See id.; Pitts, 391 A.2d at 807; Hill v. District of Columbia, 345 A.2d 867, 869 (D.C. 1975). A "notice is fatally defective if one or more of the statutory elements is lacking." Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F.Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968). Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to former Mayor Anthony Williams on or about June 16, 2005. D.C. Mot., Ex. 1. Plaintiff clearly intended for the letter to be his notice of an upcoming lawsuit stemming from the injury to his eye.

Notice was sent to the Mayor of the District of Columbia stating that appellant had a claim arising out of injuries he sustained while working on a job site for the John C. Grimberg Co. on November 12, 1974. Following Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156 (D.D.C. 1968), the court vacated the award to Mrs. Romer because neither she, her agent, nor her attorney had notified the Mayor that she was asserting a claim of loss of consortium based on her husband's injuries. This notice is conceded to be adequate under the statute.

See Pitts, supra at 809. Accord, Stone, supra, 99 U.S.App.D.C. at 45-46, 237 F.2d 41-42 (Prettyman, J., dissenting); Boone v. District ofColumbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968). More specifically, in Pitts, supra, which concerned a claim for wrongful death at a public housing project, we said with respect to the "cause" element that notice would be sufficient "if it recites facts from which it could be reasonably anticipated that a claim against the District might arise."

We similarly intimate no view on such questions as whether the statutory notice requirement is jurisdictional in nature, whether or how it may be waived, et cetera. Compare, e.g., Smith v. District of Columbia, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 128-129, 463 F.2d 962, 964-965 (1972); Hirshfeld v. District of Columbia, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 73, 254 F.2d 774, 776 (1958); Stone v. District of Columbia, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 33-34, 237 F.2d 28, 29-30, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 934, 77 S.Ct. 221, 1 L.Ed.2d 160 (1955); District of Columbia v. Green, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 20, 21-22, 223 F.2d 312, 313-314 (1955); with, e.g., Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968); Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250 (D.C.App. 1974); Toomey v. District of Columbia, 315 A.2d 565, 567 (D.C.App. 1974); Brown v. District of Columbia, 304 A.2d 292 (D.C.App. 1973). See text supra at note 10.

Because this provision "represents a waiver of sovereign immunity," Tibbs v. Williams, 263 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D.D.C. 2003), compliance is mandatory and "is to be strictly construed" against the claimant, Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981). Thus, the "notice is fatally defective if one or more of the statutory elements is lacking," Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968), and no right of action accrues. Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 137; accord Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

A "notice is fatally defective if one or more of the statutory elements is lacking." Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968). Ms. Edwards apparently fears that Defendants have blocked her access to the courts.

"[N]otice is fatally defective if[, as here,] one or more of the statutory elements is lacking." Boone v. Dist. of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968). For these reasons, the plaintiff cannot maintain the common law claims against the District. E. The Remainder of the Complaint is Dismissed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Because "the courts are not at liberty to construe [§ 12-309] other than according to its terms, or to depart from its clear requirements . . .[,] the notice is fatally defective if [, as here,] one or more of the statutory elements is lacking." Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Kirkland v. District of Columbia, 70 F.3d 629, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Omitting the place of an alleged injury is fatal under § 12-309 . . . [and] alone would seem to doom [the] claims.") (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court grants the District of Columbia's motion for partial judgment on the common law claims based on the alleged events preceding the incident that allegedly occurred on November 15, 2006.

Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981). Thus, the "notice is fatally defective if one or more of the statutory elements is lacking,"Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156, 1157 (D.D.C. 1968), and no right of action accrues. Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 137; accord Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

See S.Rept. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 37 (1970), U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News 1970, p. 5356; 116 Cong.Rec. 32926-27, 33102-03 (1970) (Remarks of Sen. Muskie). E.g. 12 D.C. Code § 309; see Boone v. District of Columbia, 294 F. Supp. 1156 (D.D.C. 1968). City of Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, Civil No. 72-2122-1H (C.D.Cal. No. 16, 1972), 3 E.L.R. 20043 (1973).