Opinion
SACV 21-01515 MWF (KS)
12-21-2021
JOHN BORKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. ORANGE COUNTY POLICE DEPT et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
KAREN L. STEVENSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff, a California state prisoner who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint ("Complaint"). (Diet. No. 1.) On October 1, 2021, after screening the Complaint, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order Dismissing the Complaint with Leave to Amend. (Dkt. No. 9.) The Court found that the the Complaint violated Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to name any ascertainable defendants or state how each of them specifically violated a federal right. (Dkt No. 9 at 6-8)
On October 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). (Dkt No" 12.) On October 29, 2021, after screening the FAC, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order Dismissing the First Amended Complaint with Leave to Amend. (Dkt. No. 14.) This time, the Court found that the FAC failed to cure the primary defects in the original Complaint because it again did not identify any ascertainable defendants or explain which defendants violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights and how they did so. (Id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff was again granted leave to amend. (Id. at 9.)
On December 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed the pending Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). (Dkt No. 20/1
RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD
In determining whether a civil rights complaint should be dismissed at screening, the Court applies the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): "[a] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d1037. 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, the plaintiffs factual allegations must be sufficient for the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002. 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544r 555 (2007) ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.").
When a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202. 1212 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89. 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the court may not supply essential elements of a claim that were not initially pled, Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135. 1140 (9th Cir. 2011), and the court need not accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences," Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979. 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
If the court finds that a pro se complaint fails to state a claim, the court must give the pro se litigant leave to amend the complaint unless "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks omitted); Lira v. Herrera, 477 F.3d 1164. 1176 (9th Cir. 2005). However, if amendment of the pleading would be futile, leave to amend may be denied. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112. 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) ("'Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend,' Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815r 845 (9th Cir. 1995), [a]nd the district court's discretion in denying amendment is 'particularly broad' when it has previously given leave to amend.").
Here, the Court finds that the SAC erroneously sues two government agencies and one individual in his or her official capacity: (1) for monetary damages; and (2) without alleging a policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional harms. Therefore, the SAC is subject to dismissal. However, leave to amend is again granted.
Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval of the district judge. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795. 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
ALLEGATIONS IN THE SAC
The SAC sues three defendants: "John Doe I," the Westminster Police Department, and the Huntington Beach Police Department. (Dkt. No. 20 at 3.) The SAC describes John Doe I as a Westminster police detective. Plaintiff sues John Doe I in his individual and official capacities. (Id.)
In Claim One, Plaintiff alleges that, on June 3, 2021, John Doe I violated Plaintiffs Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by striking him with a vehicle while trying to apprehend him. Plaintiff specifically avers that John Doe I responded to an assistance call from a Detective Kurby of the Huntington Beach Police Department. In doing so, John Doe I allegedly "sped towards [P]laintiff traveling south in the [northbound] lane of Westminster in an un-marked grey Honda," striking Plaintiff in the knees with the car and lifting Plaintiff off the ground. Plaintiffs head allegedly hit the driver's side windshield of the car, "[penetrating] the cabin of the detective's [vehicle]." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims, as a result of the incident, he lost feeling in both legs for several days, was hospitalized for two days, and continues to experience severe pain, mobility restrictions, sleeplessness, weakness in his left hand and arm, and an inability to "perform his trade to earn income." (Id.)
In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that the Westminster Police Department violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by "failfing] to train their detectives in how to detain a citizen without excessive force . . . ." (Id. at 6.) In support for this claim, Plaintiff contends that John Doe I, a Westminster police detective, "acted independent of the department, exceeding the amount of force necessary to achieve a legitimate penological interest," and that "John Doe I was not appropriately trained in detaining citizens" such that "he broke traffic laws . . . and proceeded to use his [vehicle] as a weapon to inflict pain and suffering on Plaintiff s person, injuring [P]laintiff irreparably." (Id.)
In Claim Three, Plaintiff alleges that the Huntington Beach Police Department also "failed to train their detectives in how to detain a citizen without excessive force ...." (Id. at 7.) In support for this claim, Plaintiff contends that, due to lack of training, the Huntington Beach Police Department failed to accurately communicate to the Westminster Police Department "the priority of the suspect," and that circumstance, "combined with their lack of accountability against excessive force," led to John Doe Fs unconstitutional excessive force against Plaintiff. (Id.)
For the alleged constitutional violations committed by John Doe I in Claim One, Plaintiff requests punitive damages "at three times detective John Doe I['s] salary gross income" plus $250 for each day Plaintiff suffered from his injuries. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages covering all of his current and projected medical expenses. He seeks injunctive relief in the form of a court order terminating John Doe I from his position and/or directing John Doe I to attend anger management, therapy, and traffic safety courses. (Id.)
For the alleged constitutional violations in Claims Two and Three, Plaintiff requests compensation from the Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments in the form of paying Plaintiffs medical bills, lost wages, and the costs of litigation. He seeks injunctive relief in the form of a court order mandating relevant training in the Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments to prevent the use of excessive force. Finally, Plaintiff seeks declarative relief in the form of a public admission by the Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments of their constitutional violations and the impact those violations had on Plaintiff, society, and the criminal justice system. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 of Title 42 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . ." To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143. 1149 (9th Cir. 2011); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42. 48 (1988).
A. The SAC Fails to State a Claim Against Defendants Westminster Police Department and Huntington Beach Police Department
The SAC alleges in Claims Two and Three that Defendants Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments, respectively, failed to properly train their officers, which ostensibly led to John Doe I hitting Plaintiff with a car in violation of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 20 at 6-7)
However, local governmental entities, such as the Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments:
may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658. 695. 698 (1978). "Moneirs rule that a city is not liable under § 1983 unless a municipal policy causes a constitutional deprivation will not be satisfied by merely alleging that the existing training program for . . . police officers, represents a policy for which the city is responsible." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378. 389 (1989). Instead, to plausibly assert a Monell claim based on a local government entity's allegedly deficient training, a complaint must include specific factual allegations that support a plausible inference that: (1) the defendant entity's failure to train reflected "deliberate indifference" to the rights of its inhabitants, Id. at 388-89; and (2) the specific deficiency alleged in the defendant entity's training program "actually caused" the constitutional deprivation alleged, see Id. at 391.
With regard to the first prong, to plausibly allege deliberate indifference in the context of a failure to train claim, a Section 1983 complaint must include specific factual allegations that support the inference that policymakers did not correct the deficiency in training even though "the need for more or different training [was] obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights." See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 396. "[T]he facts available to city policymakers [must have] put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens." Id.; see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469. 483-484 (1986) (plurality). Mere negligence in training or supervision does not give rise to a Monell claim. Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230. 1235 (9th Cir. 1989).
The SAC identifies no policy, practice, or custom - or specific defect in the training and supervision of Westminster or Huntington Beach police officers - that would support a claim against either police department. Further, the SAC does not articulate any factual allegations that support an inference that either the Westminster or Huntington Beach Police Departments were on actual or constructive notice that the particular defect in training was substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of local residents, as required to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 396. Finally, the SAC does not include specific factual allegations that support a plausible inference that a defect in the Westminster or Huntington Beach Police Departments' training programs "actually caused" the constitutional deprivation alleged (John Doe I hitting Plaintiff with a car). For all of these reasons, the SAC fails to state a claim against the Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments and those claims (Two and Three) are dismissed.
If Plaintiff elects to file a Third Amended Complaint, he shall either omit his failure to train claims against the Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments, or include specific factual allegations from which the Court can plausibly infer that: (1) these defendant entities' failure to train reflected "deliberate indifference" to the rights of the local inhabitants, and (2) the specific deficiencies alleged in the defendant entities' training programs "actually caused" the constitutional deprivation alleged.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against John Doe I Acting in His Official Capacity
An "official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity" and not against the official personally. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159. 166 (1985). Since "the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, the entity's policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of federal law." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 25 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114. 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that a "plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege a named official's personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional violation. Rather, a plaintiff need only identify the law or policy challenged as a constitutional violation and name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief").
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs allegations against Defendant John Doe I in his official capacity must also be dismissed. Plaintiffs official capacity claim against persons employed by the Westminster Police Department is properly treated as a claim against the Westminster Police Department itself. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. However, as was the case with Claim Two, in Claim One Plaintiff fails to allege that John Doe I was following a policy or custom of the Westminster Police Department that gave rise to a constitutional violation. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim against Defendant John Doe I in his official capacity must also be dismissed. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166: Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the SAC is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order within which to file a Third Amended Complaint. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff shall cure the defects described above.
Plaintiff shall not include new defendants or new allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted in the original Complaint. Further, the Third Amended Complaint, if any, shall be complete in itself and shall bear both the designation "Third Amended Complaint" and the case number assigned to this action. It shall not refer to or rely on the SAC or any other prior pleadings, and claims and defendants that are not expressly included in the Third Amended Complaint shall be deemed abandoned.
In any amended complaint, Plaintiff shall name or describe specific defendant(s) and articulate specific facts that support a reasonable inference that those defendant(s) personally participated in and caused the constitutional deprivations alleged. Plaintiff may not rely on conclusory allegations and formulaic recitations of applicable law.
Plaintiff shall make clear the nature and grounds for each claim, specifically identify each and every defendant he maintains is liable for that claim, clearly and concisely explain the factual and legal basis for liability, and identify which individual defendants are being sued in their individual capacity and which are being sued in their official capacity.
Plaintiff shall either omit his failure to train claims against the Westminster and Huntington Beach Police Departments, as well as his official-capacity claim against John Doe I, or include specific factual allegations from which the Court can plausibly infer that: (1) the defendant entities' failure to train reflected "deliberate indifference" to the rights of the local inhabitants, and (2) the specific deficiencies alleged in the defendant entities' training programs "actually caused" the constitutional deprivation alleged.
Plaintiff is again strongly encouraged to utilize the Central District's standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint.
Plaintiffs failure to timely comply with this Order may result in a recommendation of dismissal. If Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, in whole or in part, he may voluntarily dismiss it, or any portion of it, by filing a signed document entitled "Notice of Dismissal" in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).
THIS MEMORANDUM IS NOT INTENDED NOR IS IT INTENDED TO BE INCLUDED IN OR SUBMITTED TO ANY ONLINE SERVICE SUCH AS WESTLAW OR LEXIS.