Moreover, this court has previously found Rule 1024 controlling in these instances by implication. See Safeguard Investment Company v.Davis, 239 Pa. Super. 300, 361 A.2d 893 (1976); Borteck v.Goldenburg, 87 Pa. Super. 602 (1926); Safety Banking and TrustCo. v. Conwell, 28 Pa. Super. 237 (1905). In Safeguard, for example, we were confronted with a petition to strike off or open judgment which had been dismissed by the lower court.
In addition, the petition to open the judgment was not signed and sworn to by defendant, and no reason appears therein for its having been executed and sworn to by an attorney. See Borteck etal. v. Goldenburg et al., 87 Pa. Super. 602. Defendant should have explained on his own oath the cause of his apparent laches, and have sworn to a good defense; and if the allegations were disputed by a responsive answer the issues thus made should have been supported in the usual manner. I would therefore reverse the action of the court below, and affirm the judgment entered on the verdict in this case.
The Practice Act of 1915 did not introduce a new method of instituting actions and it is still necessary to begin actions by issuing a writ of summons: Spang Co. v. Adams Express Co., 75 Pa. Super. 107. See also, Borteck v. Goldenburg, 87 Pa. Super. 602. The lower court was right in holding that fifteen days having not expired from the entry of the appearance by the defendants or of the service of the summons on them, the plaintiff had no right to enter judgment by default.