Boulder v. Burns

9 Citing cases

  1. Starkey v. Bryan

    441 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1968)   Cited 19 times

    But error is now attempted to be predicated thereon. [4,5] The general rule is that the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the qualification and knowledge of a witness to entitle him to express an opinion poses a question to be determined in the first instance, at least, by the trial court and its decision is conclusive, unless clearly shown to be erroneous. City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712. Under the circumstances disclosed by the record even had there been timely objection, the trial court would not have erred in permitting these two officers to testify not only as to the test which they conducted, but also to permit them to express their individual opinions concerning the speed of the Bryan vehicle. In other words, we conclude that a sufficient foundation was laid to justify the reception of testimony of the type now complained of by the plaintiff.

  2. Harrison v. Baltimore City

    247 Md. 583 (Md. 1967)   Cited 8 times

    It is a matter of common knowledge that similar meter boxes are to be found quite frequently in public walkways in urban communities serviced by public water supply and that pedestrians walk over them as a matter of course every day without mishap. City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957); Fay v. City of Trenton, 126 N.J.L. 52, 18 A.2d 66 (1941). In the recent case of Ensor v. Ortman, 243 Md. 81, 220 A.2d 82, the lower court granted judgment n.o.v. where the facts showed that Mrs. Ensor walked on a porch that she knew to be defective and was injured when the porch flooring gave way. This Court ruled that she was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and reinstated the verdict of the jury.

  3. Atencio v. Torres

    385 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1963)   Cited 23 times

    The general rule is that the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the qualification and knowledge of a witness to entitle him to express an opinion poses a question for the trial court's determination, and that its "decision is conclusive, unless clearly shown to be erroneous." See, for example, City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712. Suffice it to say that in the instant case the trial court's determination of insufficiency has not been "clearly shown to be erroneous." Indeed, its sustaining of the objection did not even preclude additional efforts to meet the defects perceived by the court.

  4. Cerise v. Fruitvale District

    384 P.2d 462 (Colo. 1963)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that the water and sanitation district is not immune from suit for an injury caused by a failure to replace a manhole cover

    oprietary" function of the municipality. City of Denver v. Capelli, 4 Colo. 25; City of Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 Pac. 590; City of Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370, 86 Pac. 1027; Veraguth v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. App. 473, 76 Pac. 539; City and County of Denver v. Maurer, 47 Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875; Addington v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, 115 Pac. 896. Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30; City and County of Denver v. Taylor, 88 Colo. 89, 292 Pac. 594; City and County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788; City and County of Denver v. Forster, Adm'r., 89 Colo. 246, 1 P.2d 922; Moses v. Denver, 89 Colo. 609, 5 P.2d 581; McIntosh v. City and County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337; Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110; Schwalb, et al., v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667; Atkinson v. City and County of Denver, 118 Colo. 322, 195 P.2d 977; Malvernia Investment Company v. City of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945; City of Boulder v. Maren N. Burns, et al., 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712; City and County of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1101; Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826; Jensen v. South Adams Co. Water and San. Dist., 149 Colo. 102, 368 P.2d 209. The operation and maintenance of the sewer system involved in this case are activities carried on by the District in its proprietary capacity.

  5. Jensen v. South Adams Dist

    149 Colo. 102 (Colo. 1962)   Cited 9 times

    This was a correct statement of the law applicable to this case. City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712. But by Instruction No. 12 the court instructed the jury as follows: "You are instructed that the defendant, South Adams County Water and Sanitation District, is not responsible for the acts of third persons who may tamper or remove the cover to its water meter boxes unless you find from the evidence that such lid or cover tampered and removed from the water meter box was moved for such a length of time that the defendant should have known of its removal and failed to correct the same."

  6. Faw v. Town of North Wilkesboro

    253 N.C. 406 (N.C. 1960)   Cited 16 times

    We have held in Bailey v. Asheville, 180 N.C. 645, 105 S.E. 326, and in Gasque v. Asheville, 207 N.C. 821, 178 S.E. 848, that a municipality is liable for injuries to persons resulting from its negligence in connection with a water meter box it owns and maintains in its street. See also the following water meter box cases in which the municipality was held liable: Wilkins v. Rutland, 61 Vt. 336, 17 A. 735; City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712; Butler v. City of McMinnville, 126 Or. 56, 268 P. 760; and also McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 18, pp. 430-431. Gettys v. Marion, 218 N.C. 266, 10 S.E.2d 799, is factually distinguishable.

  7. Bridges v. Lintz

    346 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1959)   Cited 25 times
    In Bridges the officer who investigated an automobile accident was qualified as an expert and was permitted to give an opinion not only that defendant was exceeding a safe speed but that this speed coupled with the icy condition of the highway caused the accident.

    Hence the officer's opinion expressed a conclusion of fact which the jury was obligated to determine. The sufficiency of the evidence to establish the qualifications and knowledge of the witness was a question for the trial court's determination and its decision is not subject to reversal unless it is clearly shown to have been erroneous. City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712. In that opinion, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hall, quoted with approval the following language from Stillwell Pierce Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, 130 U.S. 520, 9 S. Ct. 601, 32 L.Ed. 1035:

  8. King Soopers v. Mitchell

    342 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1959)   Cited 43 times
    Rejecting argument that alleged open and obvious ice patches in supermarket parking lot alone discharged property owner's legal duty to exercise reasonable care towards business invitees because, inter alia, "`[a]ll of the circumstances . . . must be taken into account'"

    The question is whether the plaintiff by his conduct can be said, as a matter of law, to have exposed himself to an unreasonable risk of harm. The particular circumstance that this was a grocery store parking lot; that the plaintiff's ground vision was (by defendant) foreseeably handicapped by his purchases; that the icy condition of the lot was general (so that there was no absolute safe route); that plaintiff had no free choice about walking through the lot, and the admission of defendant that it "did nothing to disturb the natural condition of the snow as it existed on the surface of the parking lot" combine to make the question of contributory negligence a disputed one for the jury, Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460, Catlett v. The Colorado S. Ry. Co., 56 Colo. 463, 139 Pac. 14; Sprague v. Herbal, 90 Colo. 134, 6 P.2d 930, 931; Scott v. Matsuda, 127 Colo. 267, 255 P.2d 403; City of Boulder v. Maren N. Burns, et al., 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712; Peterson v. Kessler, 135 Colo. 102, 308 P.2d 610. The language of the Court per Justice Moore in the Peterson case is fully applicable here. "* * * In the instant case the jury, under proper instructions to which no error is assigned, adjudged defendant to be guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and by the verdicts found them to be free from contributory negligence. From the evidence appearing in the record before us, different conclusions might be drawn by fair-minded men.

  9. Connell v. Sun Exploration

    655 P.2d 426 (Colo. App. 1982)   Cited 10 times

    "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The trial court has wide discretion in determining whether these requirements are met. Starkey v. Bryan, 166 Colo. 43, 441 P.2d 314 (1968); City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957). Here, because the witness was allowed to testify regarding his opinion, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in characterizing the witness as an expert and receiving only opinion evidence from him.