Opinion
C.A. No. 06C-02-011-JTV.
Submitted: August 6, 2007.
Decided: August 28, 2007.
Upon Consideration of Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, GRANTED.
Craig T. Eliassen, Esq., Schmittinger Rodriguez, Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Carol J. Antoff, Esq., Law Office of Cynthia G. Beam, Esq., Newark, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant White Oak.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff's response, and the record in the case, it appears that:
1. This is an action for personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff, Latina McNeal Booker, fell on snow and ice at White Oak Condominiums in Dover, Delaware. The defendant, White Oak Condominium Association, Inc., has moved for summary judgment, contending that it had no duty to clear ice and snow from the location where the plaintiff fell.
2. Summary judgment should be rendered if the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment will not be granted if the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstances.
Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c).
Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 659 A.2d 777, 780 (Del.Super. 1995).
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Devlin, 1998 Del. Super. LEXIS 109 at *9.
3. The plaintiff resides in a first floor unit in the condominium complex. Although the exact numbers of units are not in and of themselves material, it appears that the complex consists of approximately seven buildings, each of which houses about 12 condo s, four of w hich are lo cated on groun d level. The main or "front" door of each first floor unit opens onto, or off of, an interior, common hallway. The interior hallway leads to a common building doorway through which one exits or enters the building. Outside the building doorway is a sidewalk which leads to another sidewalk which leads to the parking lot.
The parties' approximations are corroborated by the "Enabling Declaration Establishing a Plan for White Oak Condominium Complex" at page 6, which states that there are (7) buildings, containing compositely a total of (84) dwellings.
4. In addition to the main or "front" door just mentioned, each first floor unit has a sliding glass door on its exterior wall. A first floor unit resident can open the sliding glass door and step outside onto a small concrete patio. From the concrete patio, the resident can then step onto a grassy lawn which surrounds the building. One can, if one wishes, then walk from the patio across the lawn to the nearest sidewalk. In the case of the plaintiff's unit, the distance across the lawn from the patio to the sidewalk is about 12 or 15 feet.
5. On the day the plaintiff fell, there was ice and snow on the ground. It is undisputed that the ice and snow had been cleared away from the common building doorway which led into and out of the building and the sidewalks appurtenant thereto. The plaintiff, however, did not leave the building through that doorway. She exited her unit through the sliding glass door and started to walk across the lawn to the sidewalk. In doing so she walked across ice and snow which covered the lawn, as no ice or snow removal had occurred on the lawn. While doing so, she fell before reaching the sidewalk, causing the injury which led to this action.
At oral argument, the plaintiff conceded that she was not in a position to contest this fact.
6. In order to establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that "defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; defendant breached that duty; and defendant's breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury." To be held liable, a defendant must have been under a legal obligation — a duty — to protect the plaintiff from the risk of harm which caused [her] injuries. "[W]he ther a du ty exists is entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles, and precedents which make-up the law; and it must be determined by the court." If no duty exists, the trial court is authorized to grant summary judgment as a matter of law.
Pipher v. Parsell, 2007 Del. LEXIS 274 at *4.
Id. quoting Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 460, 471 (Del. 2002).
Id.
Kananen v. Alfred I. Dupont Inst. of the Nemours Found., 796 A.2d 1, 4-5 (Del.Super. 2000).
7. A property owner has a duty of care to keep the premises reasonably safe from hazards associated with natural accumulations of ice and snow. In additio n, in this case, the condominium documents require the Condominium Association to maintain, repair, replace, clean, sanitize, manage and operate the common elements. The common elements include all parts of the premises outside of the units themselves and include the place where the plaintiff fell.
Monroe Park Apts. Corp. v. Bennett, 232 A.2d 105, 108 (Del. 1967).
8. The plaintiff claims that the defendant was negligent because it failed to remove ice and snow from the lawn area between the plaintiff's patio and the sidewalk. In support of her contention, she cites the case of Monroe Park Apts. Corp. v. Bennett. In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that "[a] landlord owes to his tenants the duty of reasonable care as to natural accumulations of ice and snow in common approaches and passageways, over which he has retained control to the exclusion of the tenants, so as to make such areas reason ably s afe." The court in that case found that the landlord of a multi-apartment building had a duty, in the absence of statute or agreement, to remove natural accumulations of ice or snow from a paved walkway designed and used for the ingress and egress of tenants. The walkway was the only route providing for the ingress and egress between the front of the apartment building and the curb where the tenant's car was parked. Other Delaware cases have similarly established that a landlord, or in this case a condominium association, has a duty to remove ice and snow from common approaches, passageways, and walkways.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Young v. Saroukos, 185 A.2d 274, 281-282 (Del. 1962) (sidewalk leading to apartment building); Woods v. Prices Corner Shopping Center, 541 A.2d 574 (Del.Super. 1988) (duty of shopping center owner and occupier of commercial space to keep premises safe from hazards of snow and ice); Coker v. McDonald's Corp., 537 A.2d 549, 550 (Del.Super. 1987) (ice on walkway leading to restaurant); Neal v. Burns, 1980 Del. Super. LEXIS 141 (ice and snow on common approach leading to apartment building).
9. In this action, the plaintiff's theory of the case is that u nder pre mises liab ility law and the condominium documents the defendant had a duty to shovel or otherwise clear ice and snow from the lawn area so as to clear a path from the plaintiff's patio to the sidewalk. For the reasons which follow, I have concluded that the plaintiff's contention must be rejected as a matter of law.
10. When the movement of a person is one of ingress or egress to a building, the duty to clear ice and snow app lies to approaches, passageways, and walkways, not a lawn which may lie between the building and a sidewalk. No case has been suggested to the Court and research reveals no case, or any other authority or precede nt, which impos es on an owne r a duty to clear a path over a grassy lawn. Even if the plaintiff went back and forth across the lawn frequently from her patio to the sidewalk, and even if the defendant was aware of that fact, I do not believ e that a juror could conclude that the lawn was an approach, passageway or walkway over which the defendant had a duty to clear a path. I find that no such duty arises from either the law of premises liability or the condominium documents in this case.
11. In reaching this conclusion, I do not conclude that an approach, passageway, or walkway must necessarily be one designated as such by the owner. A passageway might sometimes arise in a location not intended by the owner, such as where pedestrians take shortcuts, or due to some convenience or necessity. In addition, I can presume that if the front doors of the first floor condominium units in this case were exterior doors w ith individ ual sidew alks leadin g to the main sidewalk, the defendant would have had a duty to clear ice and snow from each unit's sidewalk. These are matters upon which I need not express any opinion. My conclusion is limited to the facts of this case.
12. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted .
IT IS SO ORDERED.