(R. 24) This is a legitimate reason for discounting the weight to be accorded these records. SeeGiese v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 251 Fed. Appx. 799, 804 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that and ALJ is not obligated "to find evidence prior to the onset date to be relevant or probative"); Clayton v. Colvin, Civ. No. 14-400, 2014 WL 5439796, at * 7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2014) (stating that GAF scores assessed prior to the relevant time prior "are of limited relevance"), citing, Carmickle v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance."); Bonds v. Astrue, 2012 WL 4026561, at * 5 n. 4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2012) (finding that the ALJ did not err in ignoring evaluations that occurred prior to the alleged onset date); and Ingham v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1875651, at * 3 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) ("[M]edical opinions of any physician, treating or examining, which predate the alleged onset of disability are not considered substantial evidence."). Indeed, as set forth above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Masarik was not disabled prior to the day before he turned 50.
See Brooks v. Colvin, 1:11CV2124-SKO, 2014 WL 1270531, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (holding that medical evidence associated with a prior claim for benefits was relevant "to the extent it sheds light on plaintiff's longitudinal condition, treatment, and the severity of his condition over time"). However, while they can be considered, medical opinions that predate the alleged onset date are of limited relevance. Bonds v. Astrue, No. 2:11CV578, 2012 WL 4026561, at *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2012) (citing Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance.") report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:11CV578, 2012 WL 4017933 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2012)). To properly consider pre-onset evidence, an ALJ must acknowledge that the evidence predates the alleged onset date and explain the relevance to a plaintiff's disability claim.
Those scores are of limited relevance. See, e.g., McCormick v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1740712, at *6 (D. Del. April 30, 2010) (holding that the ALJ had not erred in failing to consider a GAF score of 42 because that score had been assessed eleven months prior to the alleged date of onset). See also Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Medical opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance."); Bonds v. Astrue, 2012 WL 4026561, at *5 n. 4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2012) (finding that the ALJ did not err in ignoring evaluations that occurred prior to the alleged onset date); Ingham v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1875651, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) ("[M]edical opinions of any physician, treating or examining, which predate the alleged onset of disability are not considered substantial evidence."). With respect to the GAF scores of 45 and 50 that were assessed during the relevant time period (or in sufficient proximity thereto), Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not specifically mention these two scores in her determination.