Opinion
Case No. 1:99 CV 779
October 18, 2000
OPINION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiffs claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds this decision to be supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The jurisdiction of the Court is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making his decision, and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court is not to conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and the Commissioner's findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Serv's, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardron v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). The substantiality of the evidence must consider the evidence on the record as a whole, and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984).
As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. The standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On November 7, 1994, Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits. (Tr. 14). Finding that Plaintiff was disabled due to substance abuse and alcohol addiction, the Commissioner awarded Plaintiff benefits. Id. On March 29, 1996, Congress amended the Social Security Act, providing that "[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(C). Pursuant to this provision, Plaintiffs benefits were terminated on January 1, 1997. (Tr. 14).
Plaintiff's benefits were previously suspended on August 1, 1996, due to his incarceration for drunk driving. (Tr. 14, 4647).
On April 23, 1997, Plaintiff again filed for SSI benefits, alleging that he had been disabled since November 7, 1990. (Tr. 86). Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which time he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). On October 14, 1998, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ John Murphy, with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and vocational expert Susan Rowe. In a written decision dated October 30, 1998, ALJ Murphy determined that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Act. The Appeals Council declined to review this decision, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. Plaintiff then initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
MEDICAL HISTORY
Complaining of bilateral foot numbness and tingling, Plaintiff was examined on March 8, o1995. (Tr. 188-89). The doctor reported that Plaintiff's past medical history was "significant for alcoholism," as well as "previous alcohol related seizures." (Tr. 189). It was further observed that Plaintiff was "still utilizing alcohol to a frequent degree." Id. The doctor concluded that Plaintiff suffered from neuropathy induced by "alcohol intake of a rather severe and chronic degree." (Tr. 188-89).
On June 17, 1996, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Craig Kuesel. (Tr. 184-86). A CT scan of Plaintiff's lumbar spine revealed "borderline to mild stenosis" at L3-L4, prominent central canal stenosis at L4-L5, and focal disc protrusion at L5-S1. (Tr. 184). The doctor reported, however, that "I am not sure that any of these findings would really correlate with his symptoms." Id. A physical examination was unremarkable, and Dr. Kuesel concluded that "the patient's symptoms and physical examination is not very consistent with lumbar spinal stenosis." (Tr. 185).
Complaining of an increase in pain and numbness in both of his lower extremities, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Kuesel on October 1, 1996. (Tr. 182-83). An MRI of Plaintiff's cervical spine revealed "only minor spurring but no evidence of cord compression." (Tr. 182). Upon examination, Plaintiff demonstrated normal muscle strength in "all motor groups of the lower limbs." Moreover, Plaintiff was able to heel and toe walk without difficulty and his gait appeared "quite steady." Id.
On April 23, 1997, Plaintiff was again examined by Dr. Kuesel, who reported that he observed "no evidence of radiculopathy or spinal stenosis." (Tr. 181). On April 29, 1997, Plaintiff participated in a nerve conduction study, the results of which were "normal in the motor nerves with significant improvement compared to 2-95." (Tr. 178). The doctor concluded that "since his motor nerve study improved so significantly since 2-95, an alcoholic neuropathy would certainly be quite likely."
Complaining of "a cold tingling pain in the bottom of his feet and bilateral circumferential numbness from the knees down to the toes and loss of balance," Plaintiff was examined by Dr. John Ehlert on June 11, 1997. (Tr. 187-88). Plaintiffs physical examination revealed "decreased sensation on the bottom of his feet and somewhat around the dorsum and lower legs. Otherwise he has negative straight leg raising and normal reflexes." (Tr. 188). The doctor further reported that Plaintiff did not complain of "buttock, posterior thigh, or anterior calf pain such as one would see in spinal stenosis." An MRI revealed "very mild" stenosis and "a tiny" L5-S1 bulge, but "nothing that would cause any of these symptoms." Id Dr. Ehlert concluded that Plaintiffs symptoms "have nothing to do with his spine." (Tr. 187).
On July 11, 1997, Dr. V. Sethy completed a Residual Physical Functional Capacity Assessment form regarding Plaintiffs limitations. (Tr. 195-202). Dr. Sethy reported that Plaintiff can "occasionally" lift 50 pounds, and "frequently" lift 25 pounds, as well as stand, walk, and sit, "about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday." (Tr. 196). The doctor further indicated that Plaintiff s ability to push and/or pull was unlimited, subject to the aforementioned lifting restrictions. Id. As for postural limitations, Dr. Sethy indicated that Plaintiff can only "occasionally" stoop and crouch, but is able to "frequently" climb, balance, kneel, and crawl. (Tr. 197). The doctor further indicated that Plaintiff should avoid walking on uneven terrain, as well as jobs requiring "sensory acuity." (Tr. 198-99). Finally, Dr. Sethy reported that Plaintiff suffered from no visual or communicative limitations. Id.
On October 9, 1997, Plaintiff underwent a lumbar myelogram, as well as a CT scan of the lower lumbar spine. (Tr. 222-23). This examination revealed "mild to moderate" disc bulging at the L4-L5 level "without convincing evidence of herniation but producing a mild to moderate degree of central canal stenosis," "mild to moderate posterolateral disc herniation at the LS-S1 level on the left, with posterior displacement of the left S1 nerve root," and "borderline small AP bony canal dimensions at the L4 and L5 levels." (Tr. 223).
On November 11, 1997, Plaintiff was examined by Kenneth VanderWoude, Ph.D., Licensed Psychologist. (Tr. 239-43). Upon examination, Plaintiff was "reality oriented," and responded to questioning in a spontaneous and logical manner. (Tr. 241). Testing revealed that Plaintiff possesses a verbal IQ of 82, a performance IQ of 82, and a full scale IQ of 81, which correlates with "low average intelligence." (Tr. 242-43). VanderWoude diagnosed Plaintiff with adjustment reaction with depressed mood and alcohol dependence in remission. (Tr. 243).
On November 26, 1997, Donald Tate, Psychologist, completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form regarding Plaintiffs mental limitations. (Tr. 246-54). Finding that Plaintiff suffered from adjustment disorder, Tate concluded that Plaintiff satisfied the Part A criteria for Section 12.04 (Affective Disorders) of the Listing of Impairments. (Tr. 249). Tate also concluded, however, that Plaintiff failed to satisfy any of the Part B criteria for this particular impairment. (Tr. 253). Specifically, Tate reported that Plaintiff experienced only "slight" restrictions in the activities of daily living, and maintaining social functioning, and "seldom" experiences deficiencies in concentration, persistence and pace. Furthermore, Tate concluded that Plaintiff "never" experiences episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings. Id.
On December 23, 1997, Dr. Mary Ann Kit completed a Residual Physical Functional Capacity Assessment form regarding Plaintiff's limitations. (Tr. 255-63). Dr. Kit reported that Plaintiff can "occasionally" lift 20 pounds, and "frequently" lift 10 pounds, as well as stand, walk, and sit, "about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday." (Tr. 256). The doctor further indicated that with respect to Plaintiff's lower extremities, his ability to push and/or pull was limited in that he was unable to operate foot pedals. Id. As for postural limitations, Dr. Kit indicated that Plaintiff can only "occasionally" climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, and can "never" climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 257). The doctor also indicated that Plaintiff should avoid heights and walking on uneven terrain. (Tr. 257, 259). Dr. Kit further reported that while Plaintiff's ability to perform manipulative operations was limited with respect to his right hand, it was unlimited with respect to the left. (Tr. 258). Finally, Dr. Kit reported that Plaintiff suffered from no visual or communicative limitations. (Tr. 258-59).
On January 11, 1998, Plaintiff was admitted to Holland Community Hospital after apparently ingesting alcohol in combination with various medications. (Tr. 275-77). Two days later, Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital and transferred to Kalamazoo Psychiatric Hospital. (Tr. 280, 296). Plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with dysthymic disorder, as well as alcohol dependence, and discharged on January 27, 1998. (Tr. 305).
Because he was "not complying with his out-patient treatment program," Plaintiff was readmitted to Kalamazoo Psychiatric Hospital on March 5, 1998. (Tr. 310-23). Upon admission, Plaintiff was "smelling of alcohol." (Tr. 310). Upon examination, Plaintiff exhibited "appropriate" attitude, as well as "normal" psychomotor activity. (Tr. 311). Plaintiff denied experiencing suicidal ideas, hallucinations, or delusions. His tempo of ideas and associations were normal, and his speech was coherent and logical. Plaintiff was oriented to time, place, and person, and his concentration was adequate. Id. Plaintiff was diagnosed with dysthymic disorder and alcohol dependence. (Tr. 312). It was further noted that Plaintiff required "supervision to prevent alcohol use." Id. Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on April 17, 1998. (Tr. 318). Upon discharge, Plaintiff's mood and physical condition were both "stable," and he denied any suicidal thoughts. (Tr. 319).
X-rays of Plaintiff's lumbar spine, taken on May 18, 1998, revealed "no apparent compression deformity or subluxation. There is mild vertebral spurring anteriorly at the L4-5 level." (Tr. 324). The x-rays further revealed "no evidence of spondylolysis or spondylolisthesis." Id.
An MRI of Plaintiff's lumbar spine, performed on May 30, 1998, revealed "mild" degenerative disc changes with disc bulging at L4-L5 and L5-S1," "borderline to mild" central stenosis at L4-L5, and a "mild" broad-based disc protrusion at L5-S1. (Tr. 326).
Plaintiff has also attached to his brief two additional reports, both allegedly prepared by Dr. Keith Javery. Plaintiff acknowledges that these "reports" were not provided to the ALJ, but were instead first presented to the Appeals Council. One report is a form on which a box has been marked indicating that Plaintiff is capable of performing sedentary work. This form is dated March 15, 1999. It is signed as well, but the signature is indecipherable. The other report is an Ability to do Work-Related Activities form, the contents of which indicate that Plaintiff is not disabled, but is rather fully capable of performing sedentary work. This report is neither dated, nor signed.
The Court cannot consider these two reports, however, unless Plaintiff demonstrates that such evidence is material, and that good cause existed for not presenting it to the ALJ. See Cline v. Commissioner of Social Security, 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1993); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2F.3d 692, 695-96 (6th Cir. 1993). With respect to materiality, Plaintiff must establish that there exists a reasonable probability that the Commissioner would have reached a different result if presented with the evidence at issue. See Sizemore v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir. 1988).
These two reports do not suggest that Plaintiff is disabled or incapable of working, but instead indicate just the opposite. While Plaintiff correctly notes that Dr. Javery's opinion regarding the extent to which Plaintiff can perform work activities differs slightly from the ALJ's findings, Dr. Javery's conclusions in this regard are contradicted by substantial medical evidence to the contrary, The Court concludes, therefore, that there does not exist a reasonable probability that consideration of this evidence would have lead to a different result, Accordingly, the Court is precluded from considering this evidence.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S DECISION A. Applicable Standards
The social security regulations provide a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1420(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if an individual suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining a claimant's residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, 416.945.
1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to be "disabled" regardless of medical findings ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)); 2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found "disabled" ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (c)); 3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which "meets or equals" a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of "disabled" will be made without consideration of vocational factors ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (d)); 4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)); 5. If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can be performed ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)).
B. The ALJ's Decision
In his decision denying Plaintiff's claim for benefits, ALJ Murphy determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: (1) mild degenerative disc disease and mild stenosis at L4-L5 and L5-S1, (2) peripheral neuropathy, (3) status post right hand injury with only 60 percent grip strength, (4) dysthymic disorder, and (5) alcohol abuse in remission since March 5, 1998. (Tr. 16-17, 23). The ALJ further determined, however, that Plaintiff did not suffer from a condition, or combination of conditions, which satisfied the requirements of the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 23-24). Moreover, while he found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ further determined that there existed a significant number of jobs which Plaintiff could perform despite his limitations. Id. As a result, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act.
1. The ALJ's Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 52$; 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
As noted above, the Commissioner has established a five-step disability determination procedure. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987); Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).
Furthermore, as indicated above, Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1996, providing that "[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). Pursuant to this amendment the ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535; Belcher v. Apfel, 56 F. Supp.2d 662, 666 (S.D.W. Va. 1999). If the claimant is disabled, the ALJ must then determine whether the claimant's drug addiction or alcohol abuse is a "contributing factor material to the determination of disability." Drug or alcohol use is so characterized if the claimant would not be disabled were he to discontinue their use. Id.
With respect to Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform work with the following limitations: (1) no lifting more than a maximum of 20 pounds or more than 10 pounds on a regular basis, (2) Plaintiff can stand and/or walk for four hours, and sit for six hours, in an eight-hour workday, (3) any work must afford a sit-stand option, (4) no more than occasional operation of foot controls, (5) no more than occasional kneeling, crouching, crawling, climbing, or bending and/or twisting at the waist, (6) no more than occasional reaching, handling, or fingering with the right hand, and (7) no work involving proximity to moving mechanical parts, heights, or operation of dangerous or heavy machinery. (Tr. 23-24, 175-76). The ALJ further concluded that Plaintiff was capable of (1) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions, (2) using normal judgment to perform simple, entry level types of work, (3) responding appropriately to supervisors, coworkers, and the general public, and (4) dealing appropriately in a routine work setting. (Tr. 24, 64).
The ALJ also evaluated Plaintiff's limitations in terms of the Part B criteria applicable to the Listing of Impairments. Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff: (1) experiences "slight" restrictions in the activities of daily living, (2) experiences "moderate" difficulties in maintaining social functioning, (3) "seldom" experiences deficiencies of concentration, persistence and pace, and (4) "never" suffers episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings. (Tr. 31). In short, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff satisfied none of the Part B criteria. After reviewing the relevant medical evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ's determination as to Plaintiff's RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work, at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964.
While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, "a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs" is needed to meet the burden. O'Banner v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 963-64. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, as the ALJ questioned vocational expert Susan Rowe.
The vocational expert identified approximately 21,600 jobs which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (Tr. 63-65). This represents a significant number of jobs. See Born v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv's, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990) (a finding that 2,500 jobs existed which the claimant could perform constituted a significant number); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1988) (the existence of 1,800 jobs which the claimant could perform satisfied the significance threshold).
Plaintiff first claims that the hypothetical question that the ALJ posed to the vocational expert was "incomplete and improper." While the ALJ may satisfy his burden through the use of hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert, such hypothetical questions must accurately portray the claimant's physical and mental impairments. See Cline, 96 F.3d at 150. The hypothetical question that the ALJ posed to the vocational expert simply asked her whether jobs existed which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, to which she indicated that approximately 21,600 such jobs existed. (Tr. 63-65). As substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding regarding Plaintiff's RFC, there was nothing improper or incomplete about the hypothetical question. The ALJ, therefore, properly relied upon the vocational expert's testimony.
Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to Dr. Javery's findings and conclusions. On October 20, 1997, Dr. Javery reported that Plaintiff was precluded from driving, operating machinery, or performing tasks requiring dexterity. (Tr. 331). On May 18, 1998, Dr. Javery reported that Plaintiff's pain was "reasonably controlled . . . but unfortunately his back has really started to flare up." (Tr. 329). However, an MRI of Plaintiff's lumbar spine, performed less than two weeks later, revealed only "mild" degenerative disc changes at L4-L5 and LS-S1, "borderline to mild" stenosis at L4-L5, and a "mild" disc protrusion at LS-S1 with no displacement. (Tr. 326). X-rays taken the same day revealed only "mild" spurring at L4-L5, without apparent disc space narrowing, and "no evidence" of spondylolysis or spondylolishthesis. (Tr. 324). On June 29, 1998, Dr. Javery reported that Plaintiff's back pain was "greatly decreased." (Tr. 327).
Under the treating physician doctrine, the medical opinions and diagnoses of treating physicians are given substantial deference, and if such opinions and diagnoses are uncontradicted, complete deference is appropriate. See King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the ALJ is not bound by opinions which are inconsistent with the evidence as a whole. See Walters, 127 F.3d at 530; Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528-29; 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (the ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion which is inconsistent with substantial medical evidence). First, the Court fails to discern how Dr. Javery's findings call into doubt the ALJ's conclusions. To the extent that they are so interpreted, however, such findings are contradicted by substantial medical evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the ALJ was not required to accord controlling weight to such opinions.
Plaintiff next asserts that alcoholism "was not a contributing factor" in his disability. As the medical evidence reveals, Plaintiff was "still utilizing alcohol to a frequent degree," as of March 8, 1995. (Tr. 188-89). He was subsequently incarcerated for drunk driving. (Tr. 14, 46-47). Moreover, following a January 11, 1998 hospitalization, Plaintiff was diagnosed with alcohol dependence. (Tr. 27577, 305). Finally, because Plaintiff was "not complying with his out-patient treatment program," he was readmitted to the hospital on March 5, 1998, "smelling of alcohol." (Tr. 310). There is little question, therefore, that through March 5, 1998, Plaintiff was still abusing alcohol.
With respect to the time period through March 5, 1998, the ALJ concluded that due to his alcohol abuse, Plaintiff was disabled. (Tr. 20, 24). The ALJ further concluded, however, that Plaintiff would not have been disabled had he stopped using alcohol. (Tr. 24). There exists in the record substantial evidence supporting this conclusion. Accordingly, Plaintiff was ineligible for benefits during this time period, as his alcohol abuse was "a contributing factor material to" the conclusion that he was disabled.
As for the time period following March 5, 1998, the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff's impairments did not preclude him from performing work which existed in significant numbers. Therefore, Plaintiff's alcohol use, or lack thereof, following March 5, 1998, is irrelevant. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535 (before the ALJ is obligated to inquire into whether the claimant's alcohol or drug use is a contributing factor material to his disability, the claimant must first demonstrate that he is disabled); Belcher, 56 F. Supp.2d at 666 (same). Plaintiff's argument is, therefore, unavailing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons indicated herein, there exists more than substantial evidence to support ALJ Murphy's conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Opinion entered this date:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED.