Opinion
No. 99-0670-P-L
December 8, 2000
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Order entered this date, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff benefits is hereby AFFIRMED and that this action is DISMISSED.
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presently pending before this court is Plaintiffs' Objection to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 20), with defendant's Response thereto (doc. 21).
On September 8, 2000, the Magistrate Judge recommended, under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B), that the decision of the Commissioner to deny plaintiffs' claim for disability insurance benefits be affirmed (doc. 17). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the ALJ's determination that plaintiff, at the fourth step of the five-step sequential evaluation process for determining disability, had failed to establish that she was unable to perform her past relevant work as a secretary.
After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the issues raised, and a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is adopted as the opinion of this court.
Plaintiff raises two objections to the Report and Recommendation. First, plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in failing to find that the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair administrative record. The Magistrate Judge failed to remand to the ALJ for a proper determination of plaintiffs' residual functional capacity regarding her past relevant work. Plaintiff argues that the medical evidence was insufficient to support the ALJ's findings regarding plaintiffs' residual functional capacity and the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination with a corresponding physical capacities evaluation. Second, plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in usurping the role of the ALJ in reclassifying the ALJ's improper classification of plaintiffs' past relevant work as "light work" when it should have been classified as "sedentary work," and then characterizing the ALJ's improper classification as harmless error.
The issues plaintiff raises in the first objection are the same as those raised in the complaint and this court finds that they were thoroughly addressed by the Magistrate Judge in the Report and Recommendation. This court "may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary."Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). "Even if [the court] finds that the evidence preponderates against the Secretary's decision, [the court] must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence." Id. This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's finding that the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence.
The substantial evidence clearly establishes that plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of proof that she is unable to return to her past relevant work as a secretary. Thus, the ALJ's determination that plaintiff is not disabled is due to be affirmed, as recommended by the Magistrate Judge.
As to plaintiffs' second objection, plaintiff directs the court to SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), and Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1984). Upon review this court finds that in Owens, the ALJ, without articulating the standard upon which he based his decision and without making a credibility determination, terminated Mrs. Owens' benefits and directed her to return the benefits she had already received. Id. at 1513. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for further findings at the administrative level. Id. In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit noted "[w]e decline, . . ., to affirm simply because some rationale might have supported the ALJ's conclusion. . . . Such an approach would not advance the ends of reasoned decision making.See . . . Chenery, . . . 318 U.S. [at] 94 . . ." Owens, at 1516 (footnote omitted).
The Chenery case has also been cited in Florida Dept. of Labor and Employment Sec. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 893 F.2d 1319 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812 (1990) (determining whether the Secretary of Labor was precluded from recovering prejudgment interest from a state agency, and the applicability of the Debt Collection Act). Therein, the Eleventh Circuit explained that
[i]f the agency has misapplied the law, its order cannot stand — even if the reviewing court believes that the agency either would reinstate its order under a different theory or would reach the same decision under the proper rule of law. Chenery Corp. 318 U.S. at 94 . . . Instead, the case must be remanded to the agency to make a new determination.
Adherence to this rule does not mean, however, that this court will allow misconceptions in law that arise during the agency decision-making process to go unchecked. An important corollary to the general rule that courts will not substitute their views for the discretionary decisions of an agency on matters of policy is the recognition that reviewing courts do have the authority and responsibility to correct errors of law made by the agency. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 94.
Florida Dept. of Labor, 893 F.2d at 1321-22. However, the Eleventh Circuit also noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has, . . . recognized a limited exception to this rule: `the rule in Chenery has not required courts to remand in futility.'" Id. at 1324 (citation omitted).
In the instant case a remand would be an exercise in futility. The ALJ, as noted by the Magistrate Judge, clearly articulated the standard used and the evidentiary basis for the decision that plaintiff could return to her past relevant work as a secretary, unlike the decision rendered in Owens.
Further, this court finds that the substantial evidence and guiding legal precedent analogous to the present circumstance, Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988), support the Magistrate Judge's reclassification. "Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required." Mays, 837 F.2d at 1364.
The substantial evidence, as set forth by the ALJ and the Magistrate Judge, supports the conclusion that plaintiff retains the capability to return to her past relevant work as a secretary. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the mis-classification of secretarial work as light work rather than sedentary work, compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (a), with § 404.1567(b), has no affect upon the outcome; as in Mays, the conclusion remains unaltered. 837 F.2d at 1364. The Magistrate Judge's characterization is harmless error.
Accordingly, after due and proper consideration of all pleadings in this file, and a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, it is ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED as the opinion of this court, that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED, and that this action be DISMISSED.