In so concluding, we have considered, and rejected, the argument by Harvey that an exception to the usual requirement of irreparable harm applies in this case. Specifically, Harvey argues that there is an exception to the "irreparable harm" requirement when an injunction is sought to enjoin actions that are clearly contrary to expressed law, citing Thibodeaux v. Conoco Phillips Co., 2006-1282 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07), 952 So. 2d 912 writ denied, 2007- 0725 (La. 6/29/07), 959 So. 2d 518 and Bossier v. Lovell, 410 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/23/1982), writ denied 414 So. 2d 376 (La. 1982). In the instant case, Harvey argues that the Second Injunction was based on the State's violation of the First Injunction, and that its actions in doing so, found to be in contempt of court, are by definition "clearly contrary" to law.
In so concluding, we have considered, and rejected, the argument by Harvey that an exception to the usual requirement of irreparable harm applies in this case. Specifically, Harvey argues that there is an exception to the “irreparable harm” requirement when an injunction is sought to enjoin actions that are clearly contrary to expressed law, citing Thibodeaux v. Conoco Phillips Co., 2006–1282 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07), 952 So.2d 912 writ denied, 2007–0725 (La.6/29/07), 959 So.2d 518 and Bossier v. Lovell, 410 So.2d 821 (La.App. 3 Cir. 02/03/1982), writ denied 414 So.2d 376 (La.1982). In the instant case, Harvey argues that the Second Injunction was based on the State's violation of the First Injunction, and that its actions in doing so, found to be in contempt of court, are by definition “clearly contrary” to law.