(Here, it is not even fixed in Johnson County by implication). Saigh v. Monteith, 147 Tex. 341, 215 S.W.2d 610; Bowden v. Murphy, Tex.Civ.App. (Waco) NWH, 448 S.W.2d 183; Maynard Hill, Inc. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App. (Waco) NWH 534 S.W.2d 733. Contention 1 is sustained.

Venue may not be sustained by implication. Only by a strained construction of appellant's contract could we even imply that the obligation sued upon, the liquidated damage clause, is payable in Tarrant County. The contract makes no express provision for payment of liquidated damages in Tarrant County, so it fails the test of subd. 5. Briarcliff, Inc. v. Texas Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., 472 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1971, no writ); Bowden v. Murphy, 448 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, no writ). Liquidated damages are being sought by reason of appellant's alleged breach of an obligation to accept appellee's services ; not by reason of the non-payment of any invoices.

Contracts cannot be construed to fix venue in a certain county by implication. Maynard Hill, Inc. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 534 S.W.2d 733; Bowden v. Murphy, Tex.Civ.App., 448 S.W.2d 183; Saigh v. Monteith, 147 Tex. 341, 215 S.W.2d 610. But here as noted above, disregarding the invalid language, the contract still expressly names McLennan County as the place of its performance.

It states that they are to be 'furnished' * * *. The contract is addressed to Mr. Harry Trippett in Waco, and recites 'Project: Smith Residence, Location: Waco, Texas', but nowhere expressly agrees to deliver the building materials to such project or to Waco. The only way Maynard Hill can be said to have agreed in the contract to deliver the materials to Waco would be by implication, and venue under subdivision 5, cannot be fixed by implication, Bowden v. Murphy, Tex.Civ.App. (Waco) NWH, 448 S.W.2d 183; Saigh v. Monteith, 147 Tex. 341, 215 S.W.2d 610; Thomas v. Oil Belt Supply Co., Tex.Civ.App. (Eastland) NWH, 375 S.W.2d 527; Johnston v. Personius, Tex.Civ.App. (San Antonio) NWH, 242 S.W.2d 471; Williams v. James, Tex.Civ.App. (Ft. Worth) NWH, 308 S.W.2d 528; Harkness v. Employers National Ins. Co., Tex., 502 S.W.2d 670."

A. That's what it (the written contract) said.' The defendant urges reversal because there is nothing in the written contract which provides for a 'definite place' of payment for the damages sought to be enforced herein, citing Briarcliff, Inc . v. Texas Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., 472 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1971, no writ) and Bowden v. Murphy, 448 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1969, no writ). These cases may be distinguished.

The only way Maynard Hill can be said to have agreed in the contract to deliver the materials to Waco would be by Implication, and venue under subdivision 5, cannot be fixed by implication. Bowden v. Murphy, Tex.Civ.App. (Waco) NWH, 448 S.W.2d 183; Saigh v. Monteith, 147 Tex. 341, 215 S.W.2d 610; Thomas v. Oil Belt Supply Co., Tex.Civ.App. (Eastland) NWH, 375 S.W.2d 527; Johnston v. Personius, Tex.Civ.App. (San Antonio) NWH, 242 S.W.2d 471; Williams v. James, Tex.Civ.App. (Ft. Worth) NWH, 308 S.W.2d 528; Harkness v. Employers National Ins. Co., S.Ct., 502 S.W.2d 670. Contention 1 is sustained.

The appellees argue that the trial court's judgment was proper, suggesting that the two quoted paragraphs of the contract set out independent obligations and that the second paragraph does not specify a definite place of payment. Appellees rely upon Briarcliff, Inc. v. Texas Automatic Sprinklers, Inc., 472 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas, 1971), and Bowden v. Murphy, 448 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco, 1969, no writ). In those cases, separate contractual provisions for recovery of liquidated damages failed to specify a place for payment and it was held that venue could not be established under another provision of the contract specifying the place for payment of the basic contractual obligation.

It is well settled that venue under subdivision 5 cannot be fixed by implication but the written contract must expressly name the county of performance or some definite place therein. Saigh v. Monteith, supra; Bowden v. Murphy, 448 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1969, n.w.h.); Nutt v. Cottingham, 242 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1951, n.w.h.). Under subdivision 5 of Article 1995, the essential obligation for venue purposes is that of payment, and where no place of payment is specified in the written contract, no exception to the general venue rule is involved.

Under subdivision 5, venue may not be fixed by implication. Saigh v. Monteith (1948) 147 Tex. 341, 215 S.W.2d 610; Rorschach v. Pitts (1952) 151 Tex. 215, 248 S.W.2d 120; Bowden v. Murphy (Waco, Tex.Civ.App. 1969) 448 S.W.2d 183, no writ history. We therefore sustain Appellant's points asserting a legal insufficiency of the Plaintiff-Appellee's evidence under subdivision 5.

In Rorschach v. Pitts, 151 Tex. 215, 248 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Sup. 1952), Justice Garwood, in writing upon a very similar question, stated that the `obligation' referred to in subdivision 5 must be clearly determined and it is that `obligation' that must be definitely agreed upon by the parties to be payable in a county named in order to properly cast venue in that county. To the same effect see May v. Perkin, 227 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1950); Reliance Universal, Inc. v. I.C.S. Corporation, 452 S.W.2d 926 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1970); Kaufmann v. McKissack, 446 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1969); and Bowden v. Murphy, 448 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1969). To agree with appellee's contention that venue is proper in Dallas County would require us to give a strained construction to the contract.