See City of San Antonio v. Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 360 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 967, 83 S.Ct. 1093, 10 L.Ed.2d 131 (1963); El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.Civ.App. โ El Paso 1962, no writ); Kingsville Ind. School Dist. v. Crenshaw, 164 S.W.2d 49 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.). See also Bolton v. City of Waco, 447 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Plaintiffs would apparently have us read decisions to this effect as establishing the proposition that the city council can unilaterally determine that the city charter is illegal and hence provide, without a referendum, for a council composition and method of election different than that specified in the charter.
Other public bodies, acting through their governing authorities, have employed the short cut to alienation approved in these decisions and have had their acts approved by the courts. See El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.Civ.App. El Paso 1962, no writ); City of San Antonio v. Congregation of the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 360 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1962, writ ref. n.r.e.) cert. den. 372 U.S. 967, 83 S.Ct. 1093, 10 L.Ed.2d 131; McCarthy v. City of Houston, 389 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref. n.r.e.); Bolton v. City of Waco, 447 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1969, writ ref. n.r.e.). Appellants argue that Article 1019, requiring approval by the electorate before park land may be sold by a city, was not made an issue before the court of civil appeals in Kingsville, and therefore subsequent action of the Supreme Court on application for writ of error leaves the issue undecided.
Section 253.001 does not apply to a lease of land, nor does it apply to a municipality's conveyance of parkland to an entity that has the power of eminent domain, such as a school district. See Walker v. City of Georgetown, 86 S.W.3d 249, 257-58 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied) (finding that section 253.001 does not apply to the lease of land); Bolton v. City ofWaco, 447 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding that section 253.001 does not apply to a conveyance to an entity with eminent-domain powers); accord City of San Antonio v. Congregationof Sisters of Charity, 360 S.W.2d 580,582-83 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); ElPaso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1962, no writ); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. ยง 11.155(a) (Vernon 2006) (authorizing a school district to exercise eminent-domain powers). Section 253.001 thus is not relevant to any of the issues you raise.
See Kingsville Independent School District v. Crenshaw, 252 S.W.2d 1022 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1943, writ ref'd) (adopting in full the opinion in Kingsville Independent School District v. Crenshaw, 164 S.W.2d 49 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd w.o.m.)); El Paso County v. City of El Paso, 357 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1962, no writ). See also Bolton v. City of Waco, 447 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinions H-1256 (1978); H-108 (1973); H-93 (1973). We conclude, however, that TSTI does not have the power of eminent domain.
With respect to your question on the impact of article 1019, V.T.C.S., we have concluded that it has no effect. Although that statute speaks to the abandonment of city streets and provides that no part of a street is to be closed until the question of closing it is submitted to the voters of the city, governing bodies with the power of eminent domain need not secure the consent of an electorate to obtain property they need for public purposes. Bolton v. City of Waco, 447 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); San Antonio v. Congregation of Sisters of Charity, 360 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) cert. denied ( 372 U.S. 967). See Austin Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1973). Midland County possesses the power to condemn public property needed for courthouse purposes and could seek to condemn the right-of-way.
Riley v. South Carolina State Highway Department, supra. Where a city has the right to condemn public property this right will not be defeated by the fact that the right is being exercised to facilitate the violation of restrictive covenants in a deed. Bolton v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 447 S.W.2d 718 (1969) (application for writ of error refused, no reversible error). In any event, the City is not disclaiming the trust.