Opinion
2:22-cv-418-NR
08-25-2022
TABATHA BORING, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT ISAAC BALDWIN, JR. and BOROUGH OF SEWARD, Defendants.
ORDER
J. NICHOLAS RANJAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2022, upon careful consideration of Defendant Borough of Seward's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF 16), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.
The Borough argues that Plaintiff Tabatha Boring's Section 1983 claim against it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. ECF 17, p. 3. “A [S]ection 1983 claim is characterized as a personal-injury claim and this is governed by the applicable state's statute of limitations for personal-injury claims.” Wallacev. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Pennsylvania's statute of limitations for a personal-injury claim is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524.
Ms. Boring did not file an opposition to the Borough's motion. Even so, the Court examines the Borough's motion on the merits and treats all of Ms. Boring's well-pleaded facts as true and construes all allegations and inferences in the light most favorable to her. Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs., 935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019).
According to the Borough, “the allegations in the Amended Complaint of tortious conduct and Section 1983 liability are based upon incidents occurring on February 19 and 20, 2022.” Id. (citing ECF 3, ¶¶ 10-24). “A cause of action under [Section] 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [her] action is based.” Cain v. City of Phila. Police Dep't, 447 Fed.Appx. 297, 298 (3d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Thus, Ms. Boring's claim accrued, at the latest, on February 20, 2022, because that's the date Ms. Boring alleges she was coerced into sexual activity by Defendant Robert Isaac Baldwin, Jr. ECF 3, ¶ 10-24. Ms. Boring, however, did not file this case until March 9, 2022, and so it is untimely. Schmotzer v. Rutgers Univ.-Camden, No. 15-6904, 2017 WL 2691415, at *6-7 (D.N.J. June 21, 2017) (holding that Section 1983 claim accrued in 2010, when Defendant Dever coerced Plaintiff into a sexual relationship and the “statute of limitations expired, at the latest, two years after the last sexual encounter”). As a result, the Court enters judgment in the Borough's favor on Count IV of the amended complaint.
After entering judgment on behalf of the Borough, the only claims remaining in the case are state-law claims against Mr. Baldwin. ECF 3, ¶¶ 35 -57. Notably, these claims are directed at a different defendant in this case, and he hasn't yet appeared in this action. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Alexander v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 160 Fed.Appx. 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The District Court may refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it ‘has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.' Federal jurisdiction here was predicated on Alexander's [Section] 1983 claims. Thus, once Alexander's federal claims were dismissed, the District Court properly ... declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
These claims are Counts I through III, which are claims for civil assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment against Mr. Baldwin. Unlike Count IV, they are not styled as claims brought pursuant to Section 1983 or any other federal statute. As pled and fairly construed, they are state-law tort claims, and the Court has jurisdiction over them solely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
For these reasons, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the Borough and against Ms. Boring on Count IV of the amended complaint, and dismiss without prejudice the remaining claims (Counts I-III), so they can be pursued in state court.