Bonilla v. Parole

7 Citing cases

  1. In re Young

    74 A.D.3d 1681 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 41 times

    The record demonstrates that the Board appropriately considered the statutory factors, including the nature of petitioner's crime and prior criminal history, as well as his positive program accomplishments and institutional record, expression of remorse, and his postrelease plans. While the Board emphasized the seriousness of the underlying crime, it was not obligated to accord equal weight to every relevant factor in rendering its determination ( see Matter of LaSalle v New York State Div. of Parole, 69 AD3d 1252, 1253, lv denied 14 NY3d 709; Matter of Bonilla v New York State Bd. of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070, 1071). Therefore, as that determination does not demonstrate "irrationality bordering on impropriety," we will not disturb it ( Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77; accord Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476).

  2. Cruz v. N.Y. State

    39 A.D.3d 1060 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 17 times

    We find petitioner's academic and institutional achievements exemplary. It would seem that he is a prime candidate for parole release. Yet, given the standard of review available to us, we cannot find that the Board's decision exhibits "`irrationality bordering on impropriety'" ( Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476, quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77). Clearly, the Board considered the appropriate statutory factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i, spanning from the seriousness of petitioner's crime to his lack of criminal history, nearly spotless prison disciplinary record, positive program accomplishments and postrelease plans ( see Matter of Mojica v Travis, 34 AD3d 1155, 1156; Matter of Marsh v New York State Div. of Parole, 31 AD3d 898). Yet, with the Board not required to give equal weight to those factors, and instead placing more emphasis on the serious nature of petitioner's crime, we are constrained to affirm ( see Matter of Bonilla v New York State Bd. of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070, 1071; Matter of Thompson v New York State Div. of Parole, 30 AD3d 746, lv denied 7 NY3d 716). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

  3. Cruz v. Stanford

    2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 33378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014)

    See Pearl v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner's incarceration as well as his prior criminal record. See Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268, Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 AD3d 1077, lv granted 23 NY3d 907 and Bonilla v. New York State Board of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070. Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b, effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall ". . . establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.

  4. Franklin v. New York State Bd. of Parole

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 32366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)

    Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner's incarceration. See Cody v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1141, lv den 8 NY3d 802, Bonilla v. New York State Board of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070 and Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908. Petitioner next asserts that the Parole Board's failure to consider the relevant sentencing minutes requires the reversal of the parole denial determination.

  5. In re Ernest v. New York State Div. of Parole

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 33454 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    Even were the argument preserved it would be unavailing. See Bonilla v. Board of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070. For all of the reasons cited above, petitioner's invocation of a "doctrine of cumulative effect of error" is misplaced and unavailing.

  6. In re McCants v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    In view of the above, the Court finds no bases to conclude that the parole board failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Bonilla v. New York State Board of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070, Lagarde v. New York State Division of Parole, 23 AD3d 876 and WanZhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, this Court is unable to conclude that the emphasis placed by the board on the violent nature of petitioner's crime represents irrationality bordering on impropriety.

  7. Matter of Oberoi v. Dennison

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 50569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)

    In view of the above, the Court finds no bases to conclude that the parole board failed to consider the final deportation order pending against the petitioner. See Bonilla v. New York State Board of Parole, 32 AD3d 1070, Lagarde v. New York State Division of Parole, 23 AD3d 876 and WanZhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.