Opinion
KNLCV196041792S
01-03-2020
Edward Bona v. Donna Skaats et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Murphy, Shari A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (#104)
Murphy, J.
The defendants, Donna Skaats and Seaport Capital Partners, LLC move to dismiss the plaintiff’s eight-count complaint on the grounds that counts one, two, three and four are barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity, and further that counts five, six, seven and eight fail as a matter of law. For the forgoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to counts one, two, three, four, seven and eight, and denied as to counts five and six.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Edward Bona, acting self-represented, filed an eight-count complaint against the defendants, Donna Skaats (Skaats) and Seaport Capital Partners, LLC (Seaport Capital), which alleges the following facts. Around 2012, Skaats, an attorney acting during the scope of her representation of Seaport Capital, instituted nine foreclosure actions against the alleged mortgagor, Sheri Speer. The plaintiff was appointed as a receiver of rents in the civil receivership matters (Receivership Matters), pending before the New London Superior Court. The plaintiff alleges that, subsequent to ending his tenure as a receiver of rents in May of 2013, until present, the defendants made numerous statements orally and in writing to numerous individuals regarding the plaintiff’s conduct as a receiver. The plaintiff further alleges that Skaats improperly instituted Statewide Grievance Complaints against him without probable cause, which has exceeded the bounds of ordinary litigation in an attempt to harass and annoy the plaintiff.
In 2017, the Appellate Court later evaluated issues regarding the receivership and conducted a detailed factual history of the series of events between the parties. See Seaport Capital Partners, LLC v. Speer, 177 Conn.App. 1, 14, 171 A.3d 472 (2017), cert. denied, 331 Conn . 931, 207 A.3d 1052 (2019).
Counts one through four of the plaintiff’s complaint are against Skaats for libel, slander, libel per se and libel per quod, respectively. Specifically, count one alleges that Skaats accused the plaintiff of malfeasance that were both false and defamatory, in writing to others related to his handling of the Receivership Matters. In count two, the plaintiff alleges that Skaats has orally accused the plaintiff of malfeasance in connection with his conduct of the Receivership Matters to others, which were false, defamatory and damaging to his profession. In count three, the plaintiff alleges that Skaats’ statements, which form the basis of count one, became libelous upon her communication to the recipients of the statements. In count four, the plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs one through six of the allegations that form the basis of count one of his complaint. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that Skaats’ defamatory statements were made outside of litigating the Receivership Matters.
Count five of the plaintiff’s complaint is for abuse of process against Skaats and Seaport Capital. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Skaats, acting on behalf of Seaport Capital, has improperly instituted numerous filings after his tenure as receiver. Count six of the plaintiff’s complaint is for vexatious litigation, which alleges that the institution of Statewide Grievance Committee complaints against him was for the purpose of annoying, vexing and disturbing the plaintiff. Count seven of the plaintiff’s complaint incorporates the same underlying facts as counts one and two and alleges that Skaats’ alleged defamatory statements violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), pursuant to General Statutes § 42-110b. Count eight of the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendants were unjustly enriched by the plaintiff, as Seaport Capital continues to demand that the plaintiff work for free and to provide a benefit to the receivership without compensation. The plaintiff seeks damages, attorneys fees, costs and injunctive relief.
The plaintiff filed the eight-count complaint on July 10, 2019. The defendants filed the present motion to dismiss on August 15, 2019. The defendants’ motion to dismiss is accompanied by a memorandum of law. In response, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition. The defendants filed a reply on October 1, 2019. The matter was heard at short calendar on October 7, 2019.
The court notes that the plaintiff filed a request to amend and a corresponding amended complaint on October 7, 2019. The defendants objected to the plaintiff’s request to amend on October 22, 2019. Because the defendants challenge this court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s original complaint, the court is bound to resolve the jurisdictional issues prior to consideration of a motion to amend. See Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d 914 (1991) ("[b]y considering [a] motion to amend prior to ruling on [a] challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the court [acts] inconsistently with the rule that, as soon as the jurisdiction of the court to decide an issue is called into question, all other action in the case must come to a halt until such a determination is made").
DISCUSSION
"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ... Pleadings are to be read broadly and realistically rather than narrowly and technically." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Flanagan v. Blumenthal, 265 Conn. 350, 365-66, 828 A.2d 572 (2003). "[A] court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
I
COUNTS ONE, TWO, THREE AND FOUR: DEFAMATION
In the motion to dismiss, Skaats argues that counts one through four of the plaintiff’s complaint, specifically, libel (count one), slander (count two), libel per quod (count three) and libel per se (count four) must be dismissed because they are barred by the litigation privilege. In response, the plaintiff argues that the court should deny the motion to dismiss as to counts one and two because the claims are sufficiently plead and that the litigation privilege does not apply to fraudulent statements made outside of a courthouse.
"Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander: slander is oral defamation and libel is written defamation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394, 430 n.30, 125 A.3d 920 (2015). "[T]o establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff’s reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement ... A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." Id., 430-31.
"A libel per quod is not libelous on the face of the communication, but becomes libelous in light of extrinsic facts known by the recipient of the communication ... When a plaintiff brings an action in libel per quod, he must plead and prove actual damages in order to recover."
"Libel per se ... is a libel the defamatory meaning of which is apparent on the face of the statement and is actionable without proof of actual damages ... [L]ibel is actionable per se if it charges improper conduct or lack of skill or integrity in one’s profession or business and is of such a nature that it is calculated to cause injury to one in his profession or business."
As to counts one and two, the plaintiff argues in his opposition that absolute immunity does not attach to bar the defendants’ allegedly reckless and false statements. However, the plaintiff’s argument is misplaced, as absolute immunity protects these types of statements that are made in connection with a judicial proceeding. See
A
The Litigation Privilege
"It is well settled that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject of the controversy." Tyler v. Tatoian, 164 Conn.App. 82, 88, 137 A.3d 801, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 908, 135 A.3d 710 (2016). A statement is pertinent to the subject of a controversy when "the communication has some reference to the subject matter of the proposed or pending litigation, although it need not be strictly [pertinent] to any issue involved in it." Brown v. Shipman & Goodwin, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-16-5042827-S (June 14, 2017, Peck, J.). It is well settled that "the doctrine of absolute immunity concerns a court’s subject matter jurisdiction ... in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." Tyler v. Tatoian, supra, 164 Conn.App. 87.
Connecticut courts use the terms "absolute immunity," "litigation privilege," and "absolute privilege" interchangeably.
B
Scope of Privilege
"The general rule is that defamatory words spoken upon an occasion absolutely privileged, though spoken falsely, knowingly, and with express malice, [imposes] no liability for damages recoverable in an action in slander." Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 536, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). "More recently, however, our Supreme Court has expanded the scope of immunity afforded to statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding beyond defamation." Tyler v. Tatoian, supra, 164 Conn.App. 88. "[T]he privilege extends to judges, counsel and witnesses participating in judicial proceedings." Simms v. Seaman, supra, 537.
Connecticut courts have expanded the litigation privilege beyond defamation. See, e.g.,
"The [litigation] privilege applies also to statements made in pleadings or other documents prepared in connection with a court proceeding." Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 561-62. "The judicial proceeding to which [absolute] immunity attaches ... includes any hearing before a tribunal which performs a judicial function, ex parte or otherwise, and whether the hearing is public or not. It includes, for example, lunacy, bankruptcy, or naturalization proceedings, and an election contest. It extends also to the proceedings of many administrative officers, such as boards and commissions, so far as they have powers of discretion in applying the law to the facts which are regarded as judicial or quasi-judicial, in character." Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 84-85, 856 A.2d 372 (2004).
"In expanding the scope of the litigation privilege, however, our Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between attempting to impose liability upon a participant in a judicial proceeding for the words used therein and attempting to impose liability upon a litigant for his improper use of the judicial system itself ... In this regard, [Connecticut courts] have refused to apply absolute immunity to causes of action alleging the improper use of the judicial system." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler v. Tatoian, supra, 164 Conn.App. 88.
In the present case, the litigation privilege bars counts one, two and three of the plaintiff’s complaint for libel, slander, and libel per quod, respectively. The statements were made orally or in writing during the scope of Skaats’ representation of Seaport Capital, were made directly to a tribunal or in connection with the Receivership Matters. Furthermore, Skaats’ statements are relevant to the subject of the underlying litigation because the statements were made during the pendency and enforcement of court’s orders in the Receivership Matters. Therefore, because Skaats’ alleged defamatory statements were made in the course of a judicial proceeding, the doctrine of absolute immunity applies.
To the extent that the plaintiff’s allegations pertain to Skaats’ cooperation with the investigation of the grievance committee, Connecticut courts have concluded that a grievance proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding, in which the litigation privilege applies.
As to count four, for libel per se, the plaintiff alleges that Skaats made numerous defamatory statements outside the courts and the conduct of litigation. Connecticut courts, however, have expanded the doctrine of absolute immunity to preparatory communications through the final disposition of litigation. See Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 832, 925 A.2d 1030 (2007) ("[t]he scope of privileged communication extends not merely to those made directly to a tribunal, but also to those preparatory communications that may be directed to the goal of the proceeding"). Furthermore, Skaats’ statements were pertinent because the statements were made in furtherance of litigating the Receivership Matters enforcing the court’s judgments in those matters.
Additionally, the purpose of affording absolute immunity to counts one, two, three and four furthers the public policy rationale of the litigation privilege. "The purpose of affording absolute immunity ... is that in certain situations the public interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements." Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 539. "This objective would be thwarted if those persons whom the common-law doctrine was intended to protect nevertheless faced the threat of suit." Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 344, 927 A.2d 304 (2007). "[T]he privilege is ... to encourage robust representation of clients and to protect the vast majority of attorneys who are innocent of wrongdoing from harassment in the form of retaliatory litigation by litigants dissatisfied with the outcome of a prior proceeding." Simms v. Seaman, supra, 563. Moreover, attorneys are officers of the court and execute many of the court’s orders in furtherance of their client’s interests. Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans, 159 Conn.App. 343, 353, 123 A.3d 69 (2015). Consequently, attorneys would face a dilemma: refuse to execute orders of the court or execute orders and face retaliatory lawsuits. "[I]f absolute immunity is not available, attorneys may feel constrained in advocating for their clients because of fears that their legitimate conduct may be misinterpreted as wrongful by dissatisfied parties and thus give rise to future lawsuits." Simms v. Seaman, supra, 563 n.25. Therefore, public policies of redressing grievances and encouraging participation and candor in judicial proceedings would be frustrated.
Applying the litigation privilege to counts one, two, three and four serve the public interest in encouraging the defendants to enforce their rights in the nine foreclosure actions and to comply with the grievance committee’s investigations of the plaintiff’s alleged mishandling of funds in connection with those matters. To subject Skaats to civil liability for statements and filings made in furtherance of obtaining and enforcing Seaport Capital’s judgment against the plaintiff, does not align with the goals of affording absolute immunity to attorneys.
Accordingly, because the statements that form the basis of counts one, two, three and four of the plaintiff’s complaint are absolutely privileged, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them and the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to counts one, two, three and four is granted.
II
COUNT FIVE: ABUSE OF PROCESS
The defendants next move to dismiss count five for abuse of process against both Skaats and Seaport Capital. The defendants argue that the claim should still be dismissed as count five fails as a matter of law because the Receivership Matters were filed for the primary purpose of obtaining judgments of foreclosure. The plaintiff argues in response that the claim is adequately pleaded.
Connecticut courts have concluded that the litigation privilege does not bar abuse of process claims. See Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 495, 529 A.2d 171 (1987) ("an attorney may be sued for misconduct by those who have sustained a special injury because of an unauthorized use of legal process"); see also Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 546 (abuse of process claims are not barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity because "they challenge the underlying purpose of the litigation rather than an attorney’s role as an advocate for his or her client"). Therefore, because the litigation privilege does not bar abuse of process claims and the defendants assert no other jurisdictional defect or grounds upon which to dismiss the cause of action, the defendants’ motion to dismiss count five is denied.
"An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed ... [The] ... gravamen of the action for abuse of process is the use of a legal process ... against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed ... [T]he addition of ‘primarily’ is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The defendants, in arguing for dismissal of count five, admit that a claim for abuse of process falls outside the scope of absolute immunity. The defendants assert that the count fails to state a cause of action, which is more appropriately addressed by way of a motion to strike, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-39(a), which provides: "A motion to strike shall be used whenever any party wishes to contest: (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ..." Whereas, a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30 is "used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) insufficiency of process; and (4) insufficiency of service of process."
III
COUNT SIX: VEXATIOUS LITIGATION
The defendants next move to dismiss count six of the plaintiff’s complaint for vexatious litigation against both Skaats and Seaport Capital. The defendants argue that count six must be dismissed because it fails as a matter of law, as the primary purpose of filing the Receivership Matters was to obtain foreclosures and that Skaats was acting with the requisite probable cause.
Connecticut courts have concluded that the litigation privilege does not apply to claims for vexatious litigation. See Rioux v. Barry, supra, 283 Conn. 348-49 ("the requisite elements of the tort of vexatious litigation effectively strike the balance between the public interest of encouraging complaining witnesses to come forward and protecting the private individual from false and malicious claims. It is unnecessary and undesirable to extend the additional protection afforded by the doctrine of absolute immunity to defendants in vexatious litigation claims"). Therefore, because the litigation privilege does not bar vexatious litigation claims and the defendants assert no other jurisdictional defect or grounds upon which to dismiss the cause of action, the defendants’ motion to dismiss count six is denied.
"Vexatious litigation requires a plaintiff to establish that (1) the previous lawsuit or action was initiated or procured by the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice; (3) the defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff’s favor."
See footnote eleven of this memorandum.
IV
COUNT SEVEN: CUTPA
The defendant next moves to dismiss count seven of the plaintiff’s complaint for violation of CUTPA. The defendants argue that count seven fails because the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim is intended to dissuade Skaats’ robust and zealous representation of her client, Seaport Capital, in connection with her collection of rents allegedly mishandled by the plaintiff in the Receivership Matters. In response, the plaintiff argues that count seven establishes this court’s subject matter jurisdiction and that the defendant fails to acknowledge that attorneys may lie and defame their competition.
"To prevail on a CUTPA claim, the plaintiffs must prove that (1) the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce ... and (2) each class member claiming entitlement to relief under CUTPA has suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property ... [T]o be entitled to any relief under CUTPA, a plaintiff must first prove that he has suffered an ascertainable loss due to a CUTPA violation." (Citation omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 157 Conn.App. 139, 197, 117 A.3d 876, cert denied, 318 Conn. 902, 123 A.3d 882 (2015).
Connecticut courts have concluded that the litigation privilege is applicable to CUTPA claims. In Tyler v. Tatoian, supra, 164 Conn.App. 93-94, the Appellate Court held that the plaintiff’s CUTPA claims were privileged because the factual allegations of the claim arose out of the defendant’s communications made in a prior judicial proceeding for the defendant’s alleged mismanagement of a trust. Specifically, the court noted that a letter, which formed the factual basis of the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim, "was published in the course of, and was clearly pertinent to, a judicial proceeding." Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim is based on the same allegations that form the factual basis of counts one and two of the plaintiff’s complaint, which are barred by absolute immunity. Moreover, even if the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim did not re-incorporate statements that are absolutely privileged, the plaintiff’s allegations fall within the litigation privilege because they were made or published in connection with the Receivership Matters and the statements were pertinent to the outcome of obtaining the nine foreclosures.
In addition, the same policy consideration in ensuring candor and fairness in the judicial process leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim is barred by absolute immunity. Moreover, the policy interests in shielding Skaats, an attorney, from unwanted and retaliatory litigation weighs in favor of applying absolute immunity. Therefore, for the reasons stated herein, the defendants’ motion to dismiss count seven of the plaintiff’s complaint is granted.
V
COUNT EIGHT: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Lastly, Seaport Capital next moves to dismiss count eight of the plaintiff’s complaint for unjust enrichment. In its motion to dismiss, the defendants argue that count eight fails as a matter of law because the facts underlying the plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment pertain to the expansive motion practice in connection with the Receivership Matters. In response, the plaintiff argues that count eight is sufficiently pleaded and that Seaport Capital continues to force the plaintiff into additional work in retaliation of the "benefitted from hundreds of uncompensated hours of [his] time, and continues to arbitrarily force the plaintiff into additional makework to this very day ..."
"Unjust enrichment is a legal doctrine to be applied when no remedy is available pursuant to a contract ... Recovery is proper if the defendant was benefited, the defendant did not pay for the benefit and the failure of payment operated to the detriment of the plaintiff." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United Coastal Industries, Inc. v. Clearheart Construction Co., 71 Conn.App. 506, 512, 802 A.2d 901 (2002). "Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs’ detriment." Jo Ann Stores, Inc. v. Property Operating Co., LLC, 91 Conn.App. 179, 194, 880 A.2d 945 (2005).
Because Connecticut Appellate and Supreme courts have not yet addressed the question of whether the doctrine of absolute immunity applies to unjust enrichment claims, this court will undertake the balancing analysis uniformly used in Connecticut. "[W]hether and what form of immunity applies in any given case is a matter of policy that requires a balancing of interests ... a court considering whether absolute immunity is applicable is directed to consider ... the issues relevant to the competing interests in each case." MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 630-31, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). Some relevant interests include whether the underlying purpose of absolute immunity applies equally to the cause of action in question as it does to defamation and whether the elements of the cause of action in question provide the same level of protection against the chilling of a party’s statements as do the elements of vexatious litigation or abuse of process. Rioux v. Barry, supra, 283 Conn. 350-51.
Only one Superior Court has considered the issue of whether the litigation privilege applies to unjust enrichment claims. See
In the present case, the plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment is barred by the litigation privilege. Firstly, the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants used the legal process in order to accomplish a goal for which it was not designed, to make an unjust enrichment claim similar to an abuse of process or vexatious claim, but rather he seeks monetary relief as a result of Seaport Capital’s attempt to enforce judgments entered against him for unaccounted monies in the Receivership Matters. Furthermore, to the extent that the factual basis of the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim relies on Seaport Capital’s attempt to recover monies, via motions in the Receivership Matters and other filings, such conduct falls squarely within the litigation privilege. An attorney’s mere attempt to enforce a judgment entered against the plaintiff and in a furtherance of her client’s interests is conduct that the litigation privilege seeks to protect, statements or conduct made by an attorney in furtherance of her client’s interests.
In balancing the policy considerations, the plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment stemming from the defendants’ alleged conduct during the judicial proceeding is barred by absolute immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to counts one, two, three, four, seven and eight of the plaintiff’s complaint, as it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Bruno v. Travelers Companies, supra, 172 Conn.App. 729. The defendants’ motion to dismiss as to counts five and six is hereby denied.
Lega Siciliana Social Club, Inc. v. St. Germaine, 77 Conn.App. 846, 852, 825 A.2d 827 (2003).
Mercer v. Cosley, 110 Conn.App. 283, 295 n.9, 955 A.2d 550 (2008).
Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 536 ("[t]he general rule is that defamatory words spoken upon an occasion absolutely privileged, though spoken falsely, knowingly, and with express malice, impose no liability for damages ...") (Emphasis added.)
See Bruno v. Travelers Co., 172 Conn.App. 717, 719 n.2, 161 A.3d 630 (2017).
Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 562 (common-law fraud); Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 350-51, 927 A.2d 304 (2007) (intentional interference with contractual or beneficial relations); Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 255, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Tyler v. Tatoian, supra, 164 Conn.App. 93-94 (fraud and CUTPA).
See Cohen v. King, 189 Conn.App. 85, 90, 206 A.3d 188 (2019) ("a grievance proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature").
Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 495, 529 A.2d 171 (1987).
Rioux v. Barry, supra, 283 Conn. 347.
Mandell v. Dolloff, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-19-5059374-S (Aug. 5, 2019, Shapiro, J.T.R.) 49. Upon balancing the policy considerations of the facts in Mandell, the court held that the policy considerations weighed against applying absolute immunity to bar the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim because the risk "[t]hat some bidders for property may be deterred from bidding by the potential threat of a claim for unjust enrichment appears to be unlikely ... [and] [t]he risk of a chilling effect caused by the potential threat of litigation is de minimis and would potentially arise in a limited number of situations." Here, the factual scenario as alleged is distinguishable because the allegations include demands within the ordinary course of the Receivership Matters and the likelihood of the potential threat of litigation for enforcing court orders is higher.