“Rule 15(a)(2) is a lenient standard, and the Court is to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Borozny v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., Pratt & Whitney Div., No. 21-CV-1657 (SVN), 2023 WL 7037523, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023) (citing Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021)). “If the [movant] has at least colorable grounds for relief, justice . . . require[s]” that the court grant leave to amend a complaint.
First, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the amendments because he acted with reasonable diligence in obtaining the information. See Borozny v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., Pratt & Whitney Div., No. 3:21-cv-1657 (SVN), 2023 WL 7037523, at *2, *7 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023) (rejecting claim that plaintiffs could have been more diligent in investigating publicly available information where plaintiffs sought to amend following resolution of a discovery dispute). Here, Plaintiff acted diligently in moving to amend after learning new facts based on discovery produced by Defendants and shortly after the deposition of Defendant Marinaccio.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” making sure to interpret the rule liberally in favor of amendment so as to enable disputes to be resolved on the merits whenever possible. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2); Amaya v. Roadhouse Brick Oven Pizza, Inc., 285 F.R.D. 251, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that leave to amend is entrusted to the court's discretion); Assam v. Deer Park Spring Water, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). “Rule 15(a)(2) is a lenient standard, and the Court is to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Borozny v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., Pratt & Whitney Div., No. 3:21-CV-1657 (SVN), 2023 WL 7037523, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023) (citing Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1112 (2022)). “If the [movant] has at least colorable grounds for relief, justice . . . require[s]” that the court grant leave to amend a complaint. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Jordache, 143 F.R.D. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (quoting S.S.Silberblatt v. East Harlem Pilot Block-Building 1 Hous.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” making sure to interpret the rule liberally in favor of amendment so as to enable disputes to be resolved on the merits whenever possible. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2); Amaya v. Roadhouse Brick Oven Pizza, Inc., 285 F.R.D. 251, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that leave to amend is entrusted to the court's discretion); Assam v. Deer Park Spring Water, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). “Rule 15(a)(2) is a lenient standard, and the Court is to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Borozny v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., Pratt & Whitney Div., No. 3:21-CV-1657 (SVN), 2023 WL 7037523, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023) (citing Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1112 (2022)). “If the [movant] has at least colorable grounds for relief, justice . . . require[s]” that the court grant leave to amend a complaint. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Jordache, 143 F.R.D. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (quoting S.S. Silberblatt v. East Harlem Pilot Block-Building 1 Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 28, 42 (2d Cir.1979)).
After the stated amendment deadline, a court must balance the standard set out in Rule 16(b)(4) with that of Rule 15 to evaluate the permissibility of the proposed amendment. Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Pasternack v. Shrader, 863 F.3d 162, 174 n.10 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that a plaintiff who "wishes to amend after the scheduling deadline has passed ... must satisfy both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 16 to be permitted to amend") (emphasis added) (cleaned up); Borozny v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., Pratt & Whitney Div., No. 3:21-CV-1657 (SVN), 2023 WL 7037523, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023) (applying and balancing the standards of both Rule 15 and Rule 16 where amendment was sought after the Court's scheduling order deadline). Under Rule 16(b)(4), a plaintiff should be permitted to assert an amended complaint after a scheduling order's deadline to do so only if there is "good cause" for the modification of the scheduling order.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires,” making sure to interpret the rule liberally in favor of amendment so as to enable disputes to be resolved on the merits whenever possible. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2); Amaya v. Roadhouse Brick Oven Pizza, Inc., 285 F.R.D. 251, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that leave to amend is entrusted to the court's discretion); Assam v. Deer Park Spring Water, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). “Rule 15(a)(2) is a lenient standard, and the Court is to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Borozny v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., Pratt & Whitney Div., No. 3:21-CV-1657 (SVN), 2023 WL 7037523, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023) (citing Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1112 (2022)). “If the [movant] has at least colorable grounds for relief, justice ... require[s]” that the court grant leave to amend a complaint. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Jordache, 143 F.R.D. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (quoting S.S. Silberblatt v. East Harlem Pilot Block-Building 1 Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 28, 42 (2d Cir.1979)).