Where the fault was technical, Rule 273 has not been applied and amendment has been allowed. We recognized this distinction in Bond v. Dunmire (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 802, 473 N.E.2d 78, 82. Plaintiffs go on to cite a First District case which held when two alternative grounds for dismissal were before a court and the court failed to state which it relied on in its order, the burden is on the party seeking to employ res judicata to show which the court relied on. In re Estate of Cochrane (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 812, 391 N.E.2d 35.

However, the fee is not absolute, but it is burdened with the offer of dedication which has been made but not accepted. 120 Ill. App.3d at 672. Plaintiff contends that, since Fernwood Drive was platted as a road, he has the right to have it remain open for his use and that of the public, regardless of whether the county accepted the offer of dedication. ( Bond v. Dunmire (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 811.) In Bond v. Dunmire, the court discussed at great length the case of Welter v. Eaton (1937), 366 Ill. 143.

SSA Foods, 105 Ill. App.3d at 427-28, 434 N.E.2d at 463-64. Likewise, in Bond v. Dunmire (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 473 N.E.2d 78, this court held that injunction was proper even though the plaintiff failed to state in his complaint that he had requested defendants to remove a barrier; that defendant had acted in violation of his rights; and that any damage or injury would be sustained by him if injunctive relief was not granted. Bond, 129 Ill. App.3d at 803, 473 N.E.2d at 83-84. • 4 Based upon the foregoing cases, we conclude plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts in their amended complaint to indicate irreparable injury.

Under both Illinois and federal law, a dismissal for failure to state of claim operates as a disposition on the merits for res judicata purposes. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n. 3 (citing Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947), and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)); Ryburn v. People, 811 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Bond v. Dunmire, 473 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Ill. 1984)).

Id. Moreover, our role is not to question the correctness of the previous judgment, but rather to determine if the judgment was a final adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that "final resolution of one suit is conclusive in a successor, whether or not that decision was correct); Johnson v. Panizzo, 664 F. Supp. 336, 341 n. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (explaining that the propriety of the substantive holding of the state court was not properly before the court because "under Illinois law claim preclusion applies without regard to whether the prior adjudication was correct or erroneous"); see also Bond v. Dunmire, 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 800 (1984) (explaining that res judicata operates irrespective of the correctness of the previous judgment). Under Rule 273, the involuntary dismissal issued on November 21, 2002 was an adjudication on the merits. Accordingly, all three elements of res judicata are satisfied.

Thus, but for state court judge's clearly improper ruling dismissing Johnson's entire lawsuit, including Johnson's claims under the federal civil rights statutes because of the statutory notice problem, this case would not be before us today. However, the propriety of the substantive ruling in the Will County suit is not properly before us because under Illinois law claim preclusion applies without regard to whether the prior adjudication is correct or erroneous. Bond v. Dunmire, 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 800, 84 Ill.Dec. 862, 866, 473 N.E.2d 78, 82 (4th Dist. 1984). Johnson's attorney should have filed an appeal to the Will County order and cannot now relitigate that issue. Therefore, defendants are left only with the argument that Johnson misapplies the Luker case to the present situation.

134 Ill.2d R. 273; Downing, 162 Ill.2d at 75. While the inclusion of " without prejudice" in an order signals the circuit court's intent to allow a plaintiff to refile an action (see Bond v. Dunmire, 129 Ill. App.3d 796, 802 (1984)), the inclusion of "with prejudice" in an order does not, alone, trigger Rule 273. The appellate majority next concluded that the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)), from which we derived Rule 273 ( Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill.2d 113, 125 (1978)), should control interpretation of our Rule 273. 286 Ill. App.3d at 35.

The City holds the title to streets in trust for the people. City of Chicago v. Rhine , 363 Ill. 619, 621, 2 N.E.2d 905 (1936) ; Bond v. Dunmire , 129 Ill. App. 3d 796, 807, 84 Ill.Dec. 862, 473 N.E.2d 78 (1984). A regulation of sales on the public way is a regulation of conduct, not speech.

¶ 18 Plaintiffs contend that the trial court's dismissal was effectively for stylistic reasons concerning the drafting of the complaint rather than for defects in the substance of the cause of actions asserted. They cite Bond v. Dunmire, 129 Ill. App. 3d 796, 804 (1984), which states: "Moreover, section 2-612(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a test for defects of substance where a pleading is attacked. [Citations.] According to this test, allegations of legal conclusions and allegations of evidence constitute merely formal defects and not defects of substance.

I recognize that plaintiff's complaint, with its attached survey, sufficiently alleges that the bushes and fences are unlawful encroachments in that they are within the public right-of-way. See Bond v. Dunmire, 129 Ill. App. 3d 796, 804 (1984) (motion to dismiss admits facts contained in exhibits to complaint). However, the complaint fails to sufficiently allege that the encroachments obstruct the road or make passage on the road unreasonably unsafe; it is undisputed that the bushes and fencing are within the road's unpaved right-of-way, and although plaintiff alleges that the encroachments "substantially reduc[e] * * * the space of the roadway that may be used for travel by motor vehicles," the survey actually shows that the fence does not intrude into the paved road at all and that just a few bushes even marginally extend over the paved roadway.