Opinion
No. 05-11-00182-CR
07-24-2012
CLAYTON CLAY BOOKMAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM; Opinion Filed July 24, 2012.
On Appeal from the 363rd District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F09-21058-W
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Lang
Clayton Clay Bookman appeals the trial court's failure to stay proceedings to determine his competency during a murder trial in which he was later found guilty and sentenced to fifty-five years' confinement. In his sole issue, Bookman argues the trial court erred when it failed to stay proceedings and determine his competency. We decide Bookman's issue against him and affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bookman was indicted for murder. At trial, he entered a plea of not guilty. At the behest of Bookman's trial counsel, the trial court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of Bookman to determine his competency to stand trial. The report returned to the trial court concluded Bookman was competent to stand trial.
Months later and shortly before commencement of trial on the merits, the trial court ordered a second psychiatric evaluation of Bookman to determine competency by the same psychiatrist who had previously evaluated him. The trial court's order specifically requested that the psychiatrist ask Bookman about "phone calls that he was receiving a week before the date of [the] offense." Four days later, the psychiatrist conducted the second examination, again concluding Bookman was competent to stand trial. However, this second report was not furnished to the trial court before the trial commenced. No objection or motion was made to stay the proceedings pending receipt of the second report. At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court asked Bookman's counsel when the court would receive the results of the second psychiatric evaluation. Bookman's counsel replied the report would be e-mailed to the court the following morning. The report was never discussed on the record subsequent to that exchange. However, the clerk's record does contain the second report.
The jury found Bookman guilty of murder and sentenced him to fifty-five years' confinement. This appeal followed. II. FAILURE TO STAY PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY
In his sole issue, Bookman argues the trial court erred when it failed to stay the proceedings to determine his competency. The State contends the trial court did not err as it twice determined Bookman to be competent to stand trial.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
"A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011). Either party or the trial court may suggest the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(a). Once such suggestion is made, if the trial judge has a "bona fide doubt" about the competency of the defendant, he "shall conduct an informal inquiry to determine if there is evidence that would support a finding of incompetence." Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(c). "A bona fide doubt is 'a real doubt in the judge's mind as to the defendant's competency.'" Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 599 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (noting "evidence generally is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt if it shows recent severe mental illness . . . or truly bizarre acts by the defendant")). After the informal inquiry, if the trial court determines some evidence exists that would support a finding of incompetence, it shall order an examination to determine the defendant's competency. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005(a).
Effective June 17, 2011, the Legislature amended article 46B.004, disposing of the bona-fide-doubt standard for determining whether a trial court should conduct an informal inquiry. See Act of Sept. 1, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 822, § 2, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1893, 1893 (West) (to be codified at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(c-1)). Because the trial in this case occurred prior to the effective date of this amendment, it does not apply. Accordingly, we apply the law at the time the alleged procedural error occurred.
If the issue of the defendant's incompetency is raised before the trial on the merits begins, the court shall stay all other proceedings. See id. art. 46B.004(d). However, if the issue of the defendant's incompetency is raised after the trial on the merits has begun, the court may determine the issue at any time before the sentenced is pronounced. Id. art. 46B.005(d). Further, the trial court is not required to hold an incompetency trial if neither party requests a trial on that issue, neither party opposes a finding of incompetency, or the court does not, on its own motion, determine that a trial is necessary. Id. art. 46B.005(b), (c). A trial court's decision to conduct an incompetency trial is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
B. Application of Law to Facts
Bookman contends on appeal that the trial court erred by proceeding to trial because once the trial court ordered the second psychiatric evaluation, the trial court was required to stay the proceedings to determine his competency. Because the record reflects the psychiatrist determined Bookman to be competent, but not the trial court, Bookman argues the trial court erred in not staying the proceedings and determining his competency.
The trial court made a determination after informal inquiry that evidence existed to support a finding of incompetency and ordered a series of two examinations of Bookman. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005(a). The first report filed by the psychiatrist concluded Bookman was competent to stand trial. The second report, although provided to the trial court after the trial began, also concluded Bookman was competent to stand trial. Even though the second report was not provided until after the trial had begun, nothing in the record indicates Bookman asked the trial court to stay the proceedings pending the receipt of the report or to take any further action as to Bookman's competency to stand trial.
Nothing in the record indicates incompetency to stand trial. In fact, the two psychiatric reports demonstrate the contrary. Bookman's competence is presumed unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. art. 46B.003(b). We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in not staying the proceedings to determine Bookman's competency. See Means v. State, 955 S.W.2d 686, 689-90 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. ref'd) (concluding after two experts examined defendant and found him competent, failure of defendant to request trial on competency waived any purported error); see also Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 393. We decide Bookman's sole issue against him. III. CONCLUSION
We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in not staying the proceedings to determine Bookman's competency. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
110182F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
CLAYTON CLAY BOOKMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 05-11-00182-CR
Appeal from the 363rd District Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. F09- 21058-W).
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices Bridges and Francis participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered July 24, 2012.
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE