Previte does not dispute that the Legislature intended the act's new limitations period to apply retroactively, but argues that the act does not apply to this case for two reasons. First, he contends that even where a statutory amendment is procedural in nature—as is the case with an alteration of a statutory limitations period, see generally Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 312, 547 N.E.2d 328 (1989) (Keene Corp. )—the amendment applies only if the case has not yet gone beyond the procedural stage to which the amendment pertains. His second point is that, in any event, retroactive legislation does not apply to judgments that are final and, in this case, there was a final judgment.
In G. L. c. 260, § 2D, the so-called asbestos revival statute, see Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 38 Mass.App.Ct. 600, 603, 650 N.E.2d 365 (1995), the Legislature established special time periods during which the Commonwealth and its subdivisions could bring an action, otherwise time-barred by § 2B, to recover the cost of asbestos removal from public buildings. See Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 303, 547 N.E.2d 328 (1989) ( Keene ); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 603-604, 650 N.E.2d 365. The effect of the legislation was, among other things, to revive asbestos claims on which the statute of repose period set forth in § 2B had already run.
We, therefore, vacate the allowance of the motion for summary judgment. The asbestos revival statute, its background and constitutionality, are the subjects of Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301 (1989). The Commonwealth sought relief under G.L.c. 231, § 118, before a single justice of this court from allowance of summary judgment (no final judgment had yet entered nor had the judge made a ruling under Mass.R.Civ.P. 54[b], 365 Mass. 821 [1974]).
The statutory actual controversy requirement is to be liberally construed, and a party seeking a declaratory judgment need not demonstrate an actual impairment of rights. Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 304 (1989); Colby v.Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 773 (1984), rev. den., 393 Mass. 1105 (1985). The purpose of Chapter 231A is to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, duties, status, and other legal relations.
The defendants first argue that the plaintiffs have no likelihood of succeeding in their declaratory judgment action because no actual controversy exists under Chapter 231 A. The statutory actual controversy requirement is to be liberally construed, and a party seeking a declaratory judgment need not demonstrate an actual impairment of rights. Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 304 (1989); Colby v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 767, 773 (1984), rev. den., 393 Mass. 1105 (1985). The purpose of Chapter 231A is to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, duties, status, and other legal relations.
The meanings of the other restrictions are obvious on their face. Massachusetts courts liberally construe the actual controversy requirement of G.L.c. 231A, § 1. Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 304 (1989), citing Massachusetts Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 293 (1977). The pleading need only set forth a real dispute concerning a legal relation, which if not resolved will likely lead to litigation identical to the present subject matter.
"A legislative enactment carries with it a presumption of constitutionality, and the challenging party must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no 'conceivable grounds' which could support its validity." Leibovich, 574 N.E.2d at 984 (quoting Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 478 N.E.2d 930, 934 (1985)); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 524, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998) (reaffirming the principle that "legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality" (quoting Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882)); City of Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 547 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1989); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 372 N.E.2d at 525 (citing Mass. Port Auth. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 352 Mass. 755, 227 N.E.2d 902, 906-07 (1967)). "Only those statutes which, on a balancing of opposing considerations, are deemed to be unreasonable, are held to be unconstitutional."
The defendants argue that the judge properly ordered credit for the time spent detained prior to adjudication because a denial of such credit violates their constitutional rights to substantive due process and equal protection. See Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 30 & n.9, 913 N.E.2d 832 (2009) ; Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 13, 768 N.E.2d 1055 (2002) ; Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 308 n.8, 547 N.E.2d 328 (1989). Taking the latter claim first, the defendants assert they are treated differently from two similarly situated groups -- incarcerated adults who received credit for pretrial detention, and juveniles committed to DYS who were not subject to preadjudication detention.
See Zeller v. Canto, supra at 84; Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co., 388 Mass. 228, 235 (1983)." Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 305 (1989). This provision, contained in the first sentence of art. 10, reads as follows: "Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws."
Finally, the Legislature has authority to resolve problems, such as those created by derelict titles, by reasonable legislation that removes uncertainty by clarifying the law without amounting to a taking. Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 311 (1989); Briggs v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 241, 255-57 (1999). The Court grants " considerable deference" to the Legislature's judgment in weighing the public interest served by the statute against the nature of the right that the statute affects retroactively and the extent and scope of that effect.