See, e.g., Doe v. Alsaud, 12 F.Supp.3d 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("The prior misconduct ... must be of the same land that caused the injury; general, unrelated or lesser allegations of prior wrongdoing are insufficient."); Bowen v. Patrick, No. 11 CIV. 4799 (JMF) (GWG), 2012 WL 3743409, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4320537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2012) (allegation that "[a doctor employee] stood idly by and watched an inmate with a severe and bleeding head injury be maliciously beaten by a correction officer ... does not show that [the doctor] was predisposed to breaching any duty to provide medical care") (internal quotation marks omitted); Milosevic v. O'Donnell, 89 A.D.3d 628, 934 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376 (2011) (allegations of a "culture" of alcohol use at company events insufficient to show that employer "was aware of the CFO's violent propensities when intoxicated or of the possibility of an assault"); Naegele v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 39 A.D.3d 270, 833 N.Y.S.2d 79, 80 (2007) ("conclusory allegations" that "priests accept money and things of value from their parishioners" were insufficient "to show that the Archdiocese knew or should have known of [the priest's] propensity to commit the [fraud] alleged"). As a result, they do not support her claim for neglig

Anderson, 17 F.3d at 557; accord Porter v. Goord, 467 F. App'x 21, 23 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order); Baines v.City of New York, 2017 WL 3425746, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017). Although liability may attach only where there was "a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring," Anderson, 17 F.3d at 557, "[w]hether an officer had sufficient time to intercede or was capable of preventing the harm being caused by another officer is an issue of fact for the jury unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly conclude otherwise," id.; accord Terebesi, 764 F.3d at 243-44; Stephens v. Venettozzi, 2016 WL 929268, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016); Bowen v. Patrick, 2012 WL 3743409, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012).

Even if Andrews did not physically transport an injured Plaintiff (or order Best and Allen to do so), to the extent that the transport constitutes a use of excessive force, Andrews can also be held liable on the grounds that "[a] corrections officer who observes another officer applying excessive force to an inmate is liable under § 1983 if the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm but failed to do so." Bowen v. Patrick , No. 11–CV–4799, 2012 WL 3743409, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), adopted by 2012 WL 4320537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2012). At this stage, Plaintiff's allegations with respect to his post-fall transport to the booking area allow for the reasonable inference that the transport took long enough that Andrews would have had a realistic opportunity to intervene to stop it.

"[M]edical malpractice is simply a form of negligence, no rigid analytical line separates the two," and "[c]onduct may be deemed malpractice, rather than negligence, when it 'constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician.'" Scott v. Uljanov, 74 N.Y.2d 673, 674-75, 541 N.E.2d 398, 399 (1989) (quoting Bleiler v. Bodnar, 65 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 479 N.E.2d 230, 234 (1985)); see Bowen v. Patrick, No. 11 Civ. 4799 (JMF) (GWG), 2012 WL 3743409, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012), R. & R. adopted, No. 11 Civ. 4799 (JMF) (GWG), 2012 WL 4320537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2012) (same); D'Elia v. Menorah Home & Hosp. for Aged & Infirm, 51 A.D.3d 848, 850, 859 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226 (2d Dep't 2008) (same). Thus, Plaintiff's claims in this case are best understood as claims for medical malpractice, not negligence.

Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, an employer-employee relationship is required for this type of claim to move forward, as a review of recent cases discussing this claim demonstrates. See e.g. Dilworth v. Goldberg, 10 Civ. 2224, 2011 WL 3501869 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) report and recommendation adopted, 10 Civ. 2224, 2011 WL 4526555 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (employer-employee relationship existed); Haight v. NYU Langone Med. Ctr., Inc., 13 Civ. 04993 LGS, 2014 WL 2933190 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2014) (same); Biggs, 2010 WL 4628360 (same); Bowen v. Patrick, 11 Civ. 4799, 2012 WL 3743409 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, 11 Civ. 4799, 2012 WL 4320537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2012) (same); Doe v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 12 Civ. 686 CM, 2013 WL 624688 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (same); Doe v. Guthrie Clinic, Ltd., 11-CV-6089, 2012 WL 531026 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012) aff'd in part, 519 F. App'x 719 (2d Cir. 2013) and aff'd, 740 F.3d 864 (2d Cir. 2014) (same).

See Anderson v. Adam's Mark Hotels & Resorts, No. 99–1100, 2000 WL 390107, at *1, *2, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 6949, at *3, *7–8 (10th Cir.2000) (prior sanctions against supervisor for sexually harassing other employees by attempting to date them did not establish his propensity to commit a sexual assault, where plaintiff failed to allege that the employer “had reason to know that [the supervisor] would cause the kind of harm alleged in this case”); Bowen v. Patrick, No. 11 Civ. 4799(JMF)(GWG), 2012 WL 3743409, at *14, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123058, at *42 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) (allegation that “[a doctor employee] stood idly by and watched an inmate with a severe and bleeding head injury be maliciously beaten by a correction officer ... does not show that [the doctor] was predisposed to breaching any duty to provide medical care”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Milosevic v. O'Donnell, 89 A.D.3d 628, 629, 934 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1st Dep't 2011) (allegations of a “culture” of alcohol use at company events insufficient to show that employer “was aware of the CFO's violent propensities when intoxicated or of the possibility of an assault”); Naegele v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 39 A.D.3d 270, 270, 833 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1st Dep't 2007) (“conclusory allegations” that “priests accept money and things of value from their parishioners” were insufficient “to show that the Archdiocese knew or should have known of [the priest's] propensity to commit the [fraud] alleged”).