The rule in Finston v. Finston, supra, was further expanded in Cooper v. Cooper, 69 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1954), where the Court held that even though claims to adjust property rights were not introduced in the litigation, they could or should have been introduced and thus could no longer be raised in any subsequent litigation. Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Simon v. Simon, 293 So.2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Boswell v. Boswell, 352 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Based on the foregoing, there is hardly any question that Ms. Harris could not maintain a suit for a claim connected with her genital herpes infection in the Circuit Court which entered Final Judgment dissolving the marriage. This in turn leads to the question whether or not Ms. Harris could not have litigated her claim related to her infection in a Circuit Court because of the doctrine of interspousal immunity recognized in this State. The doctrine of interspousal immunity bars the wife's recovery from her husband during the marriage albeit she may obtain relief in her divorce proceeding because a trial Court could use its discretion to fashion a money award for the wife. Courts may take into consideration any factor necessary to "do equity and justice between parties."

The rule set forth in Cooper has been generally followed in this state. See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 980 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1612, 56 L.Ed.2d 63 (1978); Boswell v. Boswell, 352 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Simon v. Simon, 293 So.2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). However, the Cooper decision was completely overlooked in Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).

Schneider v. Schneider, 296 So.2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). See also Boswell v. Boswell, 352 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (order held void for lack of jurisdiction as property rights may not be adjudicated where not determined in final judgment and without reservation of jurisdiction). Once a trial court enters a final judgment and the time for filing post-trial motions has expired, the trial court may not, absent factors, see, e.g., Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540, entertain any further motions in the case unless it specifically retained jurisdiction to do so in its final judgment.

Id. 69 So.2d at 883. We have previously and specifically recognized and applied this rule, Boswell v. Boswell, 352 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Henderson v. Henderson, 226 So.2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1612, 56 L.Ed.2d 63 (1978); Simon v. Simon, 293 So.2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).