t leave of court, after the petitioner filed five duplicative motions); Brady v. Goldman, 714 Fed.Appx. 63, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming district court's entry of a filing injunction barring plaintiff from filing without leave of court any case arising out of the same underlying facts); Vidurek v. Koskinen, 789 Fed.Appx. 889, 895 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's entry of a filing injunction, even where plaintiffs were pro se); Hamilton v. Mark IV Indus., Inc., 615 Fed.Appx. 710, 711-12 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming district court's judgment enjoining plaintiff from filing lawsuits related to her employment or her employer's bankruptcy proceedings); Azkour v. Maucort, No. 11 Civ. 5780 (RJS), 2018 WL 1441366, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2018) (barring plaintiff from filing any new action arising from his employment “against Defendants or their associates”); Boothe v. Rossrock Funds II LP, No. 16 Civ. 900 (PKC), 2017 WL 2271360, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017) (barring plaintiff from filing any new actions that “relate[], in any way, ” to disputed real property); Ranasinghe v. Kennell, No. 16 Civ. 2170 (JMF), 2017 WL 384357, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 25, 2017) 20 (barring plaintiff from filing “future actions relating to, or arising from” issues connected to his prior lawsuit “against any party and in any court”), aff'd, 718 Fed.Appx. 82 (2d Cir. 2018).

Therefore, the Complaints must be dismissed. See Boothe v. Rossrock Funds II LP, No. 16-CV-900 (PKC), 2017 WL 2271360, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against private corporations, including a bank, because none were “State actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and the amended complaint “utterly fail[ed] to allege that [the] [d]efendants' actions are attributable to the State” (citation omitted)); Anthony v. Med. Staff at Inst., 409 F.Supp.3d 102, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“A private hospital is generally not considered a state . . . actor.”) (collecting cases); Schneiderman v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., No. 13-CV-5939, 2013 WL 6564184, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (“North Shore University Hospital is a private hospital facility.”); Brown v. Chase Bank, No. 13-CV-5309 (WFK) (LB), 2013 WL 5537302, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013) (dismissing complaint against private corporations, including banks, and private individuals who “do not act under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); White v

Therefore, the Complaints must be dismissed. See Boothe v. Rossrock Funds II LP, No. 16-CV-900 (PKC), 2017 WL 2271360, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against private corporations, including a bank, because none were “State actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and the amended complaint “utterly fail[ed] to allege that [the] [d]efendants' actions are attributable to the State” (citation omitted)); Brown v. Chase Bank, No. 13-CV-5309 (WFK) (LB), 2013 WL 5537302, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013) (dismissing complaint against private corporations, including banks, and private individuals who “do not act under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support his conclusory allegations of discrimination by these Defendants.

Rockwood v. Cenlar FSB, 17-CV-10153, 2018 WL 2122820, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2018) (holding that "plaintiff's claims for fraud against [defendants] essentially dispute the validity of the foreclosure action by challenging MER's title to the mortgage note and the fairness of the state court proceedings . . . [because] deciding those claims would require a ruling that the foreclosure was improper."); Boothe v. Rossrock Funds II LP, 16-CV-0900, 2017 WL 2271360, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017) (finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the relief that the plaintiff sought included, inter alia, "to stay all proceedings in state court."); Francis v. Nichols, 16-CV-1848, 2017 WL 1064719, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017) (finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the relief that the plaintiff sought included expenses defending the foreclosure action, the cloud on title created by the foreclosure action, emotional distress, and the auction of his home). As a result, I recommend that these claims be accepted for filing to the extent that they seek damages and I recommend dismissal to the extent that they seek a stay of the state court judgments or return of title.

This is precisely the type of collateral attack the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits. See Francis v. Nichols, 16 Civ. 1848 (CS), 2017 WL 1064719 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017) (Seibel, D.J.) (plaintiff's civil RICO claim barred by Rooker-Feldman because "plaintiff could not prevail on his claims in [district] [c]ourt without a finding that the state court judgment was wrong"); see also Murphy v. GE Capital Asset Corp., 38 F. App'x 86, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's finding that plaintiff's suit brought under RICO was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where plaintiff "alleged that defendants had fraudulently foreclosed on his property by presenting fraudulent mortgage documents to the state courts"); Boothe v. Rossrock Funds II LP, 16 Civ. 900 (PKC), 2017 WL 2271360 at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017) (plaintiff's RICO claim barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the claim was predicated on the allegedly "fraudulent transfer of [her] property" and defendants' "gross judicial misconduct" in the underlying foreclosure proceeding"). Furthermore, "[p]laintiff is [also] inviting this Court to sit in review of the state court judgment . . . [because] [her] damages claims are intertwined with questions of whether [d]efendant[s] owned the [n]ote or the [m]ortgage and are barred by Rooker-Feldman."