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Bowen v. The Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, Workers' Compensation Commission Division
Oct 2, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 4th 220575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)

Opinion

4-22-0575WC 4-22-0576WC

10-02-2023

JOSEPH E. BOWEN, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (William A. Niekamp Truck Service, Inc., Appellee)


This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County Nos. 18MR24 18MR43 Honorable Scott D. Larson, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Mullen, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

CAVANAGH JUSTICE.

¶ 1 Held: (1) Because of conflicting evidence on how the employee sustained his injury and because of conflicting medical opinions on causation, the Commission did not make a finding that was against the manifest weight of the evidence by finding that, despite the Commission's decision in the employee's favor, the employer had a good-faith defense against the workers' compensation claim.

(2) The existence of this good-faith defense defeated the employee's motion for a penalty under section 19(k) of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/19(k) (West 2018)) and attorney fees under section 16 (id. § 16), as the Commission correctly decided.
(3) The Commission's award of a penalty under section 19(l) (id. § 19(l)) is legally inconsistent with its finding that the employer had a good-faith defense.
(4) Because the case-docket website of the Commission contains a disclaimer, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by declining to take "judicial notice" of information from the website.
(5) By finding insufficient evidence to support a credit under section 8(e)(17) (id. § 8(e)(17)), the Commission did not make a finding that was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 2 Petitioner, Joseph E. Bowen, was a long-haul truck driver for respondent, William A. Niekamp Truck Service, Inc. On April 14, 2014, while climbing into the cab of a semi-trailer, petitioner injured his right knee. He went to the emergency room the next day and eventually underwent knee surgery. He filed a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2014)). There was an arbitration hearing before Arbitrator Edward Lee, who found in petitioner's favor. Mostly agreeing with the arbitrator's recommended decision, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) awarded benefits to petitioner. Respondent sought review in the circuit court of Adams County. The court confirmed the Commission's decision in part and reversed it in part. Petitioner appeals on three grounds.

¶ 3 First, petitioner contends that the Commission erred by declining to impose upon respondent a penalty under section 19(k) of the Act (id. § 19(k)) and by declining to require respondent to pay petitioner's attorney fees under section 16 of the Act (id. § 16). We conclude that neither of these rulings was an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the circuit court was correct to confirm the Commission's denial of a section 19(k) penalty and section 16 attorney fees. In this respect, we affirm the court's judgment.

¶ 4 Second, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred by reversing the Commission's award of a penalty under section 19(l) (id. § 19(l)). We find this award to be legally inconsistent with the Commission's finding-a reasonable finding-that respondent had good-faith defenses against petitioner's claim. Thus, the court was correct to reverse this award. In this respect as well, we affirm the court's judgment.

¶ 5 Third, petitioner contends that the circuit court erred by reversing the Commission's disallowance of a credit to respondent under section 8(e)(17) of the Act (id. § 8(e)(17)). We agree with this third contention. By deciding that the evidence was insufficient to support the award of such a credit, the Commission did not make a decision that was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we reverse the court's reversal of the Commission's disallowance of a section 8(e)(17) credit.

¶ 6 As specified in paragraphs 3 to 5, we affirm the circuit court's judgment in part and reverse it in part.

¶ 7 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 8 In the arbitration hearing, there were two primary factual issues. Both were relevant to the question of penalties.

¶ 9 The first factual issue was what petitioner said at the job site immediately after the accident. According to petitioner, he told a coworker, Chris Bennett, and respondent's owner, Adam Niekamp, that his knee gave out as he was climbing into his truck. On the other hand, according to Bennett and Niekamp, petitioner told them his knee gave out as he was walking in a parking lot. The Commission agreed with the arbitrator that petitioner was more believable than Bennett and Niekamp. One reason for this credibility determination was that, in his testimony, petitioner seemed "down-to-earth" and honest. Another reason was that the morning after the accident, in the emergency room of a hospital, petitioner reported that he had sustained the knee injury" 'when getting into his semi and bearing weight on his right leg' "-not when he was walking in a parking lot. Still another reason was that although petitioner testified that he filled out an accident report at respondent's request, respondent never produced this report in the arbitration hearing.

¶ 10 Therefore, deeming petitioner's account to be more credible than respondent's account, the Commission found that "the accidental injury suffered by Petitioner arose out of a risk to which the general public is not exposed, namely[,] pulling oneself up into the cab of a semi-tractor trailer truck" (as opposed to walking across a smooth parking lot). See McAllister v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2020 IL 124848, ¶ 40 (holding that injuries resulting from personal risks, such as a trick knee, generally do not arise out of employment).

¶ 11 The second factual issue was whether the work event of April 14, 2014, aggravated the preexisting degenerative condition in petitioner's right knee-a condition for which petitioner had undergone arthroscopic surgery in 1997-or whether, alternatively, the condition of ill-being in his right knee was solely the result of the preexisting degenerative condition. According to Dr. George Crickard, who, on June 3, 2014, performed the second arthroscopy on petitioner's right knee, the medial and lateral meniscal tears in the right knee likely resulted from the workplace injury. An examining physician, Dr. Kevin Walsh, disagreed. Dr. Walsh opined," '[T]he meniscal pathology treated by the orthopedic surgeon was for a degenerative condition not caused, aggravated[,] or accelerated by a work injury.'" The Commission (and the arbitrator) believed Dr. Crickard over Dr. Walsh.

¶ 12 The Commission found "a causal connection *** between the Petitioner's April 14, 2014[,] right knee injury at work and his subsequent treatment, including arthroscopic surgery, and the current condition of ill-being of his right knee." Consequently, the Commission awarded benefits to petitioner, including $486.55 per week for a period of 43 weeks, to compensate him for a 20% loss of the use of his right leg. See 820 ILCS 305/8(e) (West 2014).

¶ 13 Respondent argued to the Commission that, under section 8(e)(17) of the Act (id. § 8(e)(17)), this 20% loss of the use of the right leg should be completely offset by a credit of 22.5%. According to respondent, a previous employer, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. (OTR), had paid petitioner a lump sum for a 22.5% loss of the use of the right leg. The Commission, however, found insufficient evidence to support such a credit. The Commission wrote:

"[T]he Commission has searched its records and takes judicial notice of the fact that there is no record in its system which establishes that Respondent is entitled to a credit for a prior award to the right leg. Though the Petitioner admitted upon cross-examination that he received $10,000.00[ ] and that said sum might or could have represented 20 to 22.5% of the leg, to find such a credit without some documentation would be speculative at best and plain error.
Therefore, the Commission affirms [Arbitrator Edward Lee's] award of 20% loss of use of the right leg."

¶ 14 The Commission, however, reversed the arbitrator's award of a penalty under section 19(k) (id. § 19(k)) and attorney fees under section 16 (id. § 16). The Commission explained:

"While the Commission agrees with the [arbitrator's] finding of a compensable accident, there existed conflicting evidence as to how the accident occurred. The Petitioner testified that his right knee gave way while climbing into the cab of his semi-truck. Respondent's witnesses testified that the Petitioner informed them that his right knee gave out while walking across the parking lot to his semi truck. Because of the conflicting testimony, the Commission finds that Respondent's actions were not unreasonable or vexatious as there existed a good faith defense to the incident."

Even so, without further explanation, the Commission awarded penalties pursuant to section 19(l) (id. § 19(l)).

¶ 15 In Adams County case No. 18-MR-24, respondent sought judicial review of the Commission's decision.

¶ 16 Also, after the Commission issued its decision, respondent filed with the Commission a motion pursuant to section 19(f) (id. § 19(f)). In this motion, respondent claimed that by failing to allow it a credit for the prior settlement, the Commission had made a clerical error. Exhibit 2 of the motion was a printout from the Commission's online case-docket database showing that on June 2, 1998, in Commission case No. 98-WC-019149, OTR paid $10,671.42 to "BOWEN, JOE," in settlement of a claim for 22.5% of the right leg. See Case Docket, Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, https://webapps.illinois.gov/IWCC/ CaseDocket/CaseSearch/Index (last visited Aug. 10, 2023).

¶ 17 Nevertheless, the Commission's case-docket database has the following disclaimer:

"The user understands that this information is not the official record and should only be used to gain a general understanding of a case's history and disposition. The [Commission] and its officers and employees are not responsible or liable for any loss, consequence, or damage resulting directly or indirectly from use of the information. Please contact the [Commission] if you need more information about a case or feel that any of the information posted is in error and should be corrected.
By clicking 'Accept' below, you affirm that you have read and understand the notices and disclaimers on this page." Case Docket, Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, https://webapps.illinois.gov/IWCC/CaseDocket/
Home (last visited Aug. 19, 2023).

¶ 18 Commissioner Michael Brennan denied the section 19(f) motion.

¶ 19 Consequently, respondent brought a second action, Adams County case No. 18-MR-43, seeking to overturn the denial of the credit.

¶ 20 The circuit court consolidated the two cases. On June 6, 2022-after repeated dismissals of appeals on the ground of nonfinality (see William A. Niekamp Truck Service, Inc. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2020 IL App (4th) 190317WC-U, ¶ 12; Bowen v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2021 IL App (4th) 200268WC, ¶ 15; William A. Niekamp Truck Service, Inc. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2020 IL App (4th) 190317WC-U, ¶ 12)-the court issued a final order.

¶ 21 The circuit court's final order of June 6, 2022, contained essentially the following six points. First, the court held that by finding that respondent had acted reasonably and in good faith, the Commission did not make a finding that was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Second, the court confirmed the Commission's denial of section 19(k) penalties. Third, given the Commission's finding that respondent had acted reasonably and in good faith, the court reversed the award of section 19(l) penalties. Fourth, because petitioner's "prior settlement" was "documented in the record[ ] and in the Commission's own database," the court "set aside" the Commission's refusal to "deduct the Section 8(e)(17) credit from the Commission's 20% loss of the use of the right leg." The court held, then, that respondent was "entitled to a credit of 22.5% loss of use of the right leg pursuant to Section 8(e)(17)[,] to be deducted from the Commission's award of 20% loss of use of the right leg pursuant to Section 8.1b(b), resulting in no additional permanency payable." Fifth, the court confirmed the Commission's denial of attorney fees. Sixth, the court declared that "the Commission's denial of [respondent's] Section 19(f) motion [was] mooted by this Court's order as the credit calculation has been corrected." Accordingly, the court dismissed Adams County case No. 18-MR-43 (the section 19(f) case).

¶ 22 On June 23, 2022, petitioner filed notices of appeal in the two consolidated cases, designating the order of June 6, 2022, as the order from which he appealed. Specifically, in these appeals, petitioner challenges (1) the Commission's disallowance of a penalty under section 19(k) and attorney fees under section 16, (2) the circuit court's reversal of the penalty under section 19(l), and (3) the court's reversal of the Commission's disallowance of a credit under section 8(e)(17) for a prior award to petitioner of 22.5% loss of the use of his right leg.

¶ 23 On October 14, 2022, we consolidated the two appeals.

¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 A. Compliance With Rule 341

¶ 26 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), the appellant's brief "shall contain"

"[a] Statement of Facts, which shall contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal in the format as set forth in the Standards and Requirements for Electronic Filing the Record on Appeal."

Respondent complains that, in three ways, petitioner's brief violates that rule. First, petitioner's brief contains no part labeled as a "Statement of Facts" but instead contains a part labeled as "Statement of Evidence and Findings on Disputed Issues," which, presumably, is supposed to serve as a "Statement of Facts." Second, the "Statement of Evidence and Findings on Disputed Issues" makes factual representations-often inaccurate factual representations, in respondent's view-without citation to the record. Third, respondent characterizes petitioner's use of italics in his "Statement of Evidence and Findings on Disputed Issues" as argumentative. Although it is questionable whether the mere use of italics qualifies as "argument or comment" (id.), these are otherwise fair objections. We remind petitioner that supreme court rules are rules instead of suggestions. See Final Call, Inc. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2022 IL App (1st) 211137WC-U, ¶ 44. In his brief, petitioner should use the headings prescribed by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), and he should provide a supporting citation to the record for each factual representation he makes in his brief.

¶ 27 Respondent requests, by way of remedy, that we strike the "Statement of Evidence and Findings on Disputed Issues" from petitioner's brief. This proposed sanction would be too severe, considering that the defects in respondent's brief are not so egregious as to frustrate review. See Lock 26 Constructors v. Industrial Comm 'n, 243 Ill.App.3d 882, 886 (1993) (holding that "[a] statement of facts will not be stricken when there are no rules violations so flagrant as to hinder or preclude review"). However, we will disregard any representation of fact that is unaccompanied by a supporting citation to the record. See id.

¶ 28 B. Penalties and Attorney Fees

¶ 29 A penalty under section 19(l) is in the nature of a late fee, and the Commission must assess this penalty if (1) a payment is late and (2) the employer lacks a reasonable justification for the lateness. Ravenswood Disposal Services v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2019 IL App (1st) 181449WC, ¶ 30. "Generally, an employer's reasonable and good-faith challenge to liability does not warrant the imposition of penalties." Mechanical Devices v. Industrial Comm 'n, 344 Ill.App.3d 752, 763 (2003). "The Commission's evaluation of the reasonableness of the employer's delay is a question of fact that will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ravenswood, 2019 IL App (1st) 181449WC, ¶ 30.

¶ 30 The Commission found that "[b]ecause of the conflicting testimony, *** Respondent's actions were not unreasonable or vexatious as there existed a good faith defense to the incident." Petitioner argues we are not limited by this finding. He observes that we may "affirm the *** Commission's decision if there is any legal basis in the record which would sustain that decision, regardless of whether the particular reasons or findings contained in the decision are correct or sound." Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm n, 283 Ill.App.3d 785, 793 (1996).

¶ 31 However, a factual finding by the Commission is incorrect or unsound only if the finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Currey v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2022 IL App (1st) 210829WC-U, ¶ 60. A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if it is clearly apparent, from the record, that the finding is false or without any evidentiary foundation. See id. The question, then, is not whether we would have made the same finding if we were the trier of fact; rather, the question is whether the finding is outside the bounds of rationality. See id. Because the Commission's finding of reasonableness is a finding of fact (see McKay Plating Co. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 91 Ill.2d 198, 209 (1982)), we should defer to that finding unless the record clearly and indisputably requires a finding of unreasonableness (see Currey, 2022 IL App (1st) 210829WC-U, ¶ 60).

¶ 32 The Commission found that respondent had a reasonable, good-faith defense to liability. We are unconvinced that this finding is clearly incorrect. One arguable defense was that petitioner's right knee gave out as he was walking in the parking lot instead of as he was climbing into the truck and that the knee condition, therefore, was the result of a non-compensable "risk[ ] personal to the employee," not the result of a compensable "risk[ ] distinctly associated with the employment." McAllister, 2020 IL 124848, ¶ 38. Petitioner maintains that this defense was clearly concocted. He insists it is implausible that he would have given a different account at New Process in Alsip than he gave the next morning in the emergency room in Quincy-or that he even had the legal acumen to realize that one account would have been more advantageous to him than the other.

¶ 33 Petitioner has a good argument here, but his argument does not warrant the conclusion that the Commission's finding of reasonableness is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent has a good argument, too, in that respondent could justifiably rely on Bennett's account of what petitioner had told him at Alsip, namely, that petitioner's knee had given out as he was walking in the parking lot. Petitioner argues that Bennett had an incentive to give an account that would have been pleasing to his employer. The difficulty with that argument, however, is that Bennett was legally protected. By firing Bennett for giving unfavorable testimony in a workers' compensation proceeding, respondent would have subjected itself to liability for retaliatory discharge. See Hester v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp., 386 Ill.App.3d 1104, 1112 (2008). Another difficulty is that the same incentive-related logic could be used against petitioner: he had experience with the workers' compensation system, and on the way back to Quincy, he might have thought of a way to maximize the causal connection between his employment and his knee problem. Our point is simply this: The possible existence of a perverse incentive should not automatically invalidate Bennett's testimony any more than it should automatically invalidate petitioner's testimony.

¶ 34 Petitioner also argues that Bennett's account is implausible on its face because to call Bennett on the citizen's band (CB) radio after suffering a catastrophic knee injury in the parking lot, petitioner would have had to climb all the way back up into the cab of his truck. Evidently, though, petitioner did climb all the way back up into the cab-he would have had to do so to drive from Alsip to Quincy. After his knee gave out at New Steel, he drove his load to Quincy, where he went immediately to the emergency room. At New Steel, according to petitioner's testimony, Bennett helped him climb down from the cab to go to the restroom. It is unclear, though, how petitioner-a heavy man with an incapacitated knee-then climbed back up into the cab. To further complicate matters, Bennett was uncertain whether petitioner had called him by CB radio or by cell phone.

¶ 35 In short, even though the Commission believed petitioner over Bennett (perhaps for the very reasons that petitioner advances) and even though the Commission was entitled to believe petitioner over Bennett, something can be said for Bennett's account, and something can be said against petitioner's account. By the same token, something can be said for petitioner's account, and something can be said against Bennett's account. In other words, while the Commission could reasonably disbelieve Bennett, the Commission did not have to find his account to be so obviously false that it would have been impossible for respondent to rely on it in good faith.

¶ 36 A similar observation could be made about respondent's reliance on Dr. Walsh's opinion. "When the employer acts in reliance upon reasonable medical opinion or when there are conflicting medical opinions, penalties ordinarily are not imposed." Mechanical Devices, 344 Ill.App.3d at 763. According to a letter that Dr. Walsh wrote to respondent's attorney on July 20, 2014, petitioner suffered from "osteoarthritis of the right knee," which "certainly was not caused by the work event of April 2014." In Dr. Walsh's opinion, the osteoarthritis was a "pre-existing condition" that was neither "aggravated" nor "accelerated" by the "work event." Dr. Walsh interpreted the magnetic resonance imaging from the hospital as showing only "degenerative changes," without any defects that were "acute in origin." Dr. Walsh wrote to respondent's attorney, "The patient has osteoarthritis[,] and from time to time his knee can buckle or give out, causing pain and discomfort."

¶ 37 Although the Commission was entitled to believe Dr. Crickard over Dr. Walsh, there is no reason to regard Dr. Walsh's opinion as patently unreliable. In fact, petitioner himself admitted that, in the normal course of things, the osteoarthritis in his right knee caused his knee to buckle from time to time. In the arbitration hearing, petitioner was asked:

"Q. If the medical records indicate that you had osteoarthritis from time to time and your knee could buckle or give out causing pain or discomfort, would you agree with that?
A. I agree with that."

¶ 38 Injuries resulting from personal risks, such as a trick knee, generally do not arise out of employment. McAllister, 2020 IL 124848, ¶ 40. We defer, then, to the Commission's finding that "[Respondent's actions were not unreasonable or vexatious as there existed a good faith defense to the incident." That finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Ravenswood, 2019 IL App (1st) 181449WC, ¶ 30. Given the Commission's finding of reasonableness and good faith, the imposition of a penalty under section 19(l) is erroneous as a matter of law. See Mechanical Devices, 344 Ill.App.3d at 763. As respondent rightly argues, it is legally incorrect to impose a section 19(l) penalty after finding that the employer had a reasonable justification for declining to pay the claim.

¶ 39 By the same token, the defensible finding of reasonableness and good faith makes the denial of a penalty under section 19(k) and the denial of attorney fees under section 16 legally correct. The Commission has discretion to award a section 19(k) penalty and attorney fees only if the employer's delay in payment was "vexatious," "merely frivolous," in "bad faith," or motivated by an "improper purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McMahan v. Industrial Comm n, 183 Ill.2d 499, 515 (1998). As the Commission found, respondent had defenses that it could honestly assert. Therefore, respondent's delay in payment did not meet the description in McMahan, and the Commission lacked authority to award a penalty or attorney fees.

¶ 40 C. Credit Under Section 8(e)(17)

¶ 41 Section 8(e)(17) of the Act provides that "[f]or the permanent loss of use or the permanent partial loss of use of' any of the "members" listed in that section, including the leg, "for which compensation has been paid, *** such loss shall be taken into consideration and deducted from any award for the subsequent injury." 820 ILCS 305/8(e)(17) (West 2014). We defer to the Commission's allowance or disallowance of a section 8(e)(17) credit unless the Commission's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Page Enterprises, Inc. v. Industrial Comm n, 78 Ill.2d 287, 291 (1980).

¶ 42 According to respondent, "it is undisputed that [petitioner] settled a prior right leg claim, 98WC19149, for 22.5% loss of use of the right leg, which [petitioner] admitted was paid to him in the form of a settlement." Respondent criticizes the Commission for "put[ting] an illicit burden of proof on [respondent] to present documentation supporting the credit, in violation of Illinois law." In respondent's view, nothing in section 8(e)(17) or in case law authorizes the imposition of such a burden of proof upon the employer. Instead, according to respondent, "the only prerequisite to the Commission's] being obligated to deduct a prior credit was that compensation was paid for the prior injury"-and petitioner "admitted that he had been paid for his prior right leg injury."

¶ 43 To be sure, in his testimony in the arbitration hearing, petitioner admitted that OTR had paid him $10,000 in settlement of a workers' compensation claim for a prior injury of his right knee. As respondent explains, however, "it is not the dollar amount which forms the basis of the credit but the percentage of the prior compensated disability." Arguably, in his testimony, petitioner was uncertain and inconsistent as to the exact percentage of loss of use for which OTR previously compensated him. He was asked, "22.5 percent; does that sound right?" He answered, "I think so, yes, sir." (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, he testified, "I believe the man told me it would be 20 percent, however they word that." (Emphasis added.) He thought it was 22.5%, but he believed it was 20%. A reasonable trier of fact could find that petitioner's testimony on the percentage of prior loss of use was too uncertain and too equivocal to be reliable. It is not clearly apparent that the prior percentage was proven by petitioner's testimony. See Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 407 Ill.App.3d 1010, 1013 (2011) (explaining that "[a] finding of fact is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only where an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent").

¶ 44 Granted, a percentage of loss of use is specified in the printout that respondent attached to its section 19(f) motion, a printout that respondent had obtained from the Commission's website. It also is true that when making a decision in any case, the Commission may consider its own official records. See Centeno v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm 'n, 2020 IL App (2d) 180815WC, ¶ 40. If a "court can take judicial notice of online official records" (TCF National Bank v. Richards, 2016 IL App (1st) 152083, ¶ 50), the Commission should be able to do so, too.

¶ 45 The trouble is, the case-docket database from which respondent obtained the printout does not contain official records. The database warns that it is "not the official record." According to Centeno, "documents containing readily verifiable facts from sources of indisputable accuracy may be judicially noticed if doing so will aid in the efficient disposition of a case." (Emphasis added.) Centeno, 2020 IL App (2d) 180815WC, ¶ 39. In its disclaimer, the Commission explicitly refuses to stand behind the information in the case-docket database, and the Commission invites the public to submit any corrections. The printout does not even get petitioner's formal name right. Because the case-docket database is not a source of indisputable accuracy (see id.), the Commission did not abuse its discretion by declining to take "judicial notice" of information from that database (see Jehle v. Jehle, 2022 IL App (4th) 210547-U, ¶ 84 (holding that "[j]udicial notice is an evidentiary matter that we review for an abuse of discretion")).

¶ 46 In sum, even if, in the proceedings before the Commission, respondent had no burden to prove its entitlement to a section 8(e)(17) credit, we presume that the Commission followed the law (DeSalvo v. Industrial Comm n, 307 Ill.App.3d 628, 633 (1999)). The presumption of compliance with section 8(e)(17) has not been rebutted. Although the record shows the Commission's noncompliance with section 19(l), the record does not show the Commission's noncompliance with section 8(e)(17).

¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 48 We affirm the circuit court's judgment in part and reverse it in part. We affirm the judgment insomuch as it reverses the Commission's imposition of a section 19(l) penalty. Also, we affirm the judgment insomuch as it confirms the Commission's denial of a section 19(k) penalty and section 16 attorney fees. We reverse the judgment, however, insomuch as it reverses the Commission's denial of a section 8(e)(17) credit.

¶ 49 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.


Summaries of

Bowen v. The Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, Workers' Compensation Commission Division
Oct 2, 2023
2023 Ill. App. 4th 220575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)
Case details for

Bowen v. The Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH E. BOWEN, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION…

Court:Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, Workers' Compensation Commission Division

Date published: Oct 2, 2023

Citations

2023 Ill. App. 4th 220575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)