoner seeks damages in a civil rights lawsuit, the district court "must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Heck, 512 U.S. 487. Conversely, if the district court determines that the plaintiff's lawsuit, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any criminal judgment against the plaintiff, then "the action should be allowed to proceed." Id.
Defendants contend that Counts II, III, and IV are premature under Heck. Specifically, defendants assert that a finding in plaintiff's favor on his false arrest claim would imply the invalidity of any conviction occurring on the Wyandotte County criminal charges. The court disagrees.
Defendants concede that plaintiff's excessive force claim is not implicated under Heck and, as such, defendants do not seek dismissal of Count I.
In Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit stated that, under the rule of Heck, the litigation of certain civil rights claims may be premature until a plaintiff's criminal convictions are dismissed or otherwise invalidated. However, the Tenth Circuit made clear that the Heck doctrine applies only to those claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of any state court criminal conviction. Id. at 558-59. In Beck, the plaintiff was permitted to proceed with his claims of illegal arrest and illegal search and seizure because those claims "would not necessarily question the validity of a conviction resulting from [Beck's] rape charge or his probation revocation." Id. at 558. The Beck court quoted an earlier Tenth Circuit decision stating: "Claims arising out of police actions toward a criminal suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure are presumed to have accrued when the action actually occurred. " Id. (quoting Johnson v. Johnson County Commission Board, 925 F. 2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
In this case, Heck applies only to those claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction that might result from prosecution of the charges of criminal damage to property, reckless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia charges. The court concludes that plaintiff's challenge to his arrest would not implicate any of the elements of the crimes with which he is currently charged.
Heck did note an example of a logical exception to the general rule — when a plaintiff charged with resisting arrest challenges the legality of the arrest. Such an action would be premature because it challenges one of the elements necessary to the conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n. 6; see also Martinez v. City of Albuquerque, 184 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 1999).
Defendants point out that the only evidence upon which plaintiff's potential criminal damage to property and reckless driving convictions can be obtained is as a result of plaintiff allegedly having engaged in the elements of each of the crimes. Defendants argue that, as there is no other independent evidence upon which a conviction could be obtained, plaintiff's challenge to his arrest would necessarily implicate the elements of the charges pending against him. The Tenth Circuit has, however, rejected this blanket proposition.
In Beck, the court noted: "Several cases have held that whether a plaintiff's illegal arrest claim is affected by Heck depends on whether evidence obtained as a product of the arrest is used at trial. . . . We generally disagree with the holdings in these cases because they run counter to Heck's explanation that use of illegally obtained evidence does not, for a variety of reasons, necessarily imply an unlawful conviction." Id. at 559 n. 4 (citations omitted). The Beck court was referring to the statement in Heck: "Because of doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff's conviction was unlawful." 512 U.S. at 487 n. 7. Based upon the rationale set forth in these cases, the court cannot say as a matter of law that a finding for plaintiff on his false arrest claim would necessarily invalidate any potential convictions for damage to property or reckless driving. Having found as such, the court denies defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims.
Defendants also have failed to convince this court that a stay of this case is warranted. Other than the arguments as set forth above, which this court has rejected, defendants argue in support of their request to stay little more than asserted convenience. The court believes plaintiff's interest in proceeding expeditiously with the present litigation outweighs defendants' concerns. The court denies defendants' request to stay this case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice or, in the Alternative, Motion for Stay (Doc. 7) is denied.