Opinion
No. 04C-10-31 CLS.
Date Submitted: January 29, 2007.
Date Decided: April 12, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
GRANTED.
ARBITRATION CASEDEMANDED
TRIAL BY JURY OF TWELVE
Leo John Ramuno, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Robert Pearce, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants Kathleen L. Turner, Terry Lee Turner.
Michael A. Pedicone, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendants Holly Winter and Yenios'.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Kathleen Turner, Terry Lee Turner, Carol Holly-Winter, Cheryl Lynn Jones, and Melissa Anne Yenios (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants"). This Motion arises from claims of: 1) Malicious Prosecution; 2) Defamation; 3) False Arrest and/or False Imprisonment; 4) Gross Negligence, and 5) Invasion of Privacy. Plaintiff Ronald Boulden ("Plaintiff") generally alleges that Defendants maliciously gave false information to police which resulted in his arrest. Having considered the parties' briefs and the record below, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of fact on all of the aforementioned claims. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is, hereby, GRANTED.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims of Gross Negligence and Invasion of Privacy fall within the Malicious Prosecution claim.
FACTS
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants negligently and recklessly misrepresented facts "to obtain an arrest warrant and negligently filed the criminal charges against the Plaintiff." Plaintiff claims that Defendants falsely told Defendant Patrolman Benjamin W. Feldman ("Defendant Officer") that Plaintiff walked into the center of the roadway displaying a shotgun in a way that intimidated them.Consequently, on or about October 6, 2002, Defendant Officer arrested Plaintiff on five counts of Aggravated Menacing and five counts of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony. The Justice of the Peace Court arraigned Plaintiff and committed him to Gander Hill Prison on a $30,000 secured bail. On May 28, 2003, the Superior Court of Delaware held a jury trial which resulted in the dismissal of all the foregoing charges.
Because of these charges and subsequent legal proceedings, Plaintiff alleges that he has "expended thousands of dollars to make bail on the charges to have representation on the charges and was forced to move from the neighborhood due to the no contact order that was issued at his arrest." Plaintiff also alleges that these charges have caused injury to his good character.
Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
In Plaintiff's response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states that the Court should view the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Following this general statement of law, Plaintiff argues that, "The facts of this case have established that criminal charges were filed against the Plaintiff at the instance of the defendants' with malice and without probable cause that the defendants' provided false information to the police in order to have the charges brought." Plaintiff's response ends with this argument and does not cite to specific facts in the record.
Pl. Ans. to Def. Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 2.
Even at the January 29, 2007 hearing, Plaintiff failed to sufficiently elaborate on factual allegations. Plaintiff argued that Defendants maliciously gave false information to police because they did not like Plaintiff. To support this alleged fact, Plaintiff averred that: (1) The statements given to police by Defendants were wrong, as shown by the outcome of his trial, and (2) Defendants did not have a good relationship with Plaintiff.
Defendants deny all allegations made by Plaintiff. In particular, Defendants Holly-Winter and Yenios assert that Defendant Officer prepared and signed the Complaint which led to the warrant and arrest of Plaintiff. Defendants and Defendant Officer testified at trial on the underlying charges. Defendants further contend that Defendant Officer nor any other police "took individual recorded statements, nor did any officer take individual interviews, nor did any officer provide a written statement to any defendant for review and signature, nor did any police officer or judicial officer require any defendant to swear any affidavit or statement memorializing their recollection of events."
f. Holly-Winter and Yenios' Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 6.
Defendants also point out that Plaintiff testified that he did not hear Defendants make statements to police officers. Furthermore, Defendants contend that Defendant Officer testified that he could not individually report the verbatim statements of witnesses because they all approached him at the same time.
Therefore, Defendants Yenios and Holly-Winter aver that Plaintiff has not presented the Court with "credible, admissible evidence that defendants negligently, intentionally or willfully misrepresented facts to the investigating officer in such manner as to give rise to claims for which relief can be granted." Joining in Defendants Holly-Winters and Yenios' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants Kathleen Turner and Terry Lee Turner additionally address the law in reference to Plaintiff's claims of Malicious Prosecution, Defamation, False Arrest and/or False Imprisonment.
f. Holly-Winter and Yenios' Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 14.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court may grant summary judgment if it concludes that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present. Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact in dispute. In considering a Motion for Summary judgment, the Court must view the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The Court's decision must be based solely on the record presented and not on all evidence "potentially possible."DISCUSSION
By showing that no material issues of fact are present in the case at hand, Defendants have met their initial burden of proof and shifted the burden to Plaintiff. The Court generally finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof based on the submitted motions and the January 29, 2007 hearing. Plaintiff does not cite to specific facts in the record that sufficiently raise a genuine issue of fact in support of his contentions for: (1) Malicious Prosecution, (2) False Imprisonment, (3) Defamation and (4) False Arrest and/or False Imprisonment.The Court generally basis this decision on the Delaware Superior Court case of Lengle v. Dukes, which the Court finds very similar to the case at hand. The defendants in Lengle sought to institute two separate actions for criminal trespass against the plaintiff, their neighbor, with whom they had a "relationship that (was) less than amicable." On the second instance, a Justice of the Peace Court issued a warrant for criminal trespass against plaintiff. Like the Plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Lengle was found not guilty following a subsequent trial. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action against defendants, his neighbors, alleging Malicious Prosecution, False Arrest, Defamation, Private Nuisance and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Because the Court finds this case extremely similar to the present matter, it will individually apply the Lengle Court's conclusions of law to each claim at issue here.
1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 757.
Id. at *1.
Id.
I. Malicious Prosecution
"In order to bring an action for malicious prosecution, there must have been a prior institution or continuation of regular judicial proceedings brought against plaintiff by or at the instance of defendant, with malice and without probable cause, and such proceedings must have terminated in plaintiff's favor with resultant damages to him." As such, a defendant is not liable for Malicious Prosecution if the defendant had "probable cause to believe that plaintiff was guilty or if her primary purpose was to bring an offender to justice." Plaintiff has the burden of showing lack of probable cause and malice.
Lengle, 1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 757 at *2 (citing Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery Inc., 21 A.2d 283 (Del.Super. 1941); Wells v. Parsons, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 505 (Del. 1842)).
Id. at *3 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 (1977); Stidham, 21 A.2d at 285).
Id.
Accordingly, the Lengle Court found that the issuing of an arrest warrant for criminal trespass by the magistrate sufficiently established probable cause. The Court also found that plaintiff failed to rebut this prima facie evidence on the contention that, "defendant could state no reason or suspicion as to why she went outside of her residence and discovered plaintiff on her property." The Court further deduced that, "The reason why (defendant) went outside (was) not relevant to the defendant's declaration that plaintiff was on her property . . . " By the simple act of finding plaintiff on his land, defendant made a logical determination that plaintiff was trespassing. The Lengle Court, therefore, granted the Motion for Summary Judgment on the count of malicious prosecution.
Lengle, 1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 757 at *4.
Id.
Id. at*4-5.
Id.
Like the arrest warrant in Lengle, the arrest warrant here was issued upon a determination of probable cause. Defendants contend that, "(T)here is no dispute that the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the Justice of the Peace Court." Furthermore, Defendants here did not file an arrest warrant, nor did they provide an affidavit by which an arrest warrant was obtained. Defendants merely provided statements to police. Hence, the arrest warrant establishes prima facie evidence of probable cause which Plaintiff has failed to rebut.
Def. Kathleen Turner and Terry Lee Turner Mot. for Summ. J. at 4 (citing Def. Holly-Winter and Yenios Mot. for Summ. J.).
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of fact as to the second prong of a Malicious Prosecution claim, the existence of malice. Plaintiff attempts to establish malice by alleging that: (1) The statements given to police by Defendants were wrong, as shown by the outcome of his trial, and (2) Defendants did not have a good relationship with Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff fails to cite any evidence in the record, these facts alone do not raise a genuine issue of malice.
The Court, therefore, finds that it must grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim of Malicious Prosecution. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a lack of probable cause or malice on the part of Defendants here.
II. Defamation
In order to resolve the Defamation claim, the Lengle Court looked to other jurisdictions and held that, "(W)hen allegedly defamatory statements are made to a magistrate or other judicial officer, for the purpose of initiating a criminal prosecution, they are absolutely privileged." The Court further found that, "An absolute privilege affords a complete defense irrespective of accuracy or malice." The Lengle Court, therefore, granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defamation claim. Accordingly, this Court also grants Defendants' Motion for Summary on the Defamation claim here.
Lengle, 1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 757 at *7-8 (citing Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1956); Darnell v. Davis, 58 S.E.2d 68 (Va. 1950); Ange v. State, 123 So. 916 (Fla. 1929); Flynn v. Boglarsky, 129 N.W. 674 (Mich. 1911); Kipp v. Kueker, 386 N.E.2d1282, 1286 (Mass.App.Ct. 1979); Genito v. Rabinowitz, supra at 512. See also, 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 104(d)(9)(1948); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 comment b (1977); Prosser, Law of Torts § 114 (1971)).
Lengle, 1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 757 at *7-8 (citing Short v. New Journal, Co., 212 S.2d 718 (Del.Super. 1965)).
1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 757 at *8.
III. False Arrest and/or False Imprisonment
Where an arrest has lawfully been made "through proper legal process (even though the individual is eventually acquitted), the arrest is not `false' and an action for false imprisonment will not lie." The Lengle Court supported this contention by citing the following passage:
Lengle, 1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 757 at *5.
If the defendant complies with the formal requirements of the law, as by swearing out a valid warrant, so that the arrest of the plaintiff is legally authorized, the court and its officers are not his agents to make the arrest, and their acts are those of the law and the state, and not to be imputed to him. He is therefore liable, if at all, only for a misuse of legal process to effect a valid arrest for an improper purpose. The action must be for malicious prosecution. . . .
Id. at *5-6 (citing Law of Torts § 12 (1971); Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Alexander, 39 So.2d 570 (Ala. 1949); Broughton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1975), cert. den.; Genito v. Rabinowitz, 225 A.2d 590 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. 1966); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45A comment (b) § 37 comment (b) (1965)).
The Lengle Court, therefore, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim.
82 Del. Super. LEXIS 757 at *2.
In following, this Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the False Arrest and False Imprisonment claims as well. All Defendants here complied with the formal requirements of the law in arresting Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is, hereby, GRANTED on all of Defendant's claims. The Court finds no genuine issue of fact in the present matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.