Our courts have held such objections to be `of no force or effect.'" 414 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987) (citations omitted). Palmer contends his objection was sufficient to preserve error "because the nature of his objection was obvious: the objection followed a question and opinion that simply paraphrased the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator."
The second Grismore proposition has been applied in this state to exclude testimony relating to violations of the rules of the road. See, e.g., Miller v. Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523 (Iowa 1983) (testimony to effect that party violated the law by passing in a no-passing zone); Schlichte v. Franklin Troy Trucks, 265 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa 1978) (testimony that skid marks indicated a violation of the speed laws); Bornn v. Madagan, 414 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa App. 1987) (testimony that party failed to yield). I believe that under Iowa Rule of Evidence 704 we should move away from such a strict application of the "conclusion of law" restriction in cases where the testimony is used for a descriptive purpose.
In Tiedemann v. Radiation Therapy Consultants, P.C., 299 Or. 238, 243, 701 P.2d 440, 444 (1985), the court held that testimony similar to that in Gramling is inadmissible because it is "a pure opinion which merely tells the jury which result to reach." See also Bornn v. Madagan, 414 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (Snell, J.: testimony that automobile accident was caused by defendant's failure to yield the right of way properly excluded as "a legal conclusion on domestic law"); Dale v. Bridges, 507 So.2d 375, 378 (Miss. 1987) (testimony about who was "at fault" in automobile accident excludable as allowing "the witness to tell jury what result to reach"); Murrow v. Daniels, 85 N.C. App. 401, 408, 355 S.E.2d 204, 209 (1987), rev'd on othergrounds, 321 N.C. 494, 364 S.E.2d 392 (1988) (error to allow witness to testify that defendant's actions were gross negligence because testimony was a "legal conclusion"); Deleon v. Louder, 743 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (testimony that plaintiff's conduct was "proximate cause" of accident erroneously admitted because "it involved a legal definition").
But courts have engaged in error-preservation analyses based on standing objections in the past. See id. (reaching the merits of hearsay argument but noting sparse citations to the record in appellate briefs); State v. Johnson , 237 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Iowa 1976) (finding error was not preserved where testimony subject to sustained objection during voir dire was introduced again before the jury); Bornn v. Madagan , 414 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1987) (finding error was not preserved because no specific objections were made and because the type of objection was improper). In this case, as the nurse answered questions regarding what the child told her during the physical exam, Juste objected on "the same" grounds—hearsay and bolstering.
In addressing the sisters' objections, we first acknowledge Iowa's liberal rule allowing "expert opinion testimony if it will aid the jury and is based on special training, experience, or knowledge with respect to the issue in question." Bornn v. Madagan, 414 N.W.2d 646, 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
This court holds that the trial court committed prejudicial error in receiving into evidence, over plaintiffs' objection, Sgt. Burford's challenged testimony. In addition to Lollis, the following authorities are in accord with this ruling: Zimmer v. Miller Trucking Co., Inc., 743 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1984); Buchanan v. Brandt, 168 Colo. 138, 450 P.2d 324 (1969); Weng v. Schleiger, 130 Colo. 90, 273 P.2d 356 (1954); Turbert v. Mather Motors, Inc., 165 Conn. 422, 334 A.2d 903 (1973); Gringer v. Dattilo, 81 Ill.App.2d 244, 225 N.E.2d 408 (1966); Koch v. Greenwood, 149 Ind. App. 457, 273 N.E.2d 568 (1971); Lee v. Dickerson, 133 Ind. App. 542, 183 N.E.2d 615 (1962); Bornn v. Madagan, 414 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa App. 1987); Kennedy v. Hageman, 704 S.W.2d 656 (Ky.App. 1985); Rettler v. Ebreck, 71 N.W.2d 759 (N.D. 1955); Gabus v. Harvey, 678 P.2d 253 (Okla. 1984); Hubbard v. Coates, 444 P.2d 204 (Okla.
Allen's report "did not state the `cause' of the accident, in the sense of direct testimony allocating fault, but was rather a chronological description of the events the occurrence of which the evidence supported." Bornn v. Madagan, 414 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Iowa App. 1987). The trial court properly admitted the accident report into evidence.