Opinion
# 2019-041-025 Claim No. 129386 Motion No. M-93687
05-09-2019
BUCKY A. BOULA v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
BUCKY BOULA Pro Se HON. LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General By: Christina Calabrese, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's second motion for summary judgment in wrongful confinement action based upon administratively reversed disciplinary determination is denied where claimant fails to satisfy his initial burden to show, as a matter of law, that claimant's confinement was not privileged and where defendant is presumptively entitled to absolute immunity with respect to conduct of quasi-judicial hearing.
Case information
| UID: | 2019-041-025 |
| Claimant(s): | BUCKY A. BOULA |
| Claimant short name: | BOULA |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 129386 |
| Motion number(s): | M-93687 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | BUCKY BOULA Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General By: Christina Calabrese, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 9, 2019 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an inmate at Bare Hill Correctional Facility, moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment as to defendant's liability for allegedly wrongfully confining claimant at Clinton Correctional Facility (Clinton) as a result of an inmate disciplinary proceeding determination. Defendant opposes the motion.
Defendant asserts that the motion should be denied because claimant was previously denied summary judgment based upon the same factual allegations presented on this motion (see Boula v State of New York, UID No. 2016-041-050, [Milano, J., July 13, 2016]). Defendant argues that claimant is attempting to make multiple summary judgment motions in the same action.
Claimant does not deny that the present summary judgment motion is based upon the same factual allegations presented on his prior summary judgment motion, but instead argues that his first summary judgment motion "was pertaining to the "first" claim that claimant filed [Claim No.: 127031]" and his second summary judgment motion "is pertaining to the newly filed claim [Claim No.: 129386]."
Claim No. 127031 was dismissed by Decision and Order of this Court (filed February 24, 2017) for lack of jurisdiction because the claim had been served by regular mail, rather than certified mail, return receipt requested (Boula v State of New York, Claim No. 127031, Motion No. M-89844, [Milano, J., February 24, 2017]).
The present claim (Claim No. 129386) was thereafter filed with the Clerk of the Court of Claims on March 3, 2017 and served on the defendant on April 4, 2017.
The law is clear that successive motions for summary judgment should not be entertained, absent a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause" (Tingling v C.I.N.H.R., Inc., 120 AD3d 570, 570 [2d Dept 2014]).
In MLCFC 2007-9 ACR Master SPE, LLC v Camp Waubeeka, LLC (123 AD3d 1269, 1271 [3d Dept 2014]), the court cites Vinar v Litman (110 AD3d 867, 868-869 [2d Dept 2013]) for the proposition that "evidence is not 'newly discovered' simply because it was not submitted on the previous motion. Rather, the evidence that was not submitted in support of the previous summary judgment motion must be used to establish facts that were not available to the party at the time it made its initial motion for summary judgment and which could not have been established through alternative evidentiary means."
Claimant has failed to identify or offer any "newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause" (Tingling, 120 AD3d at 570) to warrant consideration of a second summary judgment motion. Further, in Consolidated Mortg., LLC v Westport Golf Investors, LLC (141 AD3d 923, 925 [3d Dept 2016], lv dismissed 28 NY3d 1102 [2016]), the court instructs that "[a]bsent sufficient cause for advancing the successive motions for summary judgment, [claimant's] application could have been denied on this basis alone."
Here, claimant makes essentially the same argument found wanting in the prior summary judgment motion: That solely because the disciplinary determination was administratively reversed, claimant is entitled to money damages in an ensuing civil wrongful confinement action. As claimant states in his affidavit supporting his present summary judgment motion, "that [administrative reversal of the disciplinary determination], is the basis of claimant's entire argument/complaint."
Even assuming that claimant's present summary judgment motion, made upon the same factual allegations as his prior summary judgment motion (albeit under a new claim number), is not barred by the rule against successive summary judgment motions, the motion would nevertheless be denied.
The claim, and claimant's affidavit supporting his summary judgment motion, allege that claimant was wrongfully confined at Clinton as a consequence of a guilty determination issued after a prison disciplinary hearing completed on or about June 18, 2015. The disciplinary determination found claimant guilty of possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia based upon his admitted possession of a list of ingredients required to make methamphetamine. Claimant was sentenced to 60 days keeplock (30 of which were suspended), among other penalties.
Claimant alleges that defendant found him guilty of the charge despite claimant having explained to the disciplinary hearing officer that the "ingredients were not a recipe and were information pertaining to his active [criminal appeal] case."
On July 1, 2015, claimant administratively appealed the disciplinary determination and provided to Clinton disciplinary review officers a case (Matter of Nylander v Prack, 123 AD3d 1336 [3d Dept 2014]) holding that possessing a list of ingredients to make crystal methamphetamine did not constitute substantial evidence to support a charge of drug or drug paraphernalia possession.
On July 22, 2015, defendant denied claimant's administrative appeal. Claimant commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging the disciplinary determination on August 11, 2015. The Article 78 court directed defendant to file answering papers by October 16, 2015.
On October 21, 2015, the Acting Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (Commissioner) administratively reversed the disciplinary determination, without further explanation, and the Article 78 proceeding was thereafter dismissed as moot.
The standard for review of the motion is well-established. "A motion for summary judgment should be entertained only after the moving party has established, by competent admissible evidence, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . If the movant meets this initial burden, the opposing party is required to submit evidence which raises a material issue of fact to preclude an award of summary judgment" (Ware v Baxter Health Care Corp., 25 AD3d 863, 864 [3d Dept 2006]).
Once the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts and the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue (Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 31 AD3d 877 [3d Dept 2006]).
To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove the following elements "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
The element most often contested in a prison disciplinary wrongful confinement claim is whether claimant can show that the confinement was not "otherwise privileged."
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
In the context of confinement pursuant to a prison disciplinary proceeding, such confinement is "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with [inmate misbehavior] regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).
The Court finds that claimant has failed to meet his initial burden to show prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on his claim of wrongful confinement.
Neither the claim, nor the claimant's affidavit in support of his summary judgment motion, provides competent admissible evidence demonstrating, as a matter of law, that defendant failed to follow its own rules and regulations in commencing and conducting the disciplinary proceeding. Claimant thus fails to show, as a matter of law, that the challenged confinement was not "otherwise privileged."
The reversal of the hearing determination by the Commissioner appears to have been based upon the Commissioner's assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence in view of substantive case law rather than upon a failure of the defendant to follow applicable due process rules and regulations in commencing and conducting the disciplinary proceeding.
Additionally, even had claimant satisfied his initial burden, a question of fact exists as to whether defendant is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from liability, as asserted in several of its defenses.
The law is clear that where employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary proceedings, "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations . . . their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Varela v State of New York, 283 AD2d 841 [3d Dept 2001]).
Quasi-judicial immunity attaches even if the determination is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 215).
Defendant has set forth defenses asserting that it is entitled to immunity from liability with respect to the damages purportedly arising from the quasi-judicial disciplinary proceeding.
The correction officer who wrote the disciplinary charge and the correction officer who conducted the disciplinary hearing concluded that possession of the methamphetamine ingredient list violated the facility disciplinary rules. The Clinton official who heard the administrative appeal agreed.
After claimant provided case law stating otherwise, the Attorney General, according to claimant, allegedly advised the Commissioner to reverse the disciplinary determination and the Commissioner did so.
At most, claimant shows that defendant was mistaken (or "negligent," as alleged in the claim) in its assertion that claimant's admitted possession of a list of ingredients for making methamphetamine constituted drugs or drug paraphernalia. The defendant's error was a misinterpretation of substantive law rather a failure to comply with rules and regulations intended to ensure that claimant be provided a procedurally fair hearing.
In other words, claimant has shown nothing more than that defendant made an error in charging and confining claimant, and that the error was administratively reversed when reviewed by the Attorney General after claimant commenced an Article 78 proceeding.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that claimant failed to satisfy his initial burden to show, as a matter of law, that defendant violated a disciplinary hearing rule or regulation in commencing and conducting the disciplinary proceeding.
Further, even had claimant satisfied his initial burden, a question of fact exists whether defendant is entitled, under this record, to immunity from liability with respect to the damages purportedly arising from a substantive error, rather than a procedural error implicating due process concerns, in the quasi-judicial disciplinary hearing.
Claimant's motion for summary judgment is, for all of the aforementioned reasons, denied.
May 9, 2019
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Claimant's Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 1, 2019; 2. Affidavit of Bucky A. Boula, sworn to February 27, 2019, and attached exhibits; 3. Affirmation in Opposition of Christina A. Calabrese, dated April 9, 2019; 4. Unsworn and unsigned Reply of Bucky A. Boula, dated April, 2019, and attached exhibits.