Bond v. Weller

13 Citing cases

  1. Paape v. Grimes

    256 Md. 490 (Md. 1970)   Cited 21 times
    In Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 260 A.2d 644 (1970), the Court overruled Smith v. Biddle, Lambdin v. Przyborowski, and similar cases "[t]o the extent that... [they]... imply that where a contract expressly provides for interest, the rate of interest must be specifically stated in order for the contract to be definite enough to be specifically enforced...."

    " (Emphasis added.) In Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 118 A. 142 (1922) the contract provided for a monthly installment of $58.34 and interest. Even though the provision for interest is similar to that in the instant case, the Court found the contract unenforceable because of vagueness in other of its provisions and accordingly did not discuss the use of the term and interest.

  2. Standard Homes v. Pasadena Co.

    147 A.2d 729 (Md. 1959)   Cited 25 times
    In Standard American Homes, the seller agreed to sell to the buyer certain lots in one development for $850 each and certain lots in another development for $800 each, and to convey the first six lots in each development without payment of the purchase price, but to accept instead such purchase money mortgage as would "allow the [buyer] to obtain a construction mortgage.

    Cf. Caplan v. Buckner, 123 Md. 590, 91 A. 481 (1914). See also Moore v. Modern Improvement Ass'n, 190 Md. 39, 57 A.2d 316 (1948); Gibbs v. Meredith, 187 Md. 566, 51 A.2d 77 (1947); Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 118 A. 142 (1922); Tarses v. Miller Fruit Produce Co., 155 Md. 448, 142 A. 522 (1928); Realty Improvement Co. v. Unger, 141 Md. 658, 119 A. 450 (1922). Also cf. Harris v. Kirshner, 194 Md. 139, 70 A.2d 47 (1949).

  3. Smith v. Biddle

    188 Md. 315 (Md. 1947)   Cited 23 times
    In Smith v. Biddle, 188 Md. 315, 52 A.2d 473 (1947), it was held that a contract which did not state how long a mortgage was to run or what rate of interest it was to draw was not enforceable.

    It was held that the term of the lease was an essential part of it and in the absence of any stipulation to that effect a court of equity cannot decree specific performance. See Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 118 A. 142; Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329; Gibbs v. Meredith, 187 Md. 566, 51 A.2d 77; Garbis v. Weistock, 187 Md. 549, 51 A.2d 154; Bank v. Hurst's Estate, 187 Md. 333, 50 A.2d 133; Doering v. Fields, 187 Md. 484, 50 A.2d 553. Evans testified that "the Mutual Benefit had passed the loan for $3,500.00."

  4. Gibbs v. Meredith

    187 Md. 566 (Md. 1947)   Cited 12 times
    In Gibbs v. Meredith, 187 Md. 566, 51 A.2d 77, it was held that if a contract is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would produce an absurd result and the other of which would carry out the purpose of the agreement, the latter construction should be adopted. Furthermore, as was said in Rocklin v. Eanet, 200 Md. 351, 357, 89 A.2d 572: "* * * a contract is not rendered unenforceable merely because the parties do not supply every conceivable detail or anticipate every contingency that may arise.

    Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329, 332. The lower court cited Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 118 A. 142, and Tarses v. Miller Fruit Produce Co., 155 Md. 448, 142 A. 522, in which contracts were held too indefinite to be specifically enforced. In Bond v. Weller the contract, after stating the purchase price and specifying that it was to be paid in certain instalments, provided that "A building association loan" was to be "secured" by the vendee and the balance was to be "carried" by the vendor "on a second mortgage with interest.

  5. Soehnlein v. Pumphrey

    37 A.2d 843 (Md. 1944)   Cited 40 times
    In Soehnlein v. Pumphrey, 183 Md. 334, at page 337, 37 A.2d 843, at page 845, it is said: "The rule has been adopted in this State that when time is expressly declared to be of the essence of a contract of sale, a court of equity will ordinarily not grant specific performance where the purchaser has failed to make payment within the time specified by the contract.

    To merit a decree of specific performance, a contract for the sale of land must be fair, reasonable, and certain in all its terms. Caplan v. Buckner, 123 Md. 590, 91 A. 481; King v. Kaiser, 126 Md. 213, 94 A. 780; Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 118 A. 142; Anshe Sephard Congregation v. Weisblatt, 170 Md. 390, 185 A. 107; Applestein v. Royal Realty Corporation, 180 Md. 274, 24 A.2d 684. Moreover, an oral contract will not be enforced unless the acts of part performance are proved by clear and satisfactory evidence, and refer unequivocally to the particular agreement alleged in the bill. Semmes v. Worthington, 38 Md. 298, 327; Reese v. Reese, 41 Md. 554; Hopkins v. Roberts, 54 Md. 312. It is our opinion (1) that the alleged agreement possesses the elements necessary to entitle complainants to the aid of equity, and (2) that the possession of the property by the purchaser, the payment of $2,017 on the purchase price, and the making of substantial improvements are acts of part performance sufficient to remove the contract from the operation of the Statute of Frauds.

  6. Applestein v. Royal Realty Corp.

    23 A.2d 684 (Md. 1942)   Cited 12 times
    In Applestein v. Royal Realty Corp., 180 Md. 274, 23 A.2d 684 (1942), the contract was held unenforceable on demurrer because the maturity date was ambiguous.

    " Wilentz v. Mechanik, 90 N.J. Eq. 269, 106 A. 371; 41 C.J. 849; 36 Am. Jur. 850, Sec. 324; Jones on Mortgages, 8th Ed., Vol. 3, 818, Sec. 2311. The case of Hartsock v. Mort, supra, was an action at law on a contract of sale and purchase, where the vendor had, after the contract was made, and before its consummation, sold the property, and on being sued by the vendee sought refuge behind the form of mortgage submitted by him. A case exactly like the one we have here has not been cited but the materiality of the uncertainty to which we have referred, and that is the time of maturity, seem to us to be supported in principle by the cases of Tarses v. Miller Fruit Produce Co., 155 Md. 448, 142 A. 522; Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 118 A. 142; and Fifer v. Hoover, 163 Md. 381, 163 A. 848. In the opinion of this court, because the times of maturity of the principal debt are equally capable of two meanings and constructions, the contract cannot be specifically enforced, without adopting one or the other, and so making a contract not clearly defined, its specific performance should not be decreed, and the decree appealed from should be reversed.

  7. Lambdin v. Dantzebecker

    181 A. 353 (Md. 1935)   Cited 27 times

    The surrounding circumstances enforce this construction of a paper writing which, in the opinion of the writer, expressed an intention without ambiguity. In accordance with the view here expressed, the writer, while concurring in other respects, does not agree with the conclusion of the court that the document was ambiguous nor, if it were, that parol evidence of the settlor's intention, of her instructions to the draftsman, or of her conception of the instrument's effect was admissible in evidence in aid of construction. Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.) sec. 2471, p. 408; Furness, Withy Co. v. Randall, 124 Md. 101, 106, 91 A. 797; Boswell v. Hostetter, 129 Md. 53, 56, 98 A. 222; Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 12, 118 A. 142.

  8. Fifer v. Hoover

    163 A. 848 (Md. 1933)   Cited 6 times
    In Fifer v. Hoover, 163 Md. 381, 163 A. 848, it was held that a contract to sell a business and stock in trade, with "a chattel mortgage as security for the unpaid purchase money," was enforceable in an action at law for breach, and that the mortgage was intended to cover the chattels conveyed.

    " 1 Williston on Contracts, sec. 37. The Maryland cases cited by the learned trial judge were either cases where specific performance was sought, as in Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 12, 118 A. 142; Tarses v. Miller Fruit Prod. Co., 155 Md. 448, 452, 142 A. 522; or where an injunction was prayed, as in Phoenix Pad Mfg. Co. v. Roth, 127 Md. 540, 544, 545, 96 A. 762, where it was said, in reference to definiteness of terms of contract, the same principles applied as in bills for specific performance; or where it was sought to explain a patent ambiguity by oral testimony, as in Castleman v. Du Val, 89 Md. 657, 660, 43 A. 821, and Merritt v. Peninsular Construction Co., 91 Md. 453, 463, 46 A. 1013. It might be that a court of equity would refuse specific performance if it reached the conclusion that it could not be determined from the written instrument what chattels the parties to the contract agreed should be included in the chattel mortgage referred to therein.

  9. Wagner v. Bing

    163 A. 199 (Md. 1932)   Cited 3 times

    sold and bought in gross at a fixed price, and that the vendors would convey according to their undertaking if the deed would convey the land of the vendors as shown and described on the plat. If the court were to interpolate in the terms of the written contract the clause that the sale was of a tract of "about seven and one-third acres at $3,000 per acre," the instrument would not thereby be rectified so as to express the real agreement of the parties on a material point; but would revive a rejected basis of sale. Thus the sale and purchase of the land, with all representations in respect to quantity, is found completely embodied in a single written instrument, and, therefore, all other utterances of the parties are legally immaterial and, so, inadmissible for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their contract. Wigmore on Evidence (2nd Ed.), secs. 2425, 2430, p. 289; Whitelock v. Whitelock, 156 Md. 115, 119, 143 A. 712; Brummel v. Realty Co., 146 Md. 56, 66, 125 A. 905; Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8, 118 A. 142; Rafferty v. Butler, 133 Md. 430, 432, 105 A. 530; Phoenix Pad Mfg. Co. v. Roth, 127 Md. 540, 545, 96 A. 762. In other words, any oral or other representation of the quantity of the subject-matter is superseded or extinguished by a subsequent written agreement in which the parties have expressly dealt with the matter of quantity.

  10. Scholtz v. Philbin

    145 A. 487 (Md. 1929)   Cited 5 times
    In Scholtz v. Philbin, 157 Md. 196, 198, 145 A. 487, it was held that an auctioneer's memorandum of sale of real estate, to which is attached a copy of the advertisement of sale containing the name of the agent making the sale and the name of the auctioneer, sufficiently identifies those named as the vendors to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

    That a court of equity can enforce only a definite, certain contract, with no material terms yet to be settled by the parties, is unquestionable. Bond v. Weller, 141 Md. 8; Tarses v. Miller Fruit Produce Co., 155 Md. 448; review of decisions 49 A.L.R. 1464. And here it is true that, if we are to presume an intention to have a deferred amount paid in instalments, then so far as the vendor is to have any choice in respect to the division into instalments, this form leaves the choice undetermined, and there is room for disagreement between the parties on that detail. Only the maximum limit of three years for credit is fixed, and payment by instalments is not mentioned.