Opinion
A170183
07-23-2024
MICHAEL BONNER, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(City &County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. 2524971; App. Div. No. APP-24-008759)
THE COURT:[*]
Petitioner Michael Bonner seeks a writ of mandate directing the superior court to grant his motion to dismiss misdemeanor charges against him on the ground his statutory speedy trial rights were violated. (Pen. Code, § 1382.) As we explain, petitioner is entitled to the requested relief.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Petitioner was charged in a misdemeanor complaint with annoying or molesting a child and with abusing or endangering the health of a child. He asserted his right to a speedy trial. After the statutory last day to commence trial had passed, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss in which he contended his statutory speedy trial rights under section 1382 had been violated. The People filed a memorandum in response conceding that no good cause existed for the delay in bringing the case to trial.
The court denied the motion in a written order that justified the delay due to "exceptional and extraordinary circumstances" related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Petitioner sought writ relief in the appellate division of the superior court, which summarily denied his petition. Following that denial, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition in this court along with a request for a stay of an immediate trial.
We issued an immediate stay of trial and requested preliminary briefing. We also gave notice that we might issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180 (Palma).) In response to our briefing request, the People filed a letter brief agreeing with petitioner that there was no good cause shown to continue the case beyond the last statutory day to commence trial. The People concede the superior court should have dismissed the case under section 1382.
The circumstances here are identical in all relevant respects to those in Mendoza v. Superior Court (July 15, 2024, A170135) __Cal.App.5th __ (Mendoza). There, a panel of this court concluded that the petitioner's right to relief was obvious based on existing, well settled legal principles. Just as in Mendoza, we conclude that petitioner's right to relief here is obvious, in part, because the People did not satisfy their burden to establish good cause for the delay in bringing petitioner's case to trial. (Id. at p. __[2024 Cal.App. Lexis 454 at pp. *8-*9]; see Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772, 780-781.) Indeed, the People conceded that there was no showing of good cause for the delay. It was not the superior court's role to assume the prosecutor's burden to show good cause for the delay. (Mendoza, at p. __[2024 Cal.App. Lexis 454 at p. *9].)
As noted in Mendoza, the opinion does not break new legal ground. (Mendoza, supra, __Cal.App.5th at p.__ [2024 Cal.App. Lexis 454 at p. *12].) We cite it merely because the procedural posture of that case is identical in relevant respects to this one and the opinion contains a more detailed discussion of the legal authority supporting relief.
Further, wholly apart from the failure of the People to meet their burden on the motion, the court erred in premising its ruling on the truth of facts contained in judicially noticed materials. (Mendoza, supra, __Cal.App.5th at pp.__ [2024 Cal.App. Lexis 454 at pp. *9-*11]; see generally Barri v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 428, 437; In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 541; Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121.) Under the circumstances, the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. (People v. Hajjaj (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1184, 1197-1198 [good cause determination reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
Because petitioner is entitled to relief on the grounds we have cited, we need not address and express no view regarding additional arguments petitioner raises to challenge the superior court's order.
We have reached our decision after notice to all parties that we might act by issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance and after considering the response from the People. (Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180.) Because petitioner's right to relief is obvious and no purpose would reasonably be served by further consideration of the issue, we shall issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.)
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court to vacate its order of March 21, 2024, denying petitioner Michael Bonner's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 1382 and to enter a new and different order granting the motion. The stay of trial previously imposed by this court shall remain in effect until the remittitur issues. This decision shall be final immediately in this court upon filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
[*] Brown, P. J., Goldman, J., and Jackson, J. (Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution).