Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377 (1950). However, we find the procedural history of this case similar to that of Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994), in which the Supreme Court found the defendants had a right to immediate appeal under G.S. ยง 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d). In Bowden, the jury found one co-defendant negligent and the plaintiff contributorily negligent.
We find the instant appeal to raise issues similar to those addressed by our Supreme Court in Bowdenv. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994) . In Bowden, โthe trial court (1) set aside the jury verdict and judgment entered thereon as to the decedent's contributory negligence, (2) entered judgment for the plaintiff upon the issue of contributory negligence, and (3) ordered a new trial on the issue of damages."
" Id. at 112-13, 310 S.E.2d 785 (citations omitted). Defendant cites Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994), in support of his argument that a substantial right is affected. There, the jury considered issues of negligence on the part of defendants, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, gross negligence on the part of one of the defendants, and the amount of damages to be awarded the plaintiff.
The issue left to be decided at the new trial is that of damages because the jury did not previously reach the issue. Defendant cites to Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994), in support of her argument that a substantial right is affected. In Bowden, the jury considered issues of negligence on the part of defendants, contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, gross negligence on the part of one of the defendants, and the amount of damages to be awarded the plaintiff.
" Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 425, 302 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1983); see Tridyn Indus. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 491, 251 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1979) ("That the trial court declared it to be a final, declaratory judgment does not make it so."). Second, immediate appeal is available from an interlocutory order or judgment which affects a "substantial right." N.C.G.S. ยง 1-277(a) (1996); N.C.G.S. ยง 7A-27(d)(1) (1995); Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 796, 448 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1994); Oestreicher, 290 N.C. at 124, 225 S.E.2d at 802. In the instant case, the trial court's discovery order is interlocutory because it does not "dispose of the case, but instead leave[s] it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy."
See Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (A final judgment "disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court." (citations omitted)); see also Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 796, 448 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1994) ("[F]inal judgments are always appealable[.]" (citation and quotations marks omitted)). Analysis
"`[I]t is the appellant[s'] burden to present argument in [their] brief to this Court to support acceptance of the appeal.'" Lee v. Mut. Community Sav. Bank, 136 N.C. App. 808, 810, 525 S.E.2d 854, 856 (2000), quoting Abe v. Westview Capital, L.C., 130 N.C. App. 332, 334, 502 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998). Defendant argues that the instant appeal affects a substantial right as defined by Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994), LaFalce v. Wolcott, 76 N.C. App. 565, 334 S.E.2d 236 (1985), and Desmond v. City of Charlotte, 142 N.C. App. 590, 544 S.E.2d 269 (2001). We note that in Bowden, LaFalce, and Desmond the trial court either granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict or directed verdict and therefore did not accept the jury determination of liability.
A second available avenue for immediate appeal from an interlocutory order or judgment exists where such order affects a "substantial right." See N.C. Gen. Stat. ยงยง 1-277(a), 7A-27(d)(1) (2001); Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 796, 448 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1994). An interlocutory order affects a substantial right if the order "deprive[s] the appealing party of a substantial right which will be lost if the order is not reviewed before a final judgment is entered."
However, given that both the partial new trial order in the case sub judice and the order appealed in Insurance Co. "accept[ed]" the jury's verdict fixing the issue of liability, we find the cases indistinguishable in substance. Compare Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994) (rejecting application of Insurance Co. and finding appeal of order granting partial new trial on issue of damages and appeal of underlying judgment based upon issue of contributory negligence proper where trial court did not accept jury's verdict on issue of liability but granted JNOV on issue of contributory negligence); Desmond v. Charlotte, 142 N.C. App. 590, 544 S.E.2d 269 (2001) (following Bowden given similar facts). Furthermore, similar to the appeal in Insurance Co., reviewing issues concerning the underlying judgment while the issue of damages remains pending below would contravene the well-established principle that appellate procedure "is designed to eliminate the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary appeals, and to present the whole case for determination in a single appeal from the final judgment."