Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra at 658, 856 N.E.2d 799 (cash housing allowance constituted “regular compensation,” where it was understood by both parties that payment would not actually pay for housing but was intended to supplement plaintiff's salary in attempt to convince him to extend his contract as university president). See Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 393 Mass. 427, 429, 471 N.E.2d 1296 (1984). In contrast, in Pelonzi v. Retirement Bd. of Beverly, supra, we held that the personal use value of a city-supplied automobile was not to be included as “regular compensation” in calculating a city commissioner's retirement allowance, because, inter alia, it is not a “payment” made to the employee.
Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 658 (2006). The term "[r]egular compensation" broadly denotes ordinary, recurrent, or repeated payments not inflated by any "extraordinary ad hoc" amounts such as bonuses or overtime pay. Id., quoting Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 393 Mass. 427, 429 (1984). See Boston Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs Supervisors v. Boston Retirement Bd., 383 Mass. 336, 340-341 (1981).
Considering the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a Superior Court judge reversed CRAB's decision and allowed Bulger's motion to amend the decision to include as "regular compensation" both the housing allowance payments as well as the payments to the Vanguard account from January 5, 2001, until August 31, 2003. Relying on decisions of this court interpreting "regular compensation" to include recurrent payments that are not inflated by extraordinary ad hoc payments such as bonuses or overtime pay, see Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 393 Mass. 427, 429 (1984); Boston Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs Supervisors v. Boston Retirement Bd., 383 Mass. 336, 339-340 (1981), and recognizing that the failure to take deductions from an employee's "non-salary compensation" has never been considered a dispositive factor in determining whether that compensation falls within the definition of "regular compensation," G. L. c. 32, § 1, for purposes of calculating an applicant's retirement benefit, see, e.g., Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., supra, the judge concluded that the cash housing allowance paid to Bulger throughout the relevant three-year period qualified as "regular compensation." "Regular compensation" as defined by G. L. c. 32, § 1, expressly does not include any "bonus, overtime, severance pay for any and all unused sick leave, early retirement incentives, or any other payments made as a result of giving notice of retirement."
The cases cited by plaintiffs do not involve the term "base pay" or "base compensation" or any analogous terms. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 178 Cal.App.2d 204, 3 Cal.Rptr. 127 (1960) ("salary"); City of Long Beach v. Allen, 143 Cal.App.2d 35, 300 P.2d 356 (1956) ("salary"); Kilfoil v. Johnson, 135 Ind. App. 14, 191 N.E.2d 321 (1963) ("wages"); Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 393 Mass. 427, 471 N.E.2d 1296 (1984) ("regular compensation"). Thus, we conclude the term "base rate compensation" in section 143-166.41(a) of the statute has a fixed meaning and does not authorize local governments to award a separation allowance based on plaintiffs' overtime pay, longevity pay, or accrued vacation.
Pelonzi, 451 Mass. at 479, 886 N.E.2d 707, quoting from Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 658, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006). See Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 393 Mass. 427, 429, 471 N.E.2d 1296 (1984), quoting from Boston Assn. of Sch. Administrators & Supervisors v. Boston Retirement Bd., 383 Mass. 336, 341, 419 N.E.2d 277 (1981) (“ ‘regular’ as it modifies ‘compensation,’ imports the idea of ordinariness or normality as well as the idea of recurrence”). “In addition, the language ‘salary, wages or other compensation in whatever form,’ demonstrates ‘a legislative intent to include the many distinct ways in which individuals are paid for their services.’ ”
In view of the interpretation in BASAS, the Bulger court, supra at 658, considered the statutory language "straightforward and unambiguous." Referring to BASAS and to Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 393 Mass. 427, 429 (1984), the court stated: In the BASAS case, Justice Kaplan had said, "The . . . statutory provisions do not wear their meaning on their sleeve, but it emerges on fair analysis."
One obvious reason for authorizing these employees the personal use of employer-supplied motor vehicles is to enable them to respond more rapidly to emergencies in the event that their own cars are immediately unavailable. See Bower v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 393 Mass. 427, 429 (1984) (night differential pay received by employee who regularly worked nighttime shift was "regular compensation," in contrast to bonus and overtime payments). Equally flawed is CRAB's reasoning set forth in Dufort and repeated here that G.L.c. 32, § 22(1)(c), shows that "regular compensation" is limited to cash payments with the single exception of boarding and housing benefits.