Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-5646.
April 30, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Now pending before this court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by a petitioner currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the petition be denied and dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1990, petitioner was convicted of three counts of burglary in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. He was subsequently sentenced to imprisonment of two years and five months to five years. After serving the minimum sentence, petitioner was paroled. At that point in time, petitioner owed two years, five months and twenty-nine days of backtime.
Petitioner violated his parole, and was found delinquent by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) as of April 21, 1994. Subsequently, petitioner was arrested on new charges of robbery, reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC). In lieu of bail, petitioner was held in custody at the Philadelphia County prison.
On May 11, 1994, the Board received information of two other arrests which occurred prior to petitioner's parole violation. Petitioner had been arrested by the Philadelphia Police on January 16, 1994, on charges of theft, theft by unlawful taking, burglary, receiving stolen property, and trespass. Petitioner had also been arrested on February 23, 1994, on charges of theft, burglary, receiving stolen property, criminal trespass, and criminal mischief.
The Board charged petitioner with two violations: changing his approved residence without permission, and failing to follow the instructions of his parole officer. On June 29, 1994, the Board issued a decision to schedule a hearing on petitioner's technical violations of parole and to hold petitioner in custody until the criminal charges against him were resolved.
On August 19, 1994, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of simple assault, PIC, and theft by receipt of stolen property. The court then sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for five to ten years.
Petitioner was afforded a technical violations hearing, and on November 23, 1994, the Board ordered that petitioner was to serve twelve months of backtime when he became available to do so, as a result of his failure to comply with two conditions of his parole.
On April 24, 1995, the Board held another hearing, this one for revocation of parole. It was decided that petitioner would be recommitted as a convicted parole violator, and that he would serve his unexpired (two years, five months, and twenty-nine day) term when he became available to do so. Petitioner was also required to serve nine months of backtime concurrently for the offense of theft by receipt of stolen property.
Petitioner began serving his five to ten year sentence for his August 19, 1994 convictions. He was denied parole three times: in 1998, 2000, and 2001.
On July 5, 2002, petitioner became eligible for parole on his newer sentences. The order issued by the Board referenced its April 24, 1995 decision, mandating that petitioner was to serve the unexpired term from his 1990 burglary convictions upon being paroled, which amounted to two years, five months, and twenty-nine days of backtime. Petitioner was paroled to this backtime detainer on August 16, 2002.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 10, 2003, claiming that the Board illegally changed his backtime sentence. Respondent retorts that petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies, and additionally, that petitioner's claim is without merit.
II. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Respondent's first challenge to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus asserts that petitioner's claim is barred by principles of procedural default. Specifically, respondent contends that this claim was never fairly presented to any state court. Maintaining that petitioner has not exhausted his state court remedies and could not do so now, respondent urges the court to dismiss the petition.
Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court.O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999). A petitioner is not deemed to have exhausted the remedies available to him if he has a right under state law to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1076, 109 So. Ct. 2091 (1989). In other words, a petitioner must invoke "one complete round of the state's established appellate review process," in order to exhaust his remedies. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. A habeas petitioner retains the burden of showing that all of the claims alleged have been "fairly presented" to the state courts, which demands, in turn, that the claims brought in federal court be the "substantial equivalent" of those presented to the state courts. Santana v. Fenton, 685 F.2d 71, 73-74 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 750 (1983). In the case of an unexhausted petition, the federal courts should dismiss without prejudice, otherwise, they risk depriving the state courts of the "opportunity to correct their own errors, if any." Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.3d 984, 989 (3rd Cir. 1993).
However, "[i]f [a] petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred . . . there is procedural default for the purpose of federal habeas . . ." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S.Ct. 27 (1991); McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3rd Cir. 1999). The procedural default barrier precludes federal courts from reviewing a state petitioner's federal claims if the state court decision is based on a violation of state procedural law that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. "In the context of direct review of a state court judgment, [this] doctrine is jurisdictional . . . [b]ecause this Court has no power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment." Id. "In the absence of [the procedural default doctrine] in federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaustion doctrine by defaulting their federal claims in state court." Id., at 732.
As noted above, respondent contends that petitioner's failure to present his claim regarding improper recalculation to any state court constitutes a failure to exhaust, which, in turn, results in procedural default of his claim. See Booth v. P.B.P.P. and P.P.S., et al., No. 562 M.D. 2003 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), Order dated August 19, 2003 (dismissing petition challenging Board order as untimely), appeal denied, Booth v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, No. 49 EAP 2003 ( Pa. Supreme Ct. 2004). We agree that petitioner has failed to carry his burden. However, in order to clear up petitioner's confusion, this court will address the merits of his claim.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the current version of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), an application for Writ of Habeas Corpus from a state court judgment bears a significant burden. Section 104 of the AEDPA imparts a presumption of correctness to the state court's determination of factual issues — a presumption that petitioner can only rebut by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1994). The statute also grants significant deference to legal conclusions announced by the state court as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless that adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The United States Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000), interpreted the standards established by the AEDPA regarding the deference to be accorded state court legal decisions, and more clearly defined the two-part analysis set forth in the statute. Under the first part of the review, the federal habeas court must determine whether the state court decision was "contrary to" the "clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." As defined by Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority of the Court on this issue, a state court decision can be contrary to Supreme Court precedent in two ways: (1) "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] court on a question of law," or (2) "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court]." Id. She explained, however, that this "contrary to" clause does not encompass run-of-the-mill state court decisions "applying the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 406.
To reach such "run-of-the-mill" cases, the Court turned to an interpretation of the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1). It found that a state court decision can involve an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent: (1) "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case," or (2) "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407-08. The Court specified, however, that under this clause, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 410.
IV. DISCUSSION OF MERITS
In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, petitioner claims that the Board illegally changed his twelve month backtime detainer sentence to two years, five months, and twenty-nine days. Petitioner contends that he merely had to serve twelve months for the technical violations of his parole, and that he has done so.
Petitioner is correct in that he has completed his twelve month detainer. However, because petitioner is a convicted parole violator, he is required to serve the remainder of his original sentence for his 1990 convictions, which is two years, five months, and twenty-nine days. This order, issued after a revocation hearing, has been in effect since April 24, 1995. Petitioner did not become available to serve this backtime until he was paroled on his five to ten year sentence, on August 16, 2002. Thus, petitioner's new maximum sentence will expire two years, five months, and twenty-nine days from that date, on February 14, 2005. Therefore, petitioner's claim that the Board illegally changed his backtime detainer is without merit. As such, we must dismiss the habeas petition in its entirety.
Therefore I make the following: