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Bookman v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Mar 4, 2015
# 2015-015-598 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 4, 2015)

Opinion

# 2015-015-598 Claim No. 120041

03-04-2015

GLENN BOOKMAN v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Glenn Bookman, Pro Se Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Anthony Rotondi, Esquire Assistant Attorney General


Synopsis

Pro se inmate's claim alleging various causes of action arising from a prison disciplinary hearing was dismissed following trial. Prison disciplinary proceeding is not the type of full-scale proceeding which may give rise to a malicious prosecution cause of action.

Case information

UID:

2015-015-598

Claimant(s):

GLENN BOOKMAN

Claimant short name:

BOOKMAN

Footnote (claimant name) :

Defendant(s):

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Footnote (defendant name) :

Third-party claimant(s):

Third-party defendant(s):

Claim number(s):

120041

Motion number(s):

Cross-motion number(s):

Judge:

FRANCIS T. COLLINS

Claimant's attorney:

Glenn Bookman, Pro Se

Defendant's attorney:

Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Anthony Rotondi, Esquire Assistant Attorney General

Third-party defendant's attorney:

Signature date:

March 4, 2015

City:

Saratoga Springs

Comments:

Official citation:

Appellate results:

See also (multicaptioned case)


Decision

Claimant, a pro se inmate, seeks damages for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and violations of the NYS Constitution. The claim was tried by remote video conference on December 9, 2014.

Claimant testified that he was scheduled to appear before the Parole Board on August 17, 2010. While he was waiting in the hallway for the hearing, a Correction Officer directed claimant to put his hands in his pockets and advised him that he was going back to his cell. Claimant testified that he was thereafter served with a misbehavior report charging him with refusing to attend the Parole Board Hearing. The misbehavior report indicates that claimant had been told by several officers to stop talking in the hall but disobeyed the direct orders and said "[f- you] I don't want to be hear [sic] take me back" (Exhibit A). The thrust of claimant's testimony was that the charges against him were false and that he never indicated he wanted to be returned to his cell. Claimant testified in this regard that, in preparation for his Parole Board hearing, he had been interviewed by a correction counselor and had prepared certain paperwork for submission to the Board. Claimant stated that he told the Hearing Officer presiding at his disciplinary hearing that he was going to report this incident to the news media. According to the claimant's testimony, the charges that had been brought against him just "disappeared."

On cross-examination claimant testified that he was interviewed by the Parole Board approximately one month after the incident related above and his application for release was denied. Correction Officer Robert Underwood, called by the defendant, testified that he wrote the misbehavior report charging the claimant with refusing a direct order and verbal harassment on August 17, 2010. Officer Underwood testified that as he was escorting claimant to the Parole Board interview he became disruptive and refused to stop talking after being directed to do so. The Officer stated that talking in the hallways of Great Meadow Correctional Facility is not allowed. Officer Underwood was unable to recall who the claimant was allegedly talking to or whether other inmates were in the hallway at the time of the incident.

To prevail on a cause of action for wrongful confinement, a species of false imprisonment, it must be established that "(1) the defendant intended to confine [claimant], (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975]), cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Here, the wrongful confinement claim appears to be based on the contention that the claimant was inappropriately confined to his cell pending a hearing on the disciplinary charges which had been brought against him. The applicable regulation, 7 NYCRR 251-1.6 (a), permits an officer to confine an inmate to his cell where he has reasonable grounds to believe that he represents an "immediate threat to the safety, security or order of the facility." Inasmuch as Officer Underwood indicated in his report and testified at trial that claimant's behavior was disruptive, his confinement to his cell pending the disciplinary hearing was privileged. Moreover, even if, as claimant contends, his behavior was not disruptive, such disciplinary actions are quasi-judicial in nature and accorded absolute immunity (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 218-220 [1988]; Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887 [3d Dept 1999]).

To the extent the claim may be read to allege that claimant's period of imprisonment was wrongfully extended as the result of being caused to miss the Parole Board hearing scheduled for August 17, 2010, the claim is meritless. The hearing was rescheduled for September 2010 (see Exhibits 1 and 2) at which time the claimant's application for parole release was denied. No extended period of incarceration resulted from defendant's actions under these circumstances.

Claimant's cause of action for malicious prosecution, while related to his claim for false imprisonment, is analytically distinct. Whereas an action for false imprisonment redresses the violation of an individual's freedom of movement, an action for malicious prosecution redresses an individual's right to be free from unjustifiable litigation (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 457, 459). Thus, it is not the unlawful confinement which gives rise to a malicious prosecution claim, but "the perversion of proper legal procedures" (id. at 457). "The elements of an action for malicious prosecution are (1) the initiation of a proceeding, (2) its termination favorably to plaintiff, (3) lack of probable cause, and (4) malice" (Colon v City of New York, 60 NY2d 78, 82 [1983]). While the initiation of a "judicial proceeding" is the sine qua non of a cause of action for malicious prosecution (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d at 457), it is clear that the initiation of an administrative proceeding, having sufficient attributes of a judicial proceeding, may also form the basis of a cause of action for malicious prosecution (Groat v Town Bd. of Town of Glenville, 73 AD2d 426, 429 [3d Dept 1980], appeal dismissed 50 NY2d 928 [1980]; New York City Tr. Auth. v Manti, 165 AD2d 373, 381 [1st Dept 1991]; Nazario v State of New York, 24 Misc 3d 443 [Ct Cl 2009]; Glenn v State of New York, 144 Misc 2d 101 [Ct Cl 1989]). As stated by the Appellate Division, Third Department in Groat , "administrative proceedings which require a hearing and trial of the issues on evidence and testimony under oath, with the right of cross-examination, have sufficient attributes of judicial proceedings to be considered judicial proceedings for the purposes of a cause of action for malicious prosecution" (73 AD2d at 429). Prison disciplinary hearings, however, are not such a proceeding (see 7 NYCRR Parts 253 and 254; see generally Matter of Amato v Ward, 41 NY2d 469 [1977]). While an inmate has a right to call witnesses, this right is circumscribed to the extent necessary to ensure institutional safety and security goals (7 NYCRR 253.5; 254.5). There is no right to cross-examination and no right to be represented by counsel. As a result, this Court agrees with those Court of Claims decisions which have reached the conclusion that prison disciplinary proceedings are not the type of full-scale proceedings such as to sustain a cause of action for malicious prosecution (see Brooks v State of New York, UID No. 2013-018-434 (Ct Cl, Fitzpatrick, J., Aug. 28, 2013]; Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399 [Ct Cl 1986]; Treacy v State of New York, 131 Misc 2d 849 [Ct Cl 1986], affd sub nom. Arteaga v State of New York, 125 AD2d 916, affd 72 NY2d 212 [1988]). The first element necessary to prevail on a malicious prosecution cause of action - the initiation of a proceeding having sufficient attributes of a judicial proceeding - is therefore lacking. As a result, this cause of action must be dismissed as a matter of law.

Lastly, recognition of a constitutional tort cause of action is unnecessary as alternative avenues of redress were available to vindicate claimant's constitutional rights (Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83 [2001]; Lyles v State of New York, 2 AD3d 694, 695 [2d Dept 2003], affd 3 NY3d 396 [2004]; Waxter v State of New York, 33 AD3d 1180 [3d Dept 2006]; Bullard v State of New York, 307 AD2d 676, 678 [3d Dept 2003]).

Based on the foregoing, the claim is dismissed.

Let judgment be entered accordingly.

March 4, 2015

Saratoga Springs, New York

FRANCIS T. COLLINS

Judge of the Court of Claims


Summaries of

Bookman v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Mar 4, 2015
# 2015-015-598 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 4, 2015)
Case details for

Bookman v. State

Case Details

Full title:GLENN BOOKMAN v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Court:New York State Court of Claims

Date published: Mar 4, 2015

Citations

# 2015-015-598 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 4, 2015)