Opinion
Case No. 20020947-CA.
Filed January 24, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick.
Chelsea Koch, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Mark E. Burns, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion to summarily affirm under rule 10(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Borrego asserts that the district court improperly dismissed his petition, filed under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for writ of habeas corpus challenging his extradition to Idaho. Borrego argues that the district court erred by dismissing his petition without a hearing.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly defined the limited scope of judicial review permitted in a habeas corpus petition challenging extradition.
[A] court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifiable.
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535 (1978). In this case, Borrego only challenged whether he was the person sought by Idaho. An evidentiary hearing was not necessary because the facts regarding his identity were "readily verifiable" when the State responded to the petition and provided matching fingerprints and booking photographs from both Utah and Idaho, as well as corroborating birth dates and social security numbers from both states. Borrego did not file an objection or rebuttal to this information. Furthermore, rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not require the district court to hold a hearing.See Utah R.Civ.P. 65B(b)(6) ("If the circumstances require, the courtmay also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint." (Emphasis added.)); see also Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1980) (stating if it affirmatively appears that Petitioner is not entitled to the writ, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary).
Borrego further asserts that a hearing was necessary to allow him to question the Idaho authorities regarding the pending charges. However, "[i]nterstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and trial." Doran, 439 U.S. at 288, 99 S.Ct. at 535 (internal citations omitted). "The extradition process `is but one step in securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may be tried, and in no manner determines the question of guilt.'" Id. (quoting In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 333, 25 S.Ct. 535, 537 (1905)). "[T]he inquiry into participation in the underlying crimes goes to the merits of the charge in the demanding state and is beyond the ambit of the asylum state's interest in the matter." Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1047 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-20 (1999) ("The guilt or innocence of the accused as to the crime of which he is charged in another state may not be inquired into."). Borrego's request for a hearing to question Idaho authorities regarding the nature of the evidence against him was beyond the proper scope of the habeas proceeding in Utah. Consequently, the district court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
In this case, the Governor of Idaho certified that the extradition documents were authentic. "This is a sufficient compliance with the law as to the authentication." Birmingham v. Larson, 490 P.2d 893, 894 (Utah 1971). When presented with the authentic documents from the demanding state, the Governor of Utah properly issued a rendition warrant. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-2 (stating "it is the duty of the governor" to extradite fugitive upon proper demand); Boudreaux v. State, 1999 UT App 310, ¶ 9, 989 P.2d 1103. "A governor's warrant is presumed valid, and `[a] governor's grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met.'" Boudreaux, 1999 UT App 310 at ¶ 24 (quoting Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S.Ct. at 535); accordEmig, 703 P.2d at 1047. Borrego failed to rebut the prima facie case established through issuance of the Utah governor's warrant.See Emig, 703 P.2d at 1047-48 (stating petitioner has burden of refuting the prima facie case established by Utah governor's warrant). Consequently, once the district court found that all the Doran factors had been met, it properly dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Accordingly, we grant the sua sponte motion and affirm the order of the district court.
James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge, concur.