Opinion
CV156058987S
11-13-2017
Bruce Bonner v. City of New Haven et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (#123)
Robin L. Wilson, J.
FACTS
On February 17, 2017, the plaintiff, Bruce Bonner, filed a three-count revised complaint for breach of contract, municipal estoppel, and fraud against the defendants, the City of New Haven (City) and Honorable Victor Bolden (Bolden). The revised complaint alleges the following facts. Bonner was a police officer for the New Haven Police Department and has since retired. Bonner had instituted a civil action against the City, which the City agreed to settle on May 16, 2014. Bolden was previously Corporation Counsel for the City and was involved in the settlement. As part of the settlement agreement, the City agreed to pay $58,000 to Bonner. This amount represented back pay for the period from July 2011 through May 30, 2014. The City and Bonner agreed that this amount would be applied to Bonner's pension earnings for 2013-2014. Despite the agreement, the Pension Board for the City failed to apply the amount to Bonner's pension because of a claimed calculation error and, instead, the amount was allocated to Banner's back pay period.
(June 28, 2016, Wilson, J.). On July 19, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite in defendant Bolden again, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-593, Connecticut's Accidental Failure of Suit statute. On August 4, 2016, the court, Wilson, J., granted the motion but noted that the plaintiff referred to the wrong statute and that it appeared the plaintiff intended to cite General Statutes § 52-592. On November 18, 2016, the defendants filed a request to revise. The plaintiff filed an objection on November 29, 2016. The court, Wilson, J., overruled the objection on December 14, 2016, thereby leading the plaintiff to file a revised complaint, now the operative complaint in the matter at hand. The original complaint was filed on December 10, 2015, and alleged two counts against the City of New Haven and Honorable Victor Bolden: breach of contract and municipal estoppel. On June 28, 2016, the court, Wilson, J., granted defendant Bolden's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground of insufficient service of process. Bonner v. New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-15-6058987-S
Bonner v. New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-11-6025382-S (May 16, 2014, Robinson, J.).
On April 12, 2017, the defendants collectively filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On June 9, 2017, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion. The matter was heard at short calendar on August 21, 2017. On August 25, 2017, the plaintiff filed a reply brief to defendants' cited cases during oral argument. On September 1, 2017, the defendants filed a reply brief to the plaintiff's supplemental brief.
DISCUSSION
" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014). " [I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d 578 (2016). " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
The defendants argue that because the plaintiff has alleged that he was materially misled as to the terms and/or conditions of the settlement agreement stemming from the prior litigation with the City, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because jurisdiction in a dispute about a stipulated judgment must be adjudicated in the underlying action. The defendants' position is that the plaintiff should have filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement or a motion to open the underlying matter and have a hearing on the terms of the agreement, rather than instituting a new action.
In response, the plaintiff makes two arguments. The first argument is a procedural one, taking issue with the exhibits attached to the motion by the defendants. The plaintiff's second argument is that the case relied on by the defendants for the proposition that jurisdiction over the matter is retained and is the exclusive domain of the underlying court that issued the judgment is misplaced.
I
ATTACHMENTS TO MEMORANDUM
The court will first address the plaintiff's argument that because the defendants improperly attached exhibits as supporting documents to their memorandum, this lack of compliance with Practice Book § 10-30 should result in a denial of the defendants' motion.
Practice Book § 10-30(c) states: " [The motion to dismiss] shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law and, where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record ." (Emphasis added.) When the motion to dismiss does not seek to introduce facts outside of the record, it admits all well-pleaded facts, the complaint being construed most favorably to the plaintiff. Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 227, 464 A.2d 45 (1983). A party seeking to go beyond the facts in the complaint must file an affidavit with their memorandum. Boyd v. Payne, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 362729 (April 9, 1990, Purtill, J.) (1 Conn. L. Rptr. 487, 487).
In the present case, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss and attached the following, which they purport to be from the underlying case: the public docket sheet, the motion for judgment with the stipulated agreement, and the order regarding the judgment by stipulation. There is no affidavit included with the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiff's amended complaint, however, in count one, states that the plaintiff and the City agreed to settle the underlying case. Am. Compl. P5. The allegation in that paragraph also provides the case title and docket number. Id.
As the settlement agreement in the underlying case is at issue before this court, and the case name and docket number are provided by the plaintiff in his amended complaint, the case title and docket number are facts apparent on the record. Therefore, the court takes judicial notice of the underlying case as a matter of public record. " The trial court has the power to take judicial notice of court files of other actions between the same parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hryniewicz v. Wilson, 51 Conn.App. 440, 444, 722 A.2d 288 (1999); see also McCarthy v. Warden, 213 Conn. 289, 293, 567 A.2d 1187 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 939, 110 S.Ct. 3220, 110 L.Ed.2d 667 (1990) (court took judicial notice of court files from prior proceeding between parties even though files not formally made part of record at trial). For these reasons, the plaintiff's procedural objection fails.
II
THE UNDERLYING ACTION ARGUMENT.
The defendants argue that jurisdiction in a dispute about a stipulated judgment must be adjudicated in the original underlying action. Citing to Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010), the defendants' position is that the plaintiff has failed to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement or a motion to open the underlying matter and have a hearing on the terms of the agreement. The plaintiff's counter argument is that the defendants' reliance on Valvo for that proposition is misplaced.
In Valvo, the Supreme Court looked at " whether a trial court presiding over an administrative appeal has the authority to overturn . . . orders issued by another trial court in a separate case, " and concluded it does not. Id., 543. The court continued that it was not aware of any " authority for the proposition that a trial court presiding over an administrative appeal may overturn a ruling by another trial court in an entirely unrelated case involving different parties . . ." (Emphasis in original.) Id. " Our jurisprudence concerning the trial court's authority to overturn or to modify a ruling in a particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic that it requires no citation of authority, that any such action will be taken only by the trial court with continuing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court with continuing jurisdiction is the court that originally rendered the ruling." Id., 543-44.
The plaintiff points out that there are key differences between the current case and Valvo, specifically noting that there was no breach of a settlement agreement in Valvo, and the present action is not an administrative appeal. The observation that the present matter involves a settlement agreement is important. " General Statutes § 52-212a . . . [establishes] the procedures for setting aside or opening judgments. [U]nless otherwise provided. by law . . . [a] civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months [following] the date on which it was rendered or passed . . . This rule applies to stipulated judgments as well as to judgments rendered upon controverted facts . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon v. Keiser, 22 Conn.App. 424, 426, 577 A.2d 1103 (1990).
In Solomon, the plaintiff focused on the opening phrase of § 52-212a, " [u]nless otherwise provided by law" and contended that " Connecticut law does otherwise provide for stipulated judgments." (Emphasis in original.) Solomon v. Keiser, supra, 22 Conn.App. 426. The Appellate Court stated that the plaintiff was correct and that " a stipulated judgment bears important distinctions from a judgment rendered following a trial of controverted facts. Instead of constituting a judicial determination of a litigated right, a stipulated judgment may be defined as a contract of the parties acknowledged in . . . court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . In addition, due to the contractual aspect of a stipulated judgment, it may be opened upon motion of one of the parties even after the four month period has elapsed but only if the movant can show that the judgment was obtained by fraud, duress, accident or mistake." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted." Id., 426-27. This court cannot open a judgment without a motion by one of the parties. See id., 427. Furthermore, " [a]lthough a stipulated judgment is in the nature of a contract, it is as conclusive as if it had been rendered as an adjudication on the merits of contested facts . . . Although the court has the power to issue orders necessary to protect the integrity of a stipulated judgment, it may not enlarge the scope of that judgment . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. Southport Manor Convalescent Center, 11 Conn.App. 530, 536-37, 528 A.2d 841 (1987). In other words, a court may issue orders to enforce a stipulated judgment, but it cannot alter or edit the stipulated judgment in any way without a party filing a motion to open.
In this case, no party has moved to open or enforce the judgment of the underlying matter. Following Solomon, stipulated judgments can be opened even after four months. But this does not say that stipulated judgments must be opened to address issues surrounding the creation of the stipulated agreement. Additionally, in Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 811, 626 A.2d 729 (1993), our Supreme Court held that " [a] trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous . . . Agreements that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in many situations enforceable by entry of a judgment in the original suit." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) " When parties agree to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the right to avoid a trial. The asserted right not to go to trial can appropriately be based on a contract between the parties . . . [A] trial court may summarily enforce a settlement within the framework of the original lawsuit as a matter of law when the parties do not dispute the terms of the agreement." {Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 812.
In Earth Technology, Inc. v. Fluor NE, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-07-5005595, (April 30, 2009, Stevens, J.), the court effectively analyzed Audubon and its applicability. The court stated: " Audubon was the first Connecticut case adopting the rule that an agreement resolving a civil action can be summarily enforced through a motion filed in the original case when the existence of the agreement is undisputed and the agreement's terms are clear and unambiguous. Audubon applied this rule in a case in which the agreement was placed on the record, there was no dispute that the agreement was unambiguous, and, as a consequence, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing . . . Furthermore, the Audubon holding has been applied when the parties contest the existence or the terms of the alleged settlement agreement, requiring the trial court to hold evidentiary hearings and make factual findings in order to resolve these issues . . . Consequently, as part of the disposition of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement, the court may consider whether the alleged non-complying party is asserting a bona fide legal basis for not consummating the agreement. See, e.g., Maharishi School of Vedic Sciences, Inc. (Connecticut) v. Connecticut Constitution Associates Ltd. Partnership, 260 Conn. 598, 799 A.2d 1027 (2002) (trial court properly enforced settlement agreement after rejecting plaintiff's claim that its secretary was without authority to execute it); Sicaras v. Hartford, 44 Conn.App. 771, 692 A.2d 1290, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916, 696 A.2d 340 (1997) (settlement agreement summarily enforced after court rejected plaintiff's claims that agreement was illusory and signed under duress).
Nevertheless, even though an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to resolve a summary enforcement motion, the nature of the evidentiary inquiry remains within the strictures of the Audubon holding. More specifically, the issues are whether a settlement agreement exists, whether its terms are undisputed, clear and unambiguous, and whether the nature of the parties' dispute allows summary enforcement. A motion to enforce a settlement agreement is not the same as an action for breach of contract precisely because of this limited nature and scope of an " Audubon" hearing. The ever increasing number of motions to summarily enforce settlement agreements appears to reflect litigants' failure to appreciate this difference . . . If summary enforcement is unavailable, a common-law breach of contract action is still available, where factual disputes not amenable to disposition in a summary enforcement proceeding may be adjudicated and the right to a jury trial may be preserved .(Emphasis added.) Earth Technology, Inc. v. Fluor NE, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-07-5005595.
In the present case, the plaintiff did not file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in the underlying case, however, he was not required to do so. The plaintiff filed a breach of contract action before this court, which pursuant to Earth Technology, Inc., is different than a motion to enforce. It is also worth noting that in the underlying case, the matter ended by a stipulated judgment entered by order from the court, Robinson, J., which called for money to be given to the plaintiff. In Connecticut, " a party obtaining a judgment for money damages . . . has two means to enforce that judgment; it may seek an execution of the judgment or it may initiate an independent action. See General Statutes § 52-598(a); see also 30 Am.Jur.2d 84, Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 47 (2005) (distinguishing between execution and action on judgment)." Inv. Assocs. v. Summit Assocs., 309 Conn. 840, 849, 74 A.3d 1192 (2013). Here, the plaintiff already received the $58,000. " As part of said settlement, the plaintiff Bonner was paid. . . $58,000 . . . by the defendant City . . ." (Emphasis added.) Am. Compl. P6. Moving to enforce the judgment would likely render the plaintiff the same result, and thus the plaintiff moved forward with the other option of initiating a separate breach of contract action.
The stipulated judgment may be defined as a " money judgment." 'Money judgment' means a judgment, order or decree of the court calling in whole or in part for the payment of a sum of money, other than a family support judgment . . ." General Statutes § 52-350a(13).
For the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that under Audubon, agreements that end lawsuits are contracts and can be enforceable in a subsequent suit. Also pursuant to Audubon, an agreement resolving a civil action can be enforced through a motion filed in the original action, but it is not required. Indeed, pursuant to Earth Technology, Inc., a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is not the same as an action for breach of contract, and because the plaintiff chose to file a separate action, summarily enforcing the settlement agreement is not before the court, and a breach of contract action is still available. As such, the plaintiff was not required to file a motion to reopen rather than filing a new action.
III
COLLATERAL ATTACK ARGUMENT
Lastly, an argument regarding collateral attack was mentioned during oral argument, and the parties subsequently discussed this issue in their briefs. From the court's independent research, " [a] 'collateral attack' on a judgment is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it . . . [A] collateral attack . . . is an attempt to impeach the validity or binding force of the judgment or decree as a side issue or in a proceeding instituted for some other purpose." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 49 Conn.App. 684, 688-89 n.5, 717 A.2d 246 (1998). In the present case, it does not appear that the plaintiff is attempting to avoid, defeat, or impeach the validity of the stipulated judgment. In fact, the plaintiff does not allege in his complaint that the stipulated judgment is invalid at all. To the contrary, the plaintiff is relying on the stipulated agreement as the basis for his cause of action sounding in breach of contract. As previously discussed, the plaintiff is able to bring a separate action for breach of contract pursuant to a settlement agreement.
In page two of the plaintiff's brief titled " Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Cited Cases During Oral Argument, " the plaintiff states the following: " The plaintiff in the instant case, Bruce Bonner, filed a lawsuit seeking damages for breach of settlement agreement and fraud. Bruce Bonner is not seeking a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, nor has he sought to 'overturn or to modify the ruling' in his previous cases against the City of New Haven. Bruce Bonner seeks to enforce that judgment, not set it aside." (Emphasis added.) Docket Entry No. 129. Furthermore, on page five of the same brief, the plaintiff states: " In the present case, plaintiff Bruce Bonner relies upon the prior (Stipulated) Judgment of the Superior Court as the basis for his cause of action sounding in breach of settlement agreement . . . and municipal estoppel." (Emphasis altered.) Id.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that jurisdiction in a dispute regarding a stipulated judgment must be adjudicated in the original underlying action is denied.