[Citation.]" As this court stated in Borkoski v. Tumilty (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 839, 842, 368 N.E.2d 136: "The true test in cases such as this is whether the party sued is the real party in interest." • 2, 3 In the instant case, despite the circuit court's findings of misnomer, it is evident that this is not a case of misnomer. From the record, and the original designation in the complaint, it must be concluded that the intent of the plaintiffs in their original complaint was to bring an action against the individual Delbert Anderson, who was doing business as the Double D Tavern. They believed that Anderson, as an individual, owned and operated the tavern.
The test in deciding whether the misnomer statute applies is whether the party sued is the real party in interest. ( Borkoski v. Tumilty (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136.) If section 2-401(b) applies, service of summons after the expiration of the statute of limitations does not bar the suit, provided the plaintiff used reasonable diligence in obtaining service upon the proper defendant. In cases of mistaken identity, however, service upon the proper defendant is required before the expiration of the time provided in the statute of limitations.
• 2 The test in deciding whether the misnomer statute applies is whether the party sued is the real party in interest. ( Borkoski v. Tumilty (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136.) If section 2-401(b) applies, service of summons after the expiration of the statute of limitations does not bar the suit, provided that the plaintiff used reasonable diligence in obtaining service upon the proper defendant. However, in cases of mistaken identity, service upon the proper defendant is required before the expiration of the time provided in the statute of limitations.
The pivotal determination is whether plaintiff actually serves the real party in interest with a copy of the complaint and summons, within the time limits allowed by law, so that actual notice of the complaint that has been lodged against it and notice of the need to respond has been given to that party in interest, albeit incorrectly named. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-401(b); Janove v. Bacon (1955), 6 Ill.2d 245, 250, 128 N.E.2d 706; Hoving v. Davies (1987), 159 Ill. App.3d 106, 109, 512 N.E.2d 729; Thielke v. Osman Construction Corp., 129 Ill. App.3d at 951; Hatcher v. Kentner, 120 Ill. App.2d at 575; Leonard v. City of Streator (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 404, 408, 447 N.E.2d 489; Clinton v. Avello (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 336, 338, 434 N.E.2d 355; Ashley v. Hill (1981), 101 Ill. App.3d 292, 294, 427 N.E.2d 1319; Borkoski v. Tumilty (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 839, 842, 368 N.E.2d 136. • 2 Here, an agent of the real party in interest, Ace Disposal Division of Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., was actually served with summons and with a copy of Centre's amended third-party complaint on October 10, 1985, one week before Yedor's lawsuit against Centre was dismissed by the circuit court on October 17, 1985, upon settlement.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in applying section 2-616(d) to a misnomer situation. He maintains that section 2-401(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure applies and allows the correction of a misnomer in a complaint where process was served after the expiration of the statute of limitations. • 1 Section 2-401(b) applies in those cases where the proper party or real party in interest is sued under the wrong name. ( Hatcher v. Kentner (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 571, 458 N.E.2d 131; Borkoski v. Tumilty (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136.) Section 2-401(b) provides:
We disagree with defendant, however, that the rest of the requirements of 2-616(d) were not met, but it is immaterial since the statute requires that the cause of action is barred unless all of the requirements are met and clearly (d)(3) was not. The cases cited by plaintiff in support of her allegation that naming Danelle Kentner as a defendant was merely an example of a misnomer as opposed to naming the wrong party clearly support, in our opinion, the plaintiff's position that plaintiff in fact named the proper party under the wrong name. ( Clinton v. Avello (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 336, 434 N.E.2d 355; Fleshner v. Copeland (1958), 13 Ill.2d 72, 147 N.E.2d 329; Schultz v. Gerstein (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 586, 365 N.E.2d 1128; Van Burkom v. Holquist (1962), 36 Ill. App.2d 254, 183 N.E.2d 890 (abstract); Borkoski v. Tumilty (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 839, 308 N.E.2d 136.) Plaintiff argues that since she used pronouns which clearly did not refer to Daniel Kentner, ("she" and "her," etc.), plaintiff's intent was evident that she was referring to a female Kentner and not a male Kentner. In our opinion the circuit court erred in denying plaintiff the opportunity to correct the name of Danelle Kentner to that of Earline Kentner.
Plaintiff's authorities present factual situations applying the rule of misnomer, but they must be distinguished from this case. In Borkoski v. Tumilty (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 839, 368 N.E.2d 136, appeal denied (1978), 67 Ill.2d 591, plaintiff sued the real party-in-interest and served it with process within the statute of limitations so that it had notice it was being sued; however, as the defendant was misnamed in the pleadings and summons, plaintiff was allowed to amend. Here defendant was not sued and served within the statute of limitations; the wrong party was sued and attempted to be served due to a mistake in identity.